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I only want to say 
If there is a way 
Take this cup away from me for I don't want 
to taste its poison 
Feel it burn me, I have changed I'm not as sure 
As when we started 
Then I was inspired 
Now I'm sad and tired 
Listen surely I've exceeded expectations 
Tried for three years seems like tnirty 
Could you ask as much from any other man? 
But if I die 
See the saga through and do the things you ask of me 
Let them hate me hit me hurt me nail me to their tree . . . 
Why I should die 
Would I be more noticed than I was ever before? 
Would the things I've said and done matter any more? 
• • • 
Can you show me now that I would not be killed in vain? 
Show me just a little of your omnipresent brain 
Show me there's a reason for your wanting me to die 
You're far too keen on where and how and not so hot on why 
• • • 
Then I was inspired 
Now I'm sad and tired 
After all I've tried for three years seems like ninety 
Why then am I scared to finish what I started 
What you started--! didn't start it 
God thy will is hard 
But you hold every card 
I will drink your cup of poison, nail me to the cross 
and break me 
Bleed me beat me kill me take me now--
before I change my mind 
1.1.i 
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THI:: NATURE. OF THE STUDY 
James Murphy, in a recent review of .books exploring "the new rhetoric, 11 
closed his remarks with an apt "bemoanment": "Like the man drinking the 
tidal wave through a straw, we have to make up our minds shortly or we 
will drown in a sea of data. Whether we build a boat to solve the prob-
lem, or grow wings, or make a bigger straw ••• the present situation 
cannot long continue." 1 We have seen or heard of rhetorics based in such 
a variety of fields that one is hard-pressed to imagine comprenending all 
of them, much less sorting through them to attempt a synthesis of various 
of these "new rhetorics" into a unified approacn. Yet, in tne face of 
this multi-grounded renewal of theorizing aoout rhetoric we come across 
the paradoxical complaint of Richard Ohmann: II . . . rnetoricians have 
lately taken to using the phrase 'new rhetoric' as if it had a reference 
like that of the word 'horse,' rather than that of the word 'hippogriff. •112 
Pernaps, tnough, these two statements are not as paradoxical as tney 
seem at first glance. The past few years have witnessed an explosion of 
theorizing about tne nature of rhetoric. The Aristotelian system has 
been challenged, reaffirmed, and challenged anew. Many writers pursue 
1
James J. Murphy, "Today's Rhetoric--The Searches for Analogy," 
Quarterly Journal~ Speech, LIV (1968), p. 170. 
2Richard Ohmann, "In Lieu of a New Rhetoric," Contemporary Theories 
of Rhetoric: Selected Readings, ed. Richard L. Johannesen (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1971), p. 64. 
l 
their own paths with little regard for an attempt at integrating their 
views with those of other writers. Further, very few writers take the 
2 
time or the effort to present a fully developed explanation of the theore-
tical ground from which they work. If such incomplete scholarship abounds, 
we probably do have on our hands an (undefined) hippogriff rather than a 
(clearly defined) horse. 
We need now to draw back from the battle and see what we have done 
so that future growth in the field may proceed on a stronger understanding 
of the groundwork of rhetoric. As Otis M. Walter has suggested, "We must 
uncover the starting points, the assumptions, the presuppositions of 
ancient and modern rhetorics if we are to understand the nature of our 
predecessors and to glimpse the revolutionary quality of rhetoric and if, 
indeed, we are even to see rhetori'c clearly. 113 Such starting points are 
"sometimes logically necessary prerequisites, assumptions, or presupposi-
tions on which the rhetorical system itself rests. 114 
THE PROBLEM FOR STUDY 
This study cannot alone hope to arrest the tidal wave of which 
Murphy spoke, but it can begin to construct the dike which could deaden 
the force of the water. The study seeks to investigate one of the "new 
rhetorics," that stemming from the "symbolic interactionists'" position 
in social psychology and sociology. This perspective seems to be broad 
enough in scope to adequately explain most human rhetorical behavior. 
3otis M. Walter, "On Views of Rhetoric, Whether Conservative or 
ProgNssi ve," Contemporary Theories 2£_ Rhetoric: Selected Readings, 
ed. Richard L. Johannesen (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), P• 30. 
4Ibid. , p • 2 7. 
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Three basic goals are implicit in the investigation of this "new 
rhetoric": First, the literature of the symbolic interactionists will 
be studied in an attempt to condense their ideas which can lay the ground-
work for rhetorical theory; second, an attempt will be made to draw from 
symbolic interaction theory implications for rhetorical theory. Specifi-
cally, I shall be concerned with finding those elements of human social 
behavior which are peculiarly rhetorical. Third, I will examine this 
theory of rhetoric in terms of its application as a social force in human 
interaction. In short, this study could be classified as an exercise in 
explanatory or integrative thoory b11ilding, in that it aims to draw from 
the ideas developed for one field in order to re-direct and clarify the 
ideas in another. 
DESIGN OF THE STUDY 
For any theory of rhetoric to be complete and fully useful it must 
be based upon sound philosophical groundwork. Further, for the students 
of rhetoric to fully understand their subject, they must first understand 
its philosophical bases. Therefore, one of the primary charges of this 
study is to explicate the philosophical position of the symbolic inter-
actionists. Richard L. Johannesen has suggested the questions which such 
a philosophical inquiry should attempt to answer: 
With respect to any specific theory of rhetoric, a 
philosophy of that theory would explore at least the 
following questions: (1) What is the nature of reality 
and knowledge embodied in the theory? (2) What is the 
nature of meaning and language? (3) What is the nature 
of man and what are his uniquely human characteristics? 
Is man .!2!_ rhetorical animal by virtue of his unique 
symbol-manipulation capacity? (4) What is the personal, 
cultural, and societal role of rhetoric? (5) What 
ethical system explicitly or implicitly relates to the 
theory? (6} What definition of rhetoric does the 
theory present? What is the essential nature of 
rhetoric?5 
4 
This work is designed to answer most of these questions directly (quite 
probably, question five will be answered only by implication}--to uncover 
 the philosophical underpinnings of what we may for the moment "ambiguously" 
call a "symbolic interactionist's rhetoric." 
Introduction !2_~ Symbolic Interactionists' Perspective 
The perspective from which this study will view rhetoric is termed 
"symbolic interaction." It is a perspective which has quietly worked its 
way into rhetorical theory through the writings of Kenneth Burke. But 
Burke has not proclaimed himself a symbolic interactionist, nor has he 
ever explicitly spelled out the principles of symbolic interaction. And, 
he is not alone. The literature of the speech field is astoundingly 
barren of any direct description of symbolic interaction theory. In the 
next few chapters such a direct explication of the ideas of the symbolic 
interactionists will be developed. The purpose of these chapters is 
twofold: to acquaint the reader with a theory of social action which has 
numerous implications for rhetoric and to provide the answers to several 
of Johannesen's questions. In preparation for those chapters, an orien-
tation to this perspective seems in order. 
"The term 'symbolic interaction' refers, of course, to the ••• 
character of interaction as it takes place between human beings. 110 
5Richard L. Johannesen, "Editor's Introduction," Contemporary 
Theories .2£. Rhetoric: Selected Readings (New York: Harper and Row, 
1971), pp. 2-3. 
6Herbert Blumer, "Society as Symbolic Interaction," Symbolic 
Interaction: A Reader in Social Psychology, eds. Jerome G. Manis 
and Bernard N.-Meltzer (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1967), p. 139. 
5 
In this way Herbert Blumer beings an explanation of the perspective of 
the symbolic interactionist. Though the theory of symbolic interaction 
has its roots deeply imbedded in the work of George Herbert Mead, Robert E. 
Park, and John Dewey, it was Blumer who first coined the term "symbolic 
interaction. 117 In his 1969 book he reveals some dissatisfaction with the 
term itself, maintaining that it is a "somewhat barbaric neologism that 
I coined in an offhand way ••• The term somehow caught on and is now in 
general use. 118 
But despite his regret over the term he chose, he and many other 
social theorists maintain that the symbolic interactionists' perspective 
is a viable one which can more adequately explain human conduct than can 
other theoretical thrusts. Part One of the present study is designed to 
present a systematic explanation of the basic assumptions of symbolic 
interactionism. It is well, then, that we should now pave the way for 
these chapters with a brief statement of the elements included in this 
perspective. 
At base, the distinguishing feature of the symbolic interactionists' 
position regarding human conduct 
consists in the fact that human beings interpret or 
"define" each other's actions instead of merely re-
acting to each other's actions. Their "response" is 
not made directly to the actions of one another but 
instead is based on the meaning which they attach to 
such actions. Thus, human interaction is mediated ~y 
the use of symbols, or interpretation• or by ascertain-
ing the meaning of one another's actions. 9 
7see Herbert Blumer, "Social Psychology," Man and Society. ed. 
Emerson P. Schmidt (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1938):--
8Herbert Blumer, Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective ,!!!Si Method 
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), p. 1. 
9Blumer, "Society as Symbolic Interaction," p. 139. 
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Examination of a series of statements made by three of the current pro-
ponents of symbolic interactionism will explain more fully the several 
implications of this basic definition. 
Blumer claims that symbolic interactionism can be reduced, in essence, 
to three simple premises: 
The first premise is that human beings act toward 
things on the basis of the meanings that the things 
have for them. Such things include everything that 
the human being may note in his world ••• The second 
premise is that the meaning of such things is derived 
from, or arises out of, the social interaction that 
one has with one's fellows. The third premise is that 
these meanings are handled in, and modified through, 
an interpretative process used by the person in dealing 
with the things he encounters.10 
More specifically, we first encounter the importance of a system of 
symbols, or a language, in the symbolic interactionists' approach to human 
conduct. Garretson writes: 
The general theory of symbolic interaction, specifically 
self theory, is focused upon the importance of language 
as an instrument of definition and couununication. 
People are seen as responding not directly to a resistant 
outer reality but to meanings of objects which are 
defined within a cultural system and social organiza-
tion.11 
The centrality of language as an instrument of definition and mediation 
was first realized by Mead. As Blumer notes, Mead distinguished symbolic 
from non-symbolic interaction. 
In non-symbolic interaction human beings respond 
directly to one another's gestures or actions; in 
symbolic interaction they interpret each other's 
lOB1wner, Symbolic Interactionism, P• 2. 
llwynona Smutz Garretson, "The Consen~ual D~finition of Social 
Objects" Symbolic Interaction: A Reader in Social Psychology, eds. 
Jerome G. Manis and Bemard N. Meltzer (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 
1967), p. 337. 
gestures and act on the basis of the meaning yielded 
by the interpretation. An unwitting response to the 
tone of another's voice illustrates non-symbolic 
interaction. Interpretating the shaking of a fist as 
signifying that a person is preparing to attack 
illustrates symbolic interaction. 12 
7 
Mead's emphasis of the importance of language as a mediating factor 
in human conduct implies yet another important element of symbolic inter-
action theory. As explained by Blumer, man does interpret reality through 
internal processes before reacting to it: 
••• individual action is a construction and not a 
release, being built up by the individual through 
noting and interpreting features of the situations 
in which he acts; ••• group or collective actions, 
brought about by the individuals' interpreting or 
taking into account each other's actions.13 
The continuous interpretation which an individual places on his 
\, 
social situations implies, further, that human interaction is a develop-
mental process, not a series of relatively isolated events. Human group 
life has the "character of an ongoing process--a continuing matter of 
fitting developing lines of conduct to one another." As this process 
of definition and interpretation operates, it both "sustain.l!f estab-
lished patterns of joint conduct and ••• open.l!f them to transforma-
tion.1114 
Process I in tum I brings to light the importance of time dimensions. 
As an individual interprets his current situation and attempts to project 
an effective response to it he naturally calls up memories of past 
12Herbert Blumer 1 "The Sociological Implications of the Thought 
of George Herbert Mead," American Journal .2£. Sociology, 71 (1966) 1 
p. 537. 
13Blumer, "Society as Symbolic Interaction," p. 142. 
14Blumer, "Sociological Implications," p. 538. 
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experience. Thus , both past and future are considered critical to the 
conduct of present actions by symbolic interactionists. And, as Rose 
argues, "the relation of experience and behavior is seen as highly 
complex." Further, in his past experiences man has developed a concept 
of himself, a concept which influences all his present actions: 
• • • because a person can never "unlearn" something--
although he can drastically modify the learning ("relearn 
it" )--and because the conception of self is the most 
important meaning for man's behavior, a concept of 
self once learned affects an individual's behavior 
throughout his life.15 
Finally, for present purposes, for the symbolic interactionists man 
is the determiner of his own actions. Outside forces may help to shape 
his actions, but he makes the final determination of which courses to 
follow. At base, this begins the theory of human action for these social 
analysts. They draw a clear distinction between motion and action, 
I 
claiming that man is an actor. He does not "move" in automatic response 
to stimuli; rather, he acts after mediating the stimuli and critically 
choosing from among a number of possible responses. Blumer couches this 
idea in terms of the importance of the individual and society (a stimulus 
field) in determining particular actions: 
First, from the standpoint of symbolic interaction the 
organization of a human society is the framework inside 
of which social action takes place and is not the 
determinant of that action. Second, such organization 
and changes in it are the product of the activity of 
acting units and not of "forces" which leave such 
acting units out of account.16 
15Arnold Rose, "A Systematic Summary of Symbolic Interaction 
Theory," in his Human Behavior and Social Processes (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1962)-:--;p. 17-18. 
16Blumer, "Society as Symbolic Interaction," p. 146. 
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This listing of the elements included in symbolic interaction theory 
is not intended to be exhaustive. Other features could surely be included 
in a more comprehensive analysis. 17 All that is intended here is to 
provide an introduction to some of the more basic elements of the theory 
so that the reader may begin to get a flavor of the direction symbolic 
interactionists take in their analysis of human conduct. It is a theory 
which purports to be capable of critically examining most any form of 
human symbolic endeavor, embracing equally well--as .Blumer maintains--
usuch relationships as cooperation, conflict, domination, exploitation, 
consensus, disagreement, closely knit identification, and indifferent 
concern for another. 1118 If the theory can, indeed, cover the full range 
of human association then it must surely contain the groundwork for a 
theory of rhetoric. 
Source Materials 
The wide range of sources available to the student of rhetoric 
interested in studying symbolic interaction theory must surely approach 
infinity--or so it seems to this student. Not only does the student 
have available to him the rich resources of the psychologists and 
sociologists who have developed the symbolic interaction perspective and 
the several books and articles now being written about the "new rhetoric," 
but there are numerous secondary sources providing excellent commentaries 
and critiques of the primary sources. 
17ror a more complete listing of the elements involved in this 
theory see Rose, "Systematic Sununary." 
18B1umer, "Sociological Implications," P• 538. 
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Most basic to this study are the writings of Kenneth Burke, for they 
touch on both symbolic interactionism and rhetoric. In a way, they make 
up the heart of this study because they, at least indirectly, bridge the 
gap between the two fields. Burke has written more words than most of us 
would care to count. Eight of his books have at least an inairect bearing 
upon either symbolic interaction or' rhetoric. Of tnose, five books are 
of great value to this study: Counter-Statement ,19 ! Grammar E.t_ Motives, 20 
Language Symbolic Action, 21 Permanence ~Change, 22 and A Rhetoric 
Motives.23 In addition, Stanley Edgar Hyman has edited two books containing 
some relevant Burke writings: Perspectives Incongruity,24 and Terms 
Order. 25 
Burke's writings, however, are far from clear. His mind is active 
and complex, but it is not especially systematic. William Rueckert has 
made what might be termed the understatement of the decade regarding 
Burke's works: "Nothing is ever merely simple in Burke.1126 Therefore, 
19Kenneth Burke, Counter-Statement (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1968). 
2°Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (ilerkeley: University of 
California Press, 1969T. -
2¼nneth Burke, L~uage !:!. Symbolic Action (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1966. 
22 Kenneth Burke, Permanence and Cnange (Indianapolis: The .Bo.obs-
Merrill Company, Inc., 1965). 
23Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1969T. -
24stanl.ey Edgar Hyman, ed., Perspectives~ Incongruity (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1964). 
25stanl.ey Edgar Hyman, ed. 1 Terms Order (Bl.oomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1964). 
26will.iam Rueckert, Kenneth liurke Drama of Human Relations 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota rress, 19b3), p. 137. 
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the help of several writers who "translate" Burke's ideas has been grate-
fully received. Among them is William Rueckert who has written one 
brilliant book and edited another: Kenneth Burke and the Drama of human --------- -
Relations27 and Critical Responses to Kenneth Burke, 1924-1966.28 While 
Rueckert approaches Burke from the standpoint of literary criticism, Hugh 
Dalziel Duncan views Burke's works from the standpoint of sociology. Most 
directly influenced by Burke is Duncan's Communication ,2_ Social Order. 29 
Equally helpful in studying Burke, but not so directly influenced by nim, 
is Duncan's Symbols,!.!!. Society. 30 It should be noted that Duncan is more 
than an interpreter of Burke--he is a sound social theorist in his own 
right, and his books and articles are firmly grounded in the perspective 
of symbolic interaction. 
A few basic sources containing an amazing quantity of information 
can serve to acquaint the student with symbolic interaction. Specifi-
cally, there are three books of collected readings which are of particular 
value: Human Behavior~ Social Processes, edited by Arnold Rose;31 
Symbolic Interaction: Reader _m Social Psychology~ edited by Jerome G. 
27Ibid. See entire book. 
28William Rueckert, ed., Critical Responses~ Kenneth Burke, 
{Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1969). 
29Hugh Dalziel Duncan, Communication and Social Order (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1962). -
3OHugh Dalziel Duncan, Symbols !P_ Society (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1968). 
31Arnold Rose, ed., Human Behavior and Social Processes (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1962). 
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Manis and Bernard N. Meltzer; 32 and Social Psychology Through Symbolic 
Interaction, edited by Gregory P. Stone and tlarvey A. Faroerman. 33 
In addition, Herbert Blumer's recent Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective 
Method34 provides a good basic explanation of the field from the 
point of view of its foremost current proponent. Finally, two compre-
hensive articles contained in the collected readings texts give excellent, 
concise statements regarding the basic positions and goals of the symbolic 
interactionist: Herbert Blumer's "Society as Symbolic Interaction,1135 
and Arnold Rose's "A Systematic Summary of Symbolic Interaction Theory.1136 
For the student interested in a full understanding of symbolic inter-
actionism several of George Herbert Mead's works are of some importance, 
since Mead is generally recognized as the first to systematically develop 
many 1of the ideas that these theorists now hold. Three Mead books are 
of particular relevance: ~. §!.!!_1 Society• 37 Philosophy 
Present; 3B and Philosophy .2£. !!!!_ ~- 39 Beyond these works 1 
32Jerome G. Manis and Bernard N. Meltzer, eds. , Symbolic Interaction: 
~Reader!!!_ Social Psychology (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1967). 
33&regory P. Stone and Harvey A. Farberman, eds. , Social Psychology 
Through Symbolic Interaction (Waltham, Mass.: Ginn-Blaisdell, 1970). 
34Blumer , Symbolic Interactionism. 
35Blumer, "Society as Symbolic Interaction." 
36Rose, "Systematic Summary." 
37George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self, and Society (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press,~7):-- -
38George Herbert Mead 1 The Philosophy of the Present (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago P:res's, 1932). - -
39George Herbert Mead, Philosophy .2!, !£! (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1938). 
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two books of selected Mead readings contain additional writings, plus 
condensed and edited versions of some of the more critical sections of 
the former three books: Selected Writings: George her.bert Mead40 and 
George Herbert 2!_ Social Psychology. 41 Additional help is availa.ole 
to the student in interpreting and evaluating Mead's work in the form of 
books and articles about Mead's ideas. Paul Pfuetze's ~• 8ociety, 
E • 42 • . . • f d xistence 1.s a particularly incisive treatment o Mea. Maurice 
Hatanson's Social Dynamics E!._ George Herbert Mead43 does a good Job 
of explaining Mead's views of society. Further, two articles provide a 
clear capsulization of Mead's basic views of social intercourse: Herbert 
Blumer' s "Sociological Implications of the Thougnt of George herbert 
Mead,1144 and Bernard N. Meltzer's article, "Mead's Social Psychology. 1145 
The literature currently available in regard to the "new rhetoric" 
is also quite extensive, though not all of it is directly concerned with 
the symbolic interactionists' views. Daniel Fogarty's Roots !2E. .!. !!!!!. 
40Andrew Reck, ed., Selected Writings: George Heroert Mead 
(Indianapolis: The Hobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1964). -
41Anselm Strauss, ed. , George her.bert on ~ocial Psychology 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, l9b4J. 
42P~ul E. Pfuetze, Self, Society 1 and Existence (New York: Harper 
& Brothers, 1954). - -
43Maurice Natanson, The Social Dynamics ot George Herbert Mead 
(Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1956). -
44Blumer, "Sociological Implications." 
45Bernard N. Meltzer, "Mead's Social Psychology," Symbolic Inter-
action: A Reader Social Psychology I eds. Jerome G. Manis and Bernard 
N. Meltzer (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1967). 
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Rhetoric46 and w. Ross Winterowd's Rhetoric: ! Synthesis47 both include 
a cogent synthesis of the rhetorical system of Kenneth Burke. A number 
of fine articles that either directly or indirectly address themselves to 
a symbolic interaction based rhetoric can be found in Richard L. Johannesen's 
Contemporary Theories ~Rhetoric: Selected Readings48 and in Douglas 
£hninger's Contemporary Rhetoric: A Reader's Coursebook. 49 One other 
recent book, more concerned with rhetorical criticism than with rhetori-
cal theory per se, has a good statement of the basic nature of symbolic 
interaction rhetoric: Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, Critiques ,2l Contemporary 
Rhetoric. 50 She is one of the few authors who has clearly attempted to 
begin the development of the type of rhetorical theory with which this 
study is directly concerned. In addition to the opening chapter of the 
Campbell book, her "The Ontological Foundations of Rhetorical Theory1151 
is also of significant value. Other articles have been published which 
directly or indirectly promote or add to Burkeian rhetoric--most of them 
appearing in one of the two selected readings texts just noted. The 
46D aniel Fogarty, Roots .!. !'!!!!. Rhetoric (New York: Russell & 
Russell, 1959). 
47w. Ross Winterowd, Rhetoric: ! Synthesis (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1908). 
4BRichard L. Johannesen, ed., Contemporary Theories of Rhetoric: 
Selected Readings (New York: Harper and Row, 1971). -
49nouglas Ehninger, ed. , Contemporary Rhetoric: A Reader's Course-
(Glenview, Ill. : Scott, Foresman and Company, 19"T2) • 
50Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, Cri ti~ues of Contemporary Rhetoric 
(Belmont, Calif.: Wadaworth Publis ing Company, Inc., 1972). 
51Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, "The Ontological Foundations of Rhetorical 
Theory," Philosophy 2 Rhetoric, III (1970), PP• 97-108. 
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Journal .2f Philosophy~ Rhetoric has been especially active in publish-
ing materials relevant to this new thrust in rhetorical theory. 
One final matter needs to be explained in regard to source materials. 
It is sometimes unclear as to whether an individual writer has accepted 
'symbolic interactionisrn as his perspective. Thus, an explanation of how 
I have chosen my sources seems in order. Generally, I have chosen to 
include the ideas of a writer when any of three conditions are met by his 
work: (1) If he has declared himself, in one way or another, to be 
working from the symbolic interactionists' perspective; (2) if the writer 
is generally termed a symbolic interactionist by his colleagues--as with 
many of those whose articles have been included in one of the books of 
selected readings; or, (3) if the writer probably does not totally accept 
the symbolic interactionist perspective, but does hold to a part of their 
theories on some particular issue or issues. I have used this procedure 
both for choosing those writers concerned with symbolic interaction 
'theory per se, and for choosing those concerned with the rhetoric which 
can grow from this basic theory. As an example of the third type of 
writer, where the greatest possibility for misinterpretation exists, I 
have chosen to refer to the writings of Richard M. Weaver from time to 
1 time. It is clear to me that Weaver is not a symbolic interactionist, 
but many of his views on the persuasive nature of language parallel the 
views of symbolic interactionists. Thus, I feel it fair and beneficial 
to draw from his work in this limited way. In such cases I have attempted 
to avoid implications that someone fully expoWlds tne symbolic inter-
action position when, in reality, he does not. 
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CONTENTS OF THE CHAPTERS 
This study will be divided into two parts. Part One will be con-
cerned specifically with the ideas of the symbolic interactionists as 
they have developed largely without direct reference to rhetoric. In 
Part Two1 I will draw direct implications from symoolic interaction theory 
in an attempt to describe the form that a rhetoric based in symbolic 
interaction might take. 
Part One --
The four chapters contained in Part One are designed to system-
aticallj" answer Johannesen's questions about the nature of reality and 
knowledge, meaning and language, man, and an implied ethical system. 
It is important that the reader understand, in preparation for these 
chapters, that symbolic interactionism grew out of the American pragmatic 
philosophy movement. Thus, at base, the symbolic interactionist is 
concerned with language, reality, meaning, and the like insofar as they 
serve man interacting in society. Their concern is not with some type 
of "Platonic ideal," but rather it is with the concrete business of 
everyday human interaction. 
The chapters in Part One are titled in terms of Kenneth Burke's 
pentad--the elements of which make up the constituent parts of the drama 
of human interaction. This format was chosen because of the completeness 
I 
which the Burkeian system exhibits in terms of man interacting in society. 
In the terms act, agent, agency, scene, and purpose can be found implica-
tions about all the elements which make up human social behavior. But, 
at the same time, these terms allow me to keep the elements of human 
behavior separated enough that a systematic explanation of them is possible. 
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Before beginning the precis of the chapters contained in Part One, 
it is necessary to make a brief statement regarding the ethical system 
which is implicit in the symbolic interaction view of hwnan action. The 
nature of man's ethical system implied by the writings of the symbolic 
interactionists is not directly addressed in any specific chapter, but 
it lurks in the background throughout most of Part One. Basically, they 
say, because man makes Judgements of better and worse and makes choices 
regarding his actions based upon those judgments, there is an ethical 
element in any action he undertakes. These theorists seldom address the 
topic of ethics as it is generally thought of in more formal philosophies. 
If pressed, they would presumably regard identification between men (a 
socially cohesive motive) as the ethical principle against which human 
actions are to be judged. In this respect, a statement of ethics growing 
out of symbolic interaction theory would be situationally grounded. 
Particularly instructive vis-a-vis ethics is the section in Chapter Two 
regarding the hortatory negative and Chapter Five's discussion of human 
motives. 
Chapter Two is addressed to the question: "What is the nature of 
man?" Basically, man is viewed by the symbolic interactionists as a 
symbol-using animal. All of his other qualities grow from and are 
grounded in this essential quality. At base, this implies that man's 
social interactions can all be reduced to a symbolic core--all that he 
does (in terms of social actions) is somehow influenced by the language 
that he uses. 
This chapter relies heavily upon the writings of Kenneth Burke, 
mainly because he is the only symbolic interactionist who has either 
felt the need or taken the time to fully spell out his assumptions 
about man. I do not view it as a weakness that such a heavy reliance 
is being placed here on Burke, however. His description of man is a 
cogent one, and one which meshes well with the assumptions that other 
writers seem to be making. 
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Chapter Three concerns agency and scene. It is designed to explore 
the nature of language, meaning, reality, and man's knowledge of reality. 
The symbolic interactionists view language as the primary agency for man's 
interaction with man. Three aspects of the impact of language on man 
stand out as most important. First, language plays a significant "naming" 
function in that we learn to react to a thing in terms of the way we have 
named it. In this way, language constructs "terministic screens" which 
prevent us from seeing all that there is to be seen in "reality." For 
example, if we have "named" bearded men as radical we may automatically 
react to individual bearded men as though they were radical without 
making any attempt to see if anything else confirms this notion. Second, 
language is necessarily ambiguous. The ambiguity of language actually 
facilitates communication, since it allows the types of generalization 
that are necessary if we are to be able to interact and still use a 
vocabulary containing a manageable number of words. Third, language is 
inherently persuasive, in that words always stir up meanings in the 
persons who hear them. Language is full of implicit exhortations. And 
because we attach emotion-laden meanings to the words we utter and hear, 
those words contain within them an implicit program of action toward 
their meanings. 
The symbolic interactionists view meanings as being developed by 
individuals based upon a combination of their perceptions and the pre-
vailing meanings which society holds. Meaning is the key to human 
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action, as man reacts to ideas and actions in terms of the meaning that 
those ideas and actions stir up in him. Man determines meaning--it is 
not an integral element of any obJect which is automatically understood 
upon the appearance of the obJect. 
Finally, reality is considered in terms of its social impact. 
These theorists do not deny that real, concrete objects do exist "out 
there." Rather, they say that the real world is meaningful to social 
interaction only as various individuals perceive it. And, the interpre-
tations we place on reality are mediated througn language. Our knowledge 
{interpretation) of reality is limited to that part of the environment 
which we can perceive--and our terministic screens limit our ability to 
see all that there is in the social environment. liecause of the language 
system each of us has learned, we tend to see some aspects of any situa-
tion or Object and ignore other aspects. 
Chapter Four is concerned with the nature of the act. It does not 
directly answer any of Johannesen' s questions, but it does contribute 
to an understanding of several of them. First, man is viewed as a con-
troller of his own actions. The symbolic interactionists posit the idea 
that although man may not always keep total control over the things that 
he does, he still has the capacity to do so. Second, because of tne 
control that man can have over his actions he is seen as a goal-seeking 
animal. The symbolic interactionists have broken action down into four 
basic stages: impulse, perception, manipulation, and consununation. In 
the process of acting, man searches out perceptual OOJects in his environ-
ment, perceives them by defining them in terms of his language, internally 
plots out a course of action with regard to the thing he is perceiving, 
and finally overtly reacts to it. Two basic types of act are distinguisned 
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by the symbolic interactionist. The first is the individual act, whicn 
is one that a single person undertakes in order to fulfill a personal 
goal. The other is a "social act," or a joint action, which two or more 
persons undertake Jointly to fulfill a shared goal. I will also suggest 
a third type of action, the "thought act," which is an act that reaches 
consummation entirely in the DU.nd of an individual; it never is con-
sciously projected into the obJective reality of another person. Thus, 
because of the central importance of the act to the social exchanges of 
man an understanding of the nature of action contributes to the under-
standing of both man and the ways in which language helps man aerive 
meaning from reality. 
Chapter Five discusses purpose, and is designed to explore the 
ways in which man's motives operate to shape his social actions. Again, 
it does not directly discuss any of Johannesen' s questions , but it does 
contribute to the understanding of ethics and human action. It is rele-
vant to ethics because we Judge a man's actions in various situations 
as much by the motives we ascribe to his acts as oy the actual effects 
• of those actions. And it is relevant to an understanding of numan action 
because the study of motives is a study ot those forces which internally 
"goad" man to action. At base, motives are considered the "why" of nwnan 
action. Physiological factors and psychological leanings are seen as 
contributing to motives. However, social conditions in the environment 
are equally important. In fact, the symbolic interactionists go so tar 
as to claim that motives are merely shorthand terms for situations 
(situations being defined in terms of individual perceptions of environ-
mental conditions). 
The unique contribution which the symbolic interactionists make to 
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motive theory is the concept of "symbol as motive." Not only can the 
physical :realities of the environment serve as motives to action, but 
so can words. In fact, because man interprets reality through symbols, 
all motivation is in some way affected by the symbols we use. 
This chapter also contains a discussion of another extremely import-
ant part of symbolic interaction theory: role-taking. Basically, role-
taking consists of internalizing the motives and feelings of others. 
Once this "internalization of the other" takes place, we are in a position 
to "act like" the other person would act in given situations. Thus, we 
can test our ideas and actions against the internalized picture of tne 
other person before we act overtly. By gauging the probably impact of 
various possible actions,, we are able to "test" in advance the reaction 
which the actions we are motivated to undertake will have upon those we 
view as our "audience." 
f.!!.t~ 
The four chapters which make up Part Two of this study are designed 
to answer Johannesen's questions regarding the nature of rhetoric and 
the personal, cultural, and societal role of rhetoric. To this end, 
Chapter Six and Chapter Seven investigate the nature of a rhetoric based 
in the !theory of symbolic interaction; Chapter Light and Chapter Nine 
investigate the personal, cultural, and social role of rhetoric. 
Chapter Six looks at the implications for rhetoric of the ideas of 
the symbolic interactionists. First, an attempt is made to differentiate 
symbolic interactionist rhetoric from the traditional approach patterned 
after Aristotle. Basically, the new rhetoric is a much broader concept-
ualization. Where "persuasion" was the key term of the old rhetoric, 
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11 identifi.cation" is the key term of the new. And, as persuasion implies 
tne achievement of personal goals through gaining acquiescence from an 
audience (this is somewhat analagous to the individual act), identifi-
cation implies the achievement of Joint goals through conunon action 
(somewhat analagous to joint action or the social act). 
In this chapter, rhetoric is termed "a rationale for pragmatically 
oriented symbolic behavior, 11 meaning that any time man uses symbols for 
the achievement of socially desired ends he is acting rhetorically. 
Rhetoric is further viewed as the language of "address," in that we 
tailor our messages to appeal to specific others. The rhetorical situa-
tion is seen as a circumstance filled with problems which need to be 
resolved. Thus, rhetoric is a problem-solving activity. And, because 
we tend to take the role of those we address in order to test our ideas 
against their probable reactions, rhetoric is a strategic activity. 
Chapter Seven considers the nature of the rhetorical act. Taking 
"the use of pragmatically oriented discourse" as the oasic nature of 
rhetoric, the breadth of this approach is considered. Viewed this way, 
rhetorical behavior includes not only speaker-audience interaction, but 
also interpersonal and intrapersonal symbolic acts. Further, the view 
is taken that even sub-consciously directed actions may be considered as 
rhetorical. Additional attention is also given to the concept of audience, 
noting the extreme importance of "audience analysis" in a symbolic inter-
action based rhetoric. Out of the interactionists' approach to the act 
comes the notion that we must seek to identify as many of the "receiver's" 
motives as possible. We must seek to "become one" with him so that we 
may internally test our ideas before we actually submit them to the test 
of overt action. 
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Chapter Eight addresses the social and cultural role of rhetoric 
through an examination of identification (the primary rhetorical motive) 
and the social order. The basic concern of the chapter is with the ways 
in which rhetoric operates to establish and chan~~ the social order. 
The interplay of identification and its counterpart, division, is examined 
in terms of the ways in which social order is established in a culture and 
the ways in which it begins to break down. Man is viewed as making cove-
nants with certain values through his hierarchic choices. But because 
man is incapable of perfectly fulfilling his covenants, he inevitably 
fails to achieve his goals and becomes guilt-ridden. Through the twin 
processes of mortification and victimage he manages to feel that he has 
been redeemed and renews his pledge to another social hierarchy, slightly 
different from the last. Finally, the concept of social order and dis-
order is examined on the level of an entire society to determine the ways 
in which society can maintain order marked by progress. The writings 
of Hugh Dalziel Duncan are used extensively in this chapter, primarily 
because he is the writer who has been most concerned with the way in 
which symbolic action functions to achieve and maintain social order. 
Chapter Nine examines rhetoric as a social force from a slightly 
different angle. In this chapter, balance theory--which suggests that 
individuals attempt to perceive the world in a way that will seem in-
ternally consistent to them--is explored as a basis for a theory of 
persuasion. Primary reliance is placed upon the version of balance 
theory advocated by Theodore Newcomb. A number of studies conducted 
by Newcomb, Rodrigues, and others are investigated and conclusions are 
drawn from their data regarding the conditions under which persuasion 
is most likely to be possible and the types of appeals which can most 
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likely succeed in a given circumstance. Finally, many of the findings 
of these studies are seen to give support to the Burkeian notion that 
identification is the primary rhetorical motive of man. Balance theory 
is seen to be a rich source for the student of persuasion--and one 
which has largely been ignored to date. 
CONCLUSION 
This is an exci~ing point in time for the student of rhetoric. Our 
field is engaged in changing the "order" under which it has worked for 
most of this century. The Aristotelian system of rhetoric is under severe 
challenge from many quarters. One point of challenge comes from the 
symbolic interactionists• theory of social action. This challenge does 
not reJect Aristotelian theory. Rather, it says that the social system 
has changed to an extent and that the Aristotelian system is not broad 
enough to account for all that should rightly be termed rhetorical action. 
This study is an attempt to add to an understanding of the challenge to 
rhetoric's "social order" being placed by those who subscribe to the 
perspective of symbolic interaction. It is hoped that the following 
chapters will reflect the excitement which now permeates the field of 
rhetoric. 
Chapter 2 
AGENT: MAN IN AND THROUGH SYMBOLS 
Basic to any theory of rhetoric is an understanding of the nature of 
man. It is generally argued that the classical view of rhetoric grows 
out of a rationalistic view of man. Thus, rhetoric has come to emphasize 
the rational use of language for purposes of influence. Other theories 
of man's nature posit other views and would, tnus, place a different em-
phasis upon the basic nature of rhetoric. One such theory is that of the 
symbolic interactionists who say that man is first, last, and always a 
symbol-using animal; he is so deeply grounded in ~ymbols that all his 
social actions are in some way influenced by the language system he has 
learned. In this chapter I will chart the maJor implications of viewing 
man as a symbol-user. The writings of Kenneth Burke will predominate, 
primarily because it is Burke that has directly addressed himself to 
discussions of the nature of man. Most of the other symbolic inter-
actionists simply assume a view of man, but do not explicitly spell it 
out. 
Karlyn Kohrs Campbell has recently attempted to explain three pre-
dominant approaches to rhetoric in terms of their "ontological fowida-
tions." Though some of her arguments concerning the strengths and weak-
nesses of these approaches may be overdrawn, her capsulization of the 
ontological base for these systems is instructive: 
Three interpretations of this common ontological 
presumption J!nan is, by nature, subject to and 
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capable of persuasion/ have become dominant. 
Traditional theory explains that man is rhetorical 
because he is rational; behavioristic theory 
explains that he is rhetorical because he has 
certain basic, unlearned drives; theories of 
symbolic behavior explain that he is rhetorical 
because he is the symbol-using or signifying 
animal. 1 
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A second recent approach--in social psychology rather than in rhetoric--
has suggested two, rather than three, predominant views of man. 
Two fundamentally disparate images persist. First, 
man is conceived as a passive neutral agent buffeted 
about by stimuli that impinge upon his nerve endings. 
These stimuli may be external--reifications of society, 
instincts, needs, or drives--or they may be aome 
combination of extemal and internal forces. Second, 
and in direct contrast, man is viewed as an active 
agent, selecting out those stimuli or obJects to 
which he shall respond, accomplishing his selections 
in the matrix of communication, and transforming his 
society or his social world in the process. 2 
We begin, then, an inquiry into the philosophical bases of a 
symbolic interactionist's approacn to rhetoric by asking, "What is Man?" 
In consulting two writers we have already uncovered two ways of approach-
ing the question, and we have before us three "definitions." A third 
writer, however, adds many more "ways of viewing" man. Kenneth Burke, 
who has a way of saying more about sometning than most anyone else, 
capsulized additional views of man which history and scholarly ledilings 
have bequeathed: 
1Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, "The Ontological Foundations of 
Rhetorical Theory," Philosophy Rhetoric, III ( 1970), p. 97. 
Campbell is being grouped with the symbolic interactionists because 
her writings regarding rhetorical theory and criticism are based 
upon certain fundamental assumptions which mesh with many of the 
central tenet$ of symbolic interactionism. 
2Gregory P. Stone and Harvey A. Farbennan, "Introduction," 
Social Psychology Through Symbolic Interaction (Waltham, Mass.: 
Ginn-Blaisdell, 1970), p. 2. 
Given the range of meanings in the ancient Greek's 
concept of "politics 1 11 the anthropologists• definition 
of man as the "culture-bearing animal" is not far 
from Aristotle's view of man as the "poll ti cal 
animal." ••• Just as Aristotle's definition serves 
most directly for his book on politics, so the 
anthropologists' definition serves most directly 
for their studies of tribal cultures. "Social 
animal" might most directly suit sociologists. 
• • • For the psychologist, man is a "psycho-
logical" animal; for the psychoanalyst a mentally 
sick animal ( a psychopathology being a natural 
part of even the average or "normal" Everyman' s 
everyday life); for the chemist man should be a 
congeries of chemicals; and so on. 3 
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Perhaps, for purposes of the present study, matters could be simplified 
by calling man a "rhetorical am.mal" and smugly offering a system of 
rhetoric to go with the animal. We could then define man in terms of 
the rhetorical sys tern and be done with it. But ttu.s approach , as with 
other field-oriented views of man, would serve only tne narrowest of 
purposes. Such definitions of man are useful only to those who make 
them and to those who happen to work in the same field. What we need 
is a more broadly based understanding of man, one which has the potential 
of bridging several of the "lines marked off by academia." And, .Burke 
argues, man-the-symbol-user provides such a definition: "But since man 
can't be called any of these various things except insofar as, encom-
passing the lot, he is the kind of animal that can haggle about the 
definitions of himself, in this sense he is what Ernst Cassirer has called 
the animal symbolicum • • 114 • In def~ning man as the symbol-using animal 
we emphasize "two aspects of man: nis animal nature, which groWlds him 
JKenneth Burke, Language~ Symbolic Action (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1966), p. 23. 
4Ibia. -
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in physical property; his rational nature, or symbol using capacity, and 
the differences that result from that. 115 We can, through this definition, 
look at man as a communicator, man as a political being, man as a social 
being, man as a psychological being, and man as a being in terms of any 
symbolic interaction patterning. Finally, this definition is "definitive" 
in that it provides man with a differentia from other beings and objects: 
"In brief, man differs qualitatively from other animals since they are too 
poor in symbolicity, just as man differs qualitatively from his machines, 
since these man-made caricatures of man are too poor in animality. 116 
But, for Buttke "man as symbol user" is far too simple and incom-
plete. In a rare moment of directness, Burke provided a concise, if 
complex, statement of his full view of man. "Man is" he argues, __ , 
the symbol-using (symbol-making, symbol-misusing) animal 
Inventor~~ negative (or moralized by the negative) 
separated~~ natural condition instruments__2.f 
his own making 
goaded .! spirit hierarchy ( or moved by the sense 
of order) 
2 rotten~ perfection. 7 
As we explore the implications which Burke sees in this definition of 
man, we should temper any enthusiasm for over-explanation of closely 
5Marie Hochmutn Nichols, Rhetoric and Criticism (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1967)7P. 82. Nichols is not 
a symbolic interactionist herself, but she has done a significant 
amount of work in interpreting the writings of Kenneth Burke, who 
is one. When her writings are used in this study it is in reference 
to her work in interpreting Burke. See also, Kenneth Burke, Permanence 
2 Change (Indianapolis: The .Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1965), 
p. 275, and Kenneth Burke, Language.!!. Symbolic Action, p. 63. 
6Burke, Language~ Symbolic Action, p. 64. 
7Ibid., P• 16. 
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related concepts such as reality and meaning for later chapters. For 
the time, it will prove instructive to begin unfolding their nature in 
the rich mind of Burke. 
THE SYMBOL-USING ANIMAL 
Once we name man "symbol-user," we imply certain things a.bout both 
the way that he uses symbols and the way that symbols "use him." First, 
we imply that man's understanding of reality must oe tempered by his 
"tool" for understanding--his symbols. Burke comments: 
The II symbol-using animal," yes , obviously. But can 
we nring ourselves to realize just what that formula 
implies, Just how overwhelmingly much of what we 
mean by "reality" has been built up for us through 
nothing but symbol systems? Take away our books, 
and what little do we know about history, biograpny, 
even something so "down to earth" as the relative 
position of seas and continents? What is our "reality" 
for today ••• but all this clutter of symbols about 
the past combined with whatever things we know mainly 
through maps, magazines, newspapers, and the like 
about the present? ••• And however important to us 
is the tiny sliver of reality each of us has experienced 
firsthand, the overa118
11picture" is but a construct 
of our symbol systems. 
So, for Burke, symbols determine, to a large extent, the reality each of 
us experiences. A second implication is an offshoot of the first: Just 
as words provide man with a link to the nonsymbolic world, they also screen 
that world from him: 
Do we simply use words, or do they not also use us? 
An "ideology" is like a god coming down to eartn, 
where it will inhabit a place pervaded by its pre-
sence. An "ideology" is like a spirit taKing up its 
abode in a body: it makes that body hop around in 
certain ways; and that same body would have hopped 
a~., P• s. 
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around in different ways had a different ideology 
happened to inhabit it.9 
But man is, parenthetically, also a symbol-making animal. He can 
name a "tlu.ng" whatever he wishes and, if the first name gets in the way 
he can re-name it. One of Burke's foremost interpreters, Hugh Duncan, 
suggests this third implication. 
• • • man, and man alone, creates the symbols he uses 
in communication. He is able not only to communicate, 
but to communicate about communication. No matter how 
"fixed" a meaning may be in ritual, magic, or tradition, 
it must always pass the test of relevance; that is, it 
must help men to deal with problems which arise as men 
act together •••• Thus, while action may be fixed in 
tradition, it is fixed only so long as traditional torms 
of expression help us to organize activity in a present, 
just as utopian forms of expression are fixed as perma-
nent goals only so long as they help to solve problems in 
the present. 10 
Fourth, symbol-using man does not flatter himself with such a 
definition. As Burke remarks, 
The designation of man as the symbol-using animal 
parallels the traditional formulas, "rational animal" 
and Homo sapiens--but with one notable difference. 
These'earlier versions are honorific, whereas the idea 
of symbolicity implies no such temptation to self-
flattery, and to this extent it is more admonitory. 11 
' As he parenthetically remarks, man misuses symbols. Man is placed on no 
pedastal by virtue of his symbolicity--as we will well note in discussing 
Burke's final clause. Man can use his symbol power for good or evil, he 
may use them "accurately" or "inaccurately." The demagogue may, having 
become 11more human" (presumably) with a greater development of symbol-
using powers, dupe his constituents for his personal gain, ~ut Burke 
9 lb id. , p • 6 • 
10Hugh Dalziel Dnncan, Symbols .:!!. Society (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1968), pp. 46-7. 
11 Burke, Language~ Symbolic Action, p. 9. 
has more in mind than this : 
In referring to the misuse of symbols, I have in mind 
not only such demagogic tricks ••• I also think of 
"psychogenic illnesses, 11 violent dislocations of bodily 
motion due to the improperly criticized action of sym-
bolicity. A certain kind of food may be perfectly 
wholesome ••• But our habits may be such that it seems 
to us loathsome; and under those conditions~ the very 
thougnt of eating may be nauseating to us. 1 
INVENTOR OF THE NEGATIVE 
31 
3urke places the origin of language in the negative. In a series 
of four exhaustive articles in the early 19SO's,13 Burke unfolded "A 
Dramatistic View of the Origins of Language," building upon the thesis 
that "The essential distinction between the verbal and the non-verbal ----- ---------- - ---- -
is .:!:h.!. language the peculiar possibility £t .!!!!_ 
Negative.1114 There are no negatives in nature. Either there is a tree 
or there is not; the mongoose chases cobras or it fails to chase them. 
In either case something positive exists, and as far as nature is con-
cerned, that is all that exists. As Burke explains it, "If I am expect-
ing a certain situation, and a different situation occurs, I can say that 
the expected situation did E2,! occur. But so fdr as the actual state of 
affairs is concerned, some situation positively prevails, and that's that. 1115 
12Ibid., PP• 6-7. 
13see Kenneth Burke's "A Dramatistic View of the Origins of 
Language, Part One," Quarterly Journal E!_ Speech, XXXVIII (1952)• 
PP• 2bl-64; "Part Two," Quarterly Journal~ Speech, XXXVIII 
(1952), pp. 446-60; "Part Three," Quarterly Journal _2!, Speech, 
XXXIX (1953), pp. 79-92;and "Postscripts on the Negative," 
Quarterly Journal .2£.. Speech, XXXIX (1953), pp. 209-lb. This 
series of articles is also reprinted in Language~ Symbolic Action, 
pp. 418-79. 
l'+Burke, "Part One," p. 251. 
15Burke, Language~ Symbolic Action, pp. 9-10. 
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The existence of the concept of the negative is entirely due to man's 
symbol systems. Thus, "the study of man as the specifically word-using 
animal. requires special attention to this distinctive marvel, the 
negative."16 We should, then, seek to uncover the importance of the 
negative to man and the manner in which man, through his languages, de-
veloped the negative. 
Burke suggests five steps in the full development of the power of 
the negative in language. As there are no negatives in nature , and as 
language evolved from a "natural" state of no language, the first signs 
of the negative appeared in the form of "positive pre-negatives." 
Originally there was a purely "positive kind of negative, one closer to 
those conditions of nature in which there is no negative of the peculiarly 
linguistic sort.1117 Burke suggests that the primal ancestor of the rich 
negative was a sort of imperative or hortatory grunt, "a mere tonal ges-
ture for calling-attention-to.1118 This sound probably came to nave a 
"deterrent or perjorative meaning .because the calling of attention to 
danger is of greater significance than the calling of attention just to 
something. 1119 Such a sound would be translated as "beware!" or "caution!" 
But it did not constitute the language of a full-blown symbol system, for 
"it would not be a negative in the formal sense at all. .But it would 
have the force of a negative command, insofar as it implied: 'Stop what 
16liurke, "Part One," p. 251. 
17Ibid., P• 254. 
18Ibid., p. 255. 
19Ibid. -
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you're doing,' or 'Change your ways of doing what you're doing. 11120 
Between this implied negative and the eventual explicit negative of 
command come two intermediate stages. First is an adaptation to ideas of 
fear. Second, a step involving words of doubt. Burke exp la ins , II . . . 
terms for doubt would probably be the point at which the out and out 
propositional negative emerged. We mean that from this point on, the 
t . t· ld b f 1 . . 1· . t· t 1121 nega ive qua nega ive wou e et in a given inguis ic sys em. 
Again, "In brief, when you get to doubt, you're within the scientist 
area of information. So your next step is the outright No of 'negative 
pI'opositions' that affirm a 'negative fact' (that is not a bil'<l). 1122 
Though the boundary lines separating the various stages in the 
development of the negative are hazy, Burke's summary of those stages 
helps to clarify the centI'al components of the stages: 
In analyzing the negative we arrive at these various 
distinctions: 
(1) Primitive positives, as with the animal taking 
what it wants. 
(2) Primitive negatives, as with the cillimal tuming 
away from what it doesn't want, or what it wants but fears 
to take--or is "conditioned" not to take. 
Since (1) and (2) are aspects of "behavioristic pre-
language , " they are not bona fide positive and negative 
in the peculiarly linguistic seii'se. Indeed, the turning-
away is as "positive" an operation as the "taking, 11 
so far as its sheer materiality is concerned. 
(3) There are rational or dramatist positives, in 
the sense that the intelligent carrying-out of an act 
for an intelligent purpose is positive. 
From the standpoint of (3) both (1) and (2) are 
called negative, insofar as "enslavement" to the "nec-
essities" of "the senses" is a "negation" of "freedom." 
21Ibid., p. 256. 
22Ibid. -
(4) There is the linguistic positive of words like 
stop, caution, ~, which have negative impli-
cations insofar as they are admonitory or deterrent in 
meaning. For such meanings can be phrased outright as 
negative command, once such a grammatical form is 
available. 
(5) There are the out-and-out negatives, ranging 
from "thou shal. t not" to "it is not. 11 
And our main point is: Once the Perfect Negatives 
of (5) have taken form, their genius penneates the 
motivations of the other four. For instance, whereas 
one might otherwise want to treat "Yes" simply as a 
combination of primitive positives (1) and rational 
positives (3), we would admonish always to look for 
respects in which it might more accurately be treated 
as a negating of No. 23 
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One more point needs to be mentioned before moving to the i~pll.ca-
tions the negative has for man and language. Burke's negative is norta-
tory, not descriptive--it commands rather than simply announcing the 
presence or absence of something. It is, in effect, prior to the 
scientistic negative. Burke's investigation of the negative was stimu-
lated by Henri Bergson,24 whose approach emphasized the negative in terms 
of truth or falsity, is or is not--a scientistic approach. To ~urke, 
though, "The negative begins not as a resource of definition or informa-
tion, but as a command, as 'Don't.' Its more 'Scientistic' potentialities 
develop later. And whereas Bergson is right in observing that we can't 
have an 'idea of nothing' ••• I submit that we~ have an 'idea of No,' 
an I idea of don I t. 11125 
The richness of the negative as a linguistic resource can be seen 
23.!lli_. , p. 262. 
24see Henri Bergson, Creative Lvolution, tr. Arthur Mitchell 
(New York: H. Holt and Company, 1911). 
25 Burke, Language!!. Symbolic Action, p. 10. 
when we realize that it provides language (and, thus, man) with the 
ability to generalize and specify, to develop nierarchy, to reason, and 
to moralize. 
First, the negative provides the power to generalize and to specify: 
Imp lied in the use of the negative, there is both 
the ability to generalize and the ability to specify. 
That is, you cannot use the negative properly with-
out by the same token exemplifying the two basic 
dialectical resources of merger and division. For 
you can use no properly only insofar as you can 
classify under one head many situations that are, 
in their ~ositive details, quite distinct from one 
another. 2 
However, classification and discrimination may exist beyond the realm 
of linguistic processes. 
The senses classify, when they "translate" some 
vibrations into terms of sound, others into terms of 
color, or record still others as smell, etc. And 
insofar as each biological organism selects a kind 
of food proper to its species, it is in effect dis-
criminating ••• 27 
Both linguistically and sensorally we can classify--generalize and 
specify. But sensory abstraction yields simple positives--the color is 
red, the sound is loud, and so on. Dramatistic, or linguistic, generali-
zation yields the "idea of the negative," the ability to judge yes and no 
in terms of right and wrong, not just in the sense of avoidances. The 
linguistic generalization involves choice oased upon reasoned Judgment; 
"Don't do that" does not result from mere 111.aentification" of a thing, 
but from the realization that to do "that" would in some way be wrong. 
Put another way, we can see tne power of the linguistic negative in 
the distinction between image and idea. In that type of behavior which 
26Burke, "Part One , 11 p. 256. 
27 Ibid. -
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has no language directly attached to it only the present can exist. Thus 
behaviorist pre-language, or the pre-linguistic identifications which can 
be interpreted as negatives, cannot involve expectation. There is, thus, 
a qualitative distinction between the sensory and the rational--tne 
latter being rooted in the ideas of language. "Though idea and image 
have become merged in the development of language, the negative provides 
the instrument for splitting them apart. ~~negative is ~; 
there can be no image of it. ~~imagery there negative. 1128 
Because of the negative, then, we can gene~alize and specjfy in our 
system of symbols. Generalization and specification, in turn, imply the 
arrangement of hierarchies. Positives alone cannot produce hierarchies, 
for there would be no means of separating items into any sort of order. 
Only the negative can separate ideas, concepts, horses, students, or what 
have you, from each other. And only when a means for such &eparation is 
found can hierarchies be arranged. A preference for one thing implies a 
lack of preference for another. 
And so for reason. At base, reason is the ability to use the nega-
tlve qua negative. 29 Systems of reason are based in inclusion and ex-
clusion, merger and division, generalization and specification. Such 
operations, again, require the presence of a linguistic negative. 
But, perhaps most important, the negative allows for the develop-
ment of ethics--value choices and moral choices. For ~urke, man is not 
only the inventor of the negative, but he is also "moralized by the 
28Ihid., p. 260. 
29Ibid., p. 261. 
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negative." "All definitions," he argues, "stressing man as a moral agent 
would tie in with this clause. 1130 . . He says in ,!E.!. Rhetoric _2t Religion, 
Action involves character, which involves choice--
and the form of choice attains its perfection in the 
distinction between Yes and No (shall and shall-not, 
will and will-not). Though the concept of sneer 
motion is non-ethical, action implies the ethical, 
the human personality. Hence the obvious close 
connection between the ethical and negativity, as 
indicated in the Decalogue. 31 
The essence of the negative lies in the admonition of admonitions--
the "thou-shalt-nots" of our world. Our maxims, mores, laws (which are 
presumably based in a moralistic Judgement as to the "rightness" and 
"wrongness" of certain actions as they affect the community), and command-
ments would be nonexistent without the negative. we could, perchance, 
attempt to codify laws according to what citizens can do but sucn a code 
would take longer to read than most of us have moments to live. And, 
still, after we had drawn up the code there would be the implied negative 
of all those things we had left out. No, it is through !!!!_ negative that 
we generalize those things we can do from the specification of those which 
we cannot; that we "choose the lesser of two evils;" that we reason to 
decide both whether a certain class of action is right or wrong (morally) 
and whether "this particular action" fits within that class. 
Clearly, the negative is at the base of our language. Man is 
"inventor of the negative," the hortatory negative which gave rise to 
language. From this hortatory negative flowed the ability, through 
30Burke, Language~ Symbolic Action, p. 11. 
31This statement from Burke's Language~ Symbolic Action is a 
slightly revised form of the original statement in his The Rhetoric 
Religion (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), p. 41. 
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symbol systems, for man to generalize and specify, to construct hier-
archies , to choose, to reason, and to moralize. And from the hortatory 
negative came also the "is" of linguistic being, with its implication of 
the "is not" of not-being. 
SEPARATED FROM HIS NATURAL CONDITION 
BY INSTRUMENTS OF HIS OWN MAKING 
Burke explains, "This clause is designed to take care of those who 
would define man as the 'tool-using animal' ••• we are immediately 
reminded of the close tie-up between tools and language. 1132 Language, 
though it may be a tool for man, is far more. It is the instrument that 
has separated man from the condition of nature. "Those who begin with 
the stress upon tools proceed to define language as a species of tool. 
But ••• we could not properly treat it as the essence of langua~e •••• 
Edward Sapir's view of language as 'a collective means of expression' 
points in a more appropriate direction.1133 Sapir argues, 
Human beings do not live in the objective world alone, 
alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily 
understood, but are very much at the mercy of tne 
particular language which has become the medium of 
expression for their society. It is quite an illusion 
to imagine that one adJusts to reality essentially 
without the use of language and that language is 
merely an incidental means of solving specific problems 
of communication or reflection. The fact of the 
matter is that the "real world" is to a large extent 
unconsciously built up on the language habits of the 
group. • • • We see and hear and otherwise experience 
very largely as we do because the language habits of 
32Burke , Language .2, Symbolic Action, p. 13. 
33Ibid., p. 15. 
the community predispose certain choices of inter-
pretation.J4 
The Sapir-Whorf nypothesis that the language we use structures, to a 
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great extent, our ability to see and interpret "reality" nelps to explain 
what Burke means when he says we are "separated from our natural condition" 
by language. As Whorf explains, 
It was found that the background linguistic system (in 
other words, the grammar) of each language is not 
merely a reproducing instrument for voicing ideas but 
rather is itself the shaper of ideas, the program and 
guide for the individual's mental activity, for his 
analysis of impressions, for his synthesis of nis 
mental stock in trade. Formulation of ideas is not 
an independent process, strictly rational in the old 
sense, but is part of a particular grammar, and 
differs, from slightly to greatly, between different 
grammars. dissect nature along lines 
~~native languages.:SS 
Language separates man from his condition in nature by, at once, providing 
him a means of symbolizing nature ("reality") ane1 setting up "terministic 
screens" which will to an extent distort the reality he interprets. The 
structure of a language, those elements which are particularly important 
to its grammar, quite naturally receive emphasis as the language-user 
3~dward Sapir, an introductory quotation to ~enJamin Lee Whorf's 
"The Relation of Habitual Thought and Behavior to Language," in 
Language, Thought,~ Reality: Selected Writings~ BenJamin 
Whorf, ed. John Carroll (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1956), 
p. 134. Sapir's ideas on language are being included here because 
they closely parallel several of the symbolic interactionists' views 
of language. Sapir is not, however, a symbolic interactionist himself. 
JSBenjamin Lee Whorf, "Science and Linguistics," in Language, 
Thought, Reality: Selected Writings of .Benjamin~ Whorf, 
ed. John Carroll (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1956), 
pp. 212-13. Whorf's ideas are here included, although ne is not 
a symbolic interactionist, because many of his statements about 
the nature of language closely parallel the symbolic interactionists' 
view of language. 
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interprets real.i ty, for "any nomenclature necessarily directs tne atten-
tion into some channels rather than others. 1136 
This view, however, should not be taken to its logical extreme. 
For if language separates man from reality, it does not divorce him from 
it. Paul Kolers helps to bring the matter back into perspective: 
The point is that physical reality is immensely 
varied, far more varied than any language shows. 
The fact that each language has words for only a 
limited number of perceptions does not mean other 
perceptions are impossible. If that were the case, 
languages would never change. 
What a language does is group some aspects of 
reality together •••• 
Language does not affect our capacity to perceive 
differen§;s, but it does affect the likelihood that 
we will. 
That language can be used as a tool is not in dispute. One of its 
central functions--perhaps central function as man intends its use--
is as a tool for the communication of ideas. Burke concurs: "Language 
is a species of action, symbolic action--and its nature is such that 
it can be used as a tool. 1138 But, as Ruth Nanda Anshen has suggested, 
"Lang\lage is not a mere mecharu.sm, although it is also a mechanism and 
it is the relation of language as mechanism and language as meaning which 
must be sought."39 And as Whorf's chief compiler, John Carroll, suggests, 
36Burke , Language !!. Symbolic Act ion, p. 45. 
37Paul A. Kolers, "It Loses Something in the Translation," 
P~olo~ Today, May 1969, p. 32. Kolers, like Whorf, is not a 
s olic interactionist, but his views of language are particularly 
instructive here. 
38burke, Language~ Symbolic Action, p. 15. 
39Ruth Nanda Anshen, "Language as Idea," Perspectives .2!!_ Language, 
eds. John A. Rycenga and Joseph Schwartz (New York: The Ronald Press 
Company, 1963), p. 347. Anshen is here included, altnough she is not 
a symbol;c interactionist, because this particular view ?f man~s deep 
rooting in his linguistic powers closely parallels a similar view of 
the symbolic interactionists. 
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"linguistic structure predisposes the individual to pay attention to 
some things more than others, or to perceive things in one mode rather 
than in others, even though with respect to his general perceptual capa-
cities, he is no different • • • from users of other languages." 40 
Language is man's invention. The instrument he bas made has grown 
far beyond its original role as an instrument (or tool) for the communi-
cation of ideas, feelings, and information. It has grown to the point 
that, by its power to shape man's interpretation of reality, it has 
separated man from his natural condition. 
GOADED BY THE SPIRIT OF HILRARCHY 
We have already noticed, in unfolding the power of the negative in 
the development of language, that one of the features of any language 
system is its capacity to bring about generalization and specificity--
its power to classify and to group. And we noticed that once man began 
the classification of "things" through language, he was only a short step 
away from arranging the classifications into hierarchies. In developing 
an ability to arrange ideas, items, or what have you, into hierarchies, 
language has in yet another way "taken a nold" on its inventor. For 
Burke, man does not simply use language to arrange things in hierarchies. 
Rather, he is "goaded" by the spirit of hierarchy. "Under this clause, 
4OJohn B. Carroll, "The Linguistic Weltanschauung Problem," 
Perspectives Language, eds. John A. Rycenga and Joseph Schwartz 
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1963), p. 289. Carroll's 
ideas are here included, although he is not a symbolic interactionist 
himself, oecause of las concern with "the way in which a language 
system organizes human experience"--a view which closely parallels 
the sym.oolic interactionists' perception of language. Note, for 
example, the close relationship between this view and Kenneth 
Burke• s notion of "termin1stic screens." 
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of course, would fall the incentives of organization and status.1141 
Language, we shall later notice in some detail, provides motives for man. 
It "needles" him, "cajoles" him, and, if you will, "goads" him. And 
because of its hierarchal nature, it goads him with the spirit of 
hierarchy. 
ROTTEN WITh PhRFhCTION 
One of the most important elements in Burke's writings is the prin-
ciple of perfection. It is, parenthetically, also one of the most 
difficult to fully understand; for it has impact across the breadth of 
Burke's writings--but the impact is not always stated by Burke. To the 
issue at hand, though: we need first to understand the principle of 
perfection and then to understand the "rottenness" that is in man's quest 
for perfection. We may rely on Burke for botn explanations. 
The principle of perfection I ne says, "is central to the nature of 
language as motive. The mere desire to name something by its 'proper' 
name, or to speak a language in its distinctive ways is intrinsically 
'perfectionist.' 1142 The principle perhaps becomes clearer when Burke 
draws an analogy to 
tne Aristotelian concept of "entelechy," the notion 
that each being aims at the perfection natural to 
its kind ••• Whereas Aristotle seems to have 
thought of all beings in terms of the entelechy (in 
keeping with the ambiguities of his term, kinesis, 
which includes something of ooth "action" and 
"motion"), we are confining our use of tge prin-
ciple to the realm of symbolic action. 114 
41Burke, Language .!!. Symbolic Action, p. 15 
42Ibid., p. lb. 
43~ •• p. 17. 
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The principle of perfection, simply stated, argues that man attempts 
to move his symbol-using power, and his particular symbol systems, ever 
forward to the point where perfection can be achieved. Tnus we seek to 
make things "perfectly clear," if only to ourselves. This principle of 
perfection is "implicit in the nature of symbol systems; and in keeping 
with his nature as a symbol-using animal, man is moved by this principle. 1144 
One way in which the principle of perfection is used by man entails 
what Richard M. Weaver45 calls the "God Term." Man makes linguistic tu.er-
archies, terministic screens through which he channels his perceptions 
and toward which he channels his efforts at "making the world a better 
place." Once such a term is chosen, man channels great quantities of 
energy toward fulfilling that term. It is in this respect that the 
principle of perfection may make man "rotten". 
To get the point, we need simply widen the concept 
of perfection to tne point where we can also use the 
term ironically, as when we speak of a "perfect fool" 
or a "perfect villain." And, of course, I had pre-
cisely such possibilities in mind when in my codicil 
I refer to man as being "rotten" with perfection. 
The ironic aspect of the principle is itself 
revealed most perfectly in our tendency to conceive 
of a "perfect" enemy. 46 
The man who prizes "pride" above all else centers all his actions around 
that concept, attempting at every turn to increase his pride in nimself 
45Richard M. Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric (Chicago: Henry Regnery 
& Company, 1953). Weaver is not a symbolic interactionist, but his 
ideas concerning the inherent persuasiveness of language and the making 
of linguistically arranged hierarchies are closely paralleled in 
symbolic interaction theory. 
46Burke, Language!!. Symbolic Action, p. 18. 
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and the pride others feel for him. He may do tnis at the expense of what 
other persons around him mignt term "more pragmatic" or "more rational" 
or "less ridiculous" aspects of the situations he confronts. And, in 
this respect, Burke terms the ironic sense of the perfection principle 
the "dangerous sense. 11 47 
Man is rotten with perfection precisely because of this impulse. 
If we choose a "God Term"--say, progress--and give Bur.k:e a free nand with 
rhyme, we have his conception of the perfect extension (the perfect 
"perfection"?) of the principle of perfection: 
If all the thermo-nuclear warheads 
Were one thermo-nuclear warhead 
What a great thermo-nuclear warhead that would be. 
If all the intercontinental ballistic missiles 
Were one intercontinental ballistic missile 
What a great intercontinental ballistic missile that would be. 
If all the military men 
Were one military man 
What a great military man he would be. 
And if all the land masses 
Were one land mass 
What a great land mass that would be. 
And if the great military man 
Took the great thermo-nuclear warhead 
And put it into the great intercontinental .oallisti.c missile 
And dropped it on the great land mass, 
What great PROGRESS that would be1 48 
CONCLUSION 
Much has been said about language in this chapter, but "man" has 
been the central concern. Man is so deeply grounded in the symbols he 
47Ibid. -
48Ibid., p. 22. 
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uses that it is newly impossible to discuss "the nature of man" without 
in some way relating him to language. It is language usage that disting-
uishes man from the other beings: he is the symbol-using animal. he 
maintains control over his language system in that he "invents" the 
language that he uses. Conversely, though, he often becomes entrapped 
by the language that he has "invented." Man developed language after 
he learned to use the negative. Because the negative does not exist in 
nature, it imbues man's symbol system with an "unnatural" element. Part 
of the entrapment language places upon man is a limitation of his aoility 
to "see nature as it is." Through the negative, the hierarchic motive has 
goaded man to such an extent that he is forever classifying those things 
in his environment. Such classifications lead inevitably to Judgments of 
better and worse, right and wrong, or what have you. Thus, when man views 
his natural setting he views it through linguistic lenses that immediately 
make it "unnatural." 
So, this is the symbolic interactionists 1 "man." He is screened 
from reality, yet he must interact wi tn the reality he cannot clearly 
see. In the next three chapters we snall be ex~loring the implications 
of this view of man, attempting to determine the ways in which he does 
attempt to interact using a symbol system that prevents him from seeing 
things "as they naturally are • " 
Chapter 3 
AGENCY AND SCENE : THE SOCIAL MEAN ING OF REALITY 
AS DETERMINED THROUGH LANGUAGE 
The previous chapter was primarily concerned with the nature of man. 
But in wifolding the symbolic interactionists' view of man, mediated pri-
marily through the writings of Kenneth Burke, it was necessary to preview 
a description of the nature of language. Simply put, when man is defined 
as the symbol.-using animal, with,the implications of this "naming" found 
I 
in Burke's extended definition, a discussion of language is a prerequisite 
to understanding man. As Burke explains, in the study of man 
Language is taken as "the given." Man is viewed as 
the kind of animal that is distinguished by his prowess 
in symbolic action •••• Just as, in oeing an animal 
that lives by locomotion, man moves not merely for 
purposes of acquisition or avoidance but also through 
the sheer delight in being free to move, so in being 
the typically symbol-using animal he takes a natural 
delight in the exercising of his powers with symbols. 1 
As von Humboldt has put it, "man is man by virtue of language. 112 
Perhaps the centrality of language to an understanding of man was most 
1Kenneth Burke, Lanfrage .!!:!!. Slmbolic Action (Berkeley: 
of California Press, 1966 , p. 295. 
University 
2wilhelm von Humboldt, an introductory quotation to John A. Rycenga 
and Joseph Schwartz, "Metalinguistics: Language in its Relations," 
in their Pers7ctives on Lan15ua15e (New York: The Ronald Press 
Company, 1963 , p. 283-:- Von Humboldt is not a symbolic inter~ctionist, 
but this particular view of the grounding of man in language is 
similar enough to the symbolic interactionists' ideab regarding the 
same issue to merit inclusion. 
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succinctly illustrated by Anshan: "For man is that being on earth who 
does not have language. Man is language."3 
In this chapter two more terms of the pen tad are examined: agency 
and scene. Language, man's agency, is clearly seen as a central concept 
in the theories of the symbolic interactionists. Scene provides the 
backdrop against which human action takes place. It is "scenic" reality 
which man interprets through his powers of language. Out of this inter-
pretation of reality man brings meaning into his world. Language, then, 
is the key concept of the three to be considered in the ensuing pages: 
language, meaning, and reality. Reality, I will assert, has little social 
value for man except as it is linguistically interpreted. Meaning, on 
the other hand, is socially determined according to the linguistic inter-
pretation of reality. For the symbolic interactionist, these three terms 
are so clearly intertwined that any true separation of them is quite 
difficult--bordering on artificiality. But such a separation needs to 
be made in order to understand more clearly the ways in which each of 
these three concepts operates as man goes about his daily business in a 
host of social situations. 
LANGUAGE: THE PRIMARY AGENCY OF MAN 
Man is the agent; he is thoroughly grounded in language, his primary 
agency. In discussing man, several aspects and functions of language 
were necessarily noted: its grounding in the negative, from which flows 
3Ruth Nanda Anshen, "Language as Idea," Perspectives £!!_Language, 
eds. John A. Rycenga and Joseph Schwartz (New York: The Ronald Press 
Company, 1963), p. 347. 
48 
the moralizing power of language, 1.ts power of generalization and class-
ification, which results in its ability to designate and arran~e hier-
archies; its nature as a tool or instrument for the communication of 
ideas; and its nature as a "shape?"" of human perception. But we must 
now tuI"n ouI" attention even more directly to language in an attempt to 
explain more fully and understand more clearly the nature of the symbol 
system which is at the heart of the natuI"e of man. 
I will start from the position that language is "beyona" reality: 
it encompasses and aids 1.n 1.nterpI"eting reality, but what Weaver terms 
the "divine element present 1.n language"4 gives it an element .beyond 
dealings with physical reality. Otto Jepersen has argued, 
We shall never thoroughly understdnd the nature of 
language, if we take as our starting point the sober 
attitude of the scientifically-trained man of today, 
who regards the words he uses as a means for commun-
icating, or maybe further developing, thought. To 
children and savages a word is something very dif-
ferent. To them, there is something magical or mystical 
in a name. It is something that has power over things 
and is bound up with them in a far more intimate manner 
than we are wont to irnagine. 5 
How we name a thing can often control our reactions to it in future 
chance meetings with the thing; how we name a thing may come back to 
haunt us. In physical reality a tree may be a shade tree, but if we 
4Richard M. Weaver, Ideas!:!!!!_ Consequences (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1948), p. 148. 
5 Otto Jepersen, "Mysticism of Language," Perspectives Language, 
eds. John A. Rycenga and Joseph Schwartz (New York: The Ronald 
Press Company, 1963), p. 20. Jepersen is here being included, althougn 
he is not a symbolic interactionist, because of his view regarding 
the ways in which the "names" we give things partially control our 
reactions to them. This view closely parallels a similar concept 
offered by the symbolic interactionists. 
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plant it believing that it is a fruit tree we will expect it to bear 
fruit. When it does not, our first reaction is likely to be that there 
is "something wrong" with the tree--it does not bear fruit. In reality 
there would be something wrong if it did. When we name a thing we begin 
acting towards it in accordance with the name, not in accordance with 
whatever it may, in physical reality, be. Our name for the thing has 
screened the physical reality from us. The name has, if you will, taken 
us "beyond reality." A story related by Whorf is instructive here: 
Thus, around a storage of what are called "gasoline 
drums," behavior will tend to be a certain type, that 
is, great care will be exercised; while around a storage 
of what are called "empty gasoline drums," it will tend 
to be different--careless, with little repression of 
smoking or of tossing cigarette stubs about. Yet the 
"empty" drums are perhaps the more dangerous, since 
they contain explosive vapor. Physically the situation 
is hazardous, but the linguistic analysis according to 
regular analogy must employ the word "empty•" which 
inevitably suggests lack of hazard.6 
Such a use of language, and the impact which it has regarding our 
actions toward the object we name, is inherent to symbol systems--we could 
not avoid this type of behavior even if we made sucn avoidance our prin-
ciple goal. For, as Burke says, 
We must use terministic screens, since we can't say any-
thiii'gwithout the use of terms; whatever terms we use, 
they necessarily constitute a corresponding kind of 
screen; and any such screen necessarily directs the 
attention to one field rather than another. 7 
6Benjamin Lee Whorf, "The Relation of Habitual Thought and Benavior 
to Language , " in Language , Thought, and Reality: Selected Writings £!.. 
Benjamin Lee Whorf, ed. John CarrollTcambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. 
Press, 1956T, p. 135. 
7Burke, Language Symbolic Action, P• 50. 
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The various languages which man has developed each directs attention 
to certain aspects of reality at the expense of others. Boas has shown 
this through a comparison of English and Indian grannnars. lie indicates 
that the phrase 11 the children are playing" would mean little to an Inaian, 
though it gives a fairly concrete image to one using English grammar. 
Certain Indian tribes require much more specific information. For a 
clear picture, one might have to say to them 0 children (or child) whom I 
see here, are (or is, were or was) playing in the woods which I see here." 
For tnese Indian grammars location must be definite, but the number of 
children and the time they were playing is relatively unimportant. 8 The 
form of English grammar requires that certain categories be present in any 
clear description; some types of Indian grammars require that other cate-
gories be present. This aspect of language causes potential problems in 
communication, especially when persons whose categories are different 
attempt to converse. Anselm Strauss argues that when introduced "to a 
new terminology, the best you can do is draw upon poss.1..0ly analogous exper-
iences , and these may or may not lead to accurate conceptions." 9 
8Franz Boas, "Language and Culture," Perspectives Language, 
ads.John A. Rycenga and Joseph Schwartz (New York: The Ronald Press 
Company, 1963), p. 315. The ideas of Boas regarding the ways in whicn 
the forms of a language shape the meanings we can derive from its 
use are quite similar to certain views of language forms held by 
the symbolic interactionists--Burke in particular. For this reason 
his ideas have here been included in this study. 
9Anselm L. Strauss, "Language and Identity," Symbolic Interaction: 
A Reader !!!_ Social Psychology, eds. Jerome G. Manis and Bernard N. 
Meltzer (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1967), p. 327. Strauss, known 
partly for his study of Mead, is considered a symbolic interactionist. 
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But this risk of inaccurate conceptions in "cross-cultura11110 communi-
cation is one that must be accepted if a given linguistic community is to 
thrive. For a linguistic community to exist, for it to operate in anything 
approaching an efficient manner, it must develop a set of meanings whicn 
the members of that community can understand and react to in some coor-
dinated fashion. Mills remarks, "Men discern situations witn particular 
vocabularies, and it is in terms of some delimited vocabulary that they 
anticipate consequences of conduct. 1111 Such common meanings associated 
with a particular linguistic grouping make social order possible. Foote 
explains why such common meanings are critical to the progression of 
community life: 
Without the binding thread of identity, one could 
not evaluate the succession of situations. Literally, 
one could say there would be no value in living, since 
value only exists or occurs relative to particular 
identities--at least value as experienced by organisms 
which do not live in the mere present, as animals pre-
sumably do, devoid of self and unaware of impending 
death. Moreover, it is only through identification as 
the sharing of identity that individual motives become 
social values and social values, individual motives. 12 
In a given linguistic grouping, the name one gives an obJect "provides 
10 The term "cross-cultural" is nere meant to refer to different 
linguistic groupings, not just ethnic or national boundaries. Thus, 
studying the attempts at communication between a Puerto Ricau suo-
group and an Irish sub-group in New York could be considered a 
"cross-cultural" study. 
11c. Wright Mills, "Situated Actions and Voca.oularies of Motive," 
Symbolic Interaction: Reader in Social ~sychology, eds. Jerome 
G. Manis and Bernard N. Meltzer Weston: Allyn and !3acon, 1967), 
p. 357. Mills is considered to be a symbolic interactionist. 
12Nelson Foote, "Identification as the Basis for a Tneory of 
Motivation," American Sociological Review, XVI (1~51), p. 20. 
Foote is considered to be a symbolic interactionist. 
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a directive for action, as if the object were fortnrightly to annowice, 
'You say I am this, then act in the appropriate way toward me. rnl3 
At base, then, language contains a powerful element which shapes the 
reality man sees and shapes the possibilities of his reaction to that 
reality. How we define a situation pre-sets, to a large extent, the way 
that we will act towards it. 14 Our language, then, limits our ability 
to include a sufficient number of elements in the definition of any 
situation to come anywhere near approaching the "physical reality" of 
the situation we are defining. 
A second important feature of language is its am.oiguity. Ambiguity 
in language allows the symbol-user to generalize and to place "reality" 
into linguistic categories. Without such facility, man could have no 
"commwiication" in the real sense, tor a word which is barren of ambig-
uity has little chance of operating as a symbol which more than one person 
can understand and attach meaning to. All ambiguity could not be removeu 
from language, says Winterowd, because 
no two men have exactly the same tools for perception, 
and if they did have, they would not nave the same 
conditioning. Simply, each would have t1ad different 
experiences with dogs during lives that, no matter how 
similar in some respects, were different in important 
and fundamental ways. If language were not to a 
13strauss, "Language and Identity," p. 326. 
14An interesting application of this idea is reported Dy Strauss, 
Ibid., p. 325. He says tnat for the Laplanders a single word encom-
pas;es "people" and "reindeer." He explains that the life of tne 
Laplander is so directly tied to the reindeer that the people con-
sider the animals an inseparable part ot them. rle asks, "Is a 
reindeer a human or is a human a reindeer?" 
high degree ambiguous, we could not communicate, for 
DOG would mean to you only a given animal in a given 
place. 15 
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Were language not ambiguous, we would need a different word ("name") for 
each object we experience each time we experience it. Tnus, to pursue 
Winterowd's example, each dog would need a different word for identifi-
cation, as would each other individual animal, each individual plant, 
individual human, etc. And thought, as we know it, could not proceed; 
for thought, reason, couununication, and what have you are made possible 
only through the process of generalization and classification. 
The ambiguity of language leads to a third feature, that which 
Weaver calls its "sermonic1116 nature. Winterowd argues "no language--
not even the language of mathematics (I:. = MC 2 )--is neutra1. 1117 In<leed, 
Language is persuasive almost willy-nilly, simply 
because it is language. Try as we may, we cannot 
frame an utterance in such a way that it will be 
totally informative or totally affective. When-
ever we use language, we are using persuasion. 
Even nonsense syllables, as long as we interpret 
them as language of some kind, work their persua-
sive magic.IS 
Because language mirrors man, the actor, it is naturally full of emotional 
overtones. Marie Nichols brings home Burke's point on the matter: 
15w. Ross Winterowd, Rhetoric: A Synthesis (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1968), p.-a. 
16For an excellent treatment of the emotive power of language, 
see Richard M. Weaver, "Language is Sermonic," in Contemporary 
Theories of Rhetoric: Selected Readings, ed. Richard L. Johannesen 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 163-79. 
17winterowd, Rhetoric: ! Synthesis, p. 2. 
18Ibid. , p • 4. 
Hence, from its beginning it has been marked by the 
weightings and emotional loadings that characterize 
human activity in general. In otner words, neither 
in its beginnings nor at any time has language been 
a neutral instrument. Language is an act upon a 
scene; it contains the colorings of human purpose, 
choice, feeling. It is now as it has always been, 
an adjunct of action, a way of encompassing situations. 19 
This proposition rega1,ding the inherent persuasiveness of language is a 
corollary to the previous discussion of naming. How we name a thing sets 
in action the response that we will take to it. In tne words of Burke, 
" ••• speech in its essence is not neutral. Far from aiming at sus-
pended judgment, the spontaneous speech of a people is loaded with 
judgments.1120 Indeed, language is full with 
implicit exhortations. To call a man a friend or 
an enemy is per!!:. to suggest a program of action 
with regard to him. An important ingredient in the 
meaning of such words is precisely the attitudes and 
acts which go with them. 21 
In Chapter Two language was found to have originated in the negative. 
Specifically, language systems began to develop as man grasped the admonitory 
negative. Such a negative is profoundly moralistic and, in providing the 
base from which language developed it infused the entire system of lan-
guage with this moralistic nature. Language is, like the earliest form 
of the negative, hortatory: 11 ••• the spontaneous symbols of communica-
tion are hortatory, suggestive, hypnotic. 1122 
19Marie Hochmuth Nichols, Rhetoric and Criticism (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1967),P. 83. 
2°Kenneth .Burke, Permanence Chan&e (Indianapolis: The 
Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1965), pp. 176-77. 
21Ibid., P• 77. 
22~., P• 54. 
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In these few pages, additional development of the symbolic inter-
actionists' view of language has revealed the powerful force of language's 
naming function, the necessary ambiguity of symbol systems, and the natural 
persuasiveness of the word. In the previous chapter we noticea that lan-
guage, grounded in the negative, has a powerful moralizing force, clears 
the way--through its form--for the arrangement of hierarchies, provides 
us a means for communicating ideas, and goes a long way to shape human 
perceptions. It is, indeed, a central concept in the study of man; 
language is the basic element which separates man from the other animals. 
It is man's primary agency for the conduct of his affairs. 
Mt.ANING: THE BASIS FOR HUMAN ACTION 
Language qua language does little for man, thougn. It is only after 
man has assigned a meaning to the words he utters and hears that the 
words have significant impact upon him. A Russian and an American, each 
understanding only his own native tongue, may talk to each other in 
their own languages but the words they exchange are unlikely to have much 
impact on them. An understanding of the meaning of tbe words the other 
is using is essential to significant human communication. Therefore, 
given our view of language, we shall now attempt to discover the form 
that meaning takes in the human mind, how meaning is developed in man, 
and whether one interpretation of a given situation can be considered 
any more "correct" than another. Each of these issues is central to any 
theory of meaning, and each will add to the groundwork necessary for the 
development of a theory of rhetoric based upon the symbolic interaction-
ists' point of view. 
To begin: meaning does not reside in any object. Tne oDJect is, 
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of course, "out there" in some form, but it has meaning to man only as 
man (or men) may happen to interpret it. The environment has meaning for 
us, says Burke, only after we mediate that part of it which we receive. 
This is so because 
Stimuli do not possess an absolute meaning. l.ven a 
set of signs indicating the likelihood of death by 
torture has another meaning in the orientation of a 
comfort-loving skeptic than it would for the ascetic 
whose world-view promised eternal reward for martyrdom. 
Any given situation derives its character from the 
entire framework of interpretation by which we judge 
it.23 
In fact, for the symbolic interactionist meaning exists only in the 
relationship between an object and its interpreter. The example of 
value-assignment, as explained by Strauss, makes this clear: "Value is 
not an element; it has to do with a relation between the object and the 
person who has experiences with the object •••• the 'essence' or 
'nature' of the object resides not in the object but in the relation 
between it and the namer.1124 
However, it is the observer--the man, if you will--that determines 
the meaning of the relation between himself and the object. From this 
statement it is only a short step to the nature of meaning when two 
people are involved in interaction, rather than when one person is in-
volved with an object. In conversation, two symbol-users are interacting. 
Again, the meaning of the interaction exists in the relation oetween the 
two. ~ut also, again, the meaning is interpreted by each person as he 
acts in the role of receiver. Should there be a difference in meaning 
23Ibid., P• 35. 
24strauss, "Language and Iaent.1.ty, 11 p. 327. 
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as perceived by one person in the role of "sending" and another in the 
role of "receiving," the latter has control of the meaning of the 
situation for him. Reverse the two roles and the other person deter-
mines the meaning of the situation for himself. Lach person, then, can 
determine the meaning of the situation, as each is a symbol-user, but 
the perceptions of one need not mirror the perceptions of the other--
and indeed they probably do not. 
Now we consider the manner by which an inaividual determines the 
meaning that an obJect or situation has for him. Two factors, language 
and society, cast primary influence upon his choices in assigning meaning. 
Basically, language is the means used to interpret meaning. Language 
is the vehicle of meaning. Hugh Duncan maintains that "meaning • • • is 
usually studied through the interpretation of symbols, for it is only in 
symbols that meaning (as attention ana intention) can be ooserved. 1125 
Indeed, because language is tne primary vehicle of interpersonal communi-
cation, it is only through language that shared meanings are made possl..ble 
(even "body language," as we assign meaning to it in thought, is mediated 
through the linguistic equivalents of given movements); and without shared 
meanings there would be no real possibility of communication. Again we 
look to Duncan for the explanation: 
Words become names, and, in so doing, fix social 
meanings. In the meeting and response of conver-
sation, relationships emerge which endure only so 
long as the self and the other continue in dialogue. 
We are not solitary selves who "decide" what to say, 
and then find meaning in this decision. Nor are we 
determined selves wholly formed by forces in nature 
25Hugh Dalziel Duncan, Symbols l:!!_ Society (New York: 
University Press, 1968), p. s. 
• • • 
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and society. The reality in which we live is the 
reality of the named relations between the things of 
the world and man, as well as oetween man and man. 26 
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And, the way in which communication spurs the development of meaning is 
made clear by social psychologists Stone and Farberman: "Specifically, 
the problem of personal meaning lies in the forefront of our conversa-
tion and gives it relevance. Meaning, however, only .2!. established 
in communication. 1127 
But society also helps to provide individuals with a way of deter-
mining meaning. The values of the group often become the values of 
specific individuals who enter the group; or, at times "'the disenchanted 
may be guided to new meanings out of a rejection of the values that 
society holds. These societal values, of course, are formed from the 
individual values of a large number of its members. Rose makes the 
nature of society more graphic: 
••• society is more than a collection of indi-
viduals: it is a collection of individuals with a 
culture, which has been learned by symbolic com-
munication from other individuals back througn 
time, so that tne members can gauge their behavior 
to each other and to the society as a whole. 28 
The symbolic interactiouists reJect the view of man put fortn by the 1 
existentialists. Man is not alone in the world, uninfluenced oy other 
men. Indeed, as Blumer indicates, "group life consists of the association 
26~ •• pp. 103-4. 
27Gregory P. Stone and Harvey A. Far.berman, "Introduction," in their 
Social Psychol,: Through Symbolic Interaction {Waltham, Mass,: Ginn-
Blaisdell, 1970~ P• 2. 
28Arnold Rose, "A Systematic Summary of Symbolic Interaction 
Theory," in his Human Behavior !!!,2_ Social Processes (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1962), PP• 8-9. 
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of ••• reacting organisms. 1129 Each man is influenced in some way by 
each other man with whom he holds conversation (even if that conversation 
is only "in the mind"). Thus, each man is influenced in his assignment 
of meanings ny the people with whom he comes in contact. These signifi-
cant others, when they form the community an l.ndividual belongs to, provide 
the societal background which impinges upon the individual as he gives 
meaning to his world. In the words of Natanson, "Apart from society, 
there can be ••• no community of lUlderstanding. 1130 In this way 
society contributes to the individual's assignment of meaning to situa-
tions, and the individual contributes to the establishment of socially 
held meanings. 
Now, recall for a moment the discussion of language in which I 
asserted that only through ambiguity was language capable oi allowing 
cl~sification and, thus, providing a means for communication. Ambiguity 
in language_, of course, refers to ambiguity in the meaning of language. 
And, as we noted in the earlier discussion,
obscurity and ambiguity must not be explained away 
as meaningless, either because of difficulty of inter-
pretation or subjectivity. A symbol is "meaningless" 
only because we do not know how to interpret it • • • 
And perhaps it is the ambiguity of symbols which makes 
them so useful in human society. Ambiguity is a kind of 
bridge that allows us to run .back and forth from one kind 
of meaning to another, until we take firm resolve to 
cross the bridge into new, and fixed, meanings. 31 
29.Herbert Blumer, "Sociological Implications of the Thought of George 
Herbert Mead," American Joumal of Sociology, LXVI (1966), p. 535. 
30Maurice Natanson, Social Dynamics .2£._ George Herbert~ 
(Washington, D.C.: The Public Affairs Press, 1956), p. 7. Though 
Natanson would probably not be termed a symbolic interactionist now, 
his work is included because he is here providing an interpretation 
of George Herbert Mead. 
31ouncan, Symbols Society• PP• 7-8 • 
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Given the ambiguity of language and the "interpreter-centered" under-
standing of meaning, it becomes clear that there are no "set" or "correct" 
meanings in the symbolic interactions of man. It is true, of course, that 
each of us may intend that our meanings be accepted as correct; and it may 
be true that some statements may be more clearly accurate in their description 
of some object or event than others. But, it is also true tnat the "others" 
who confront each of us with slightly different meanings than our own nave 
the same "I am right" view. As each person necessarily determines what a 
given situation means to him in terms of his background and experiences, 
and any pressures or whims of the moment• only he can determine whether or 
not his interpretation of the situation is--in terms of his momentary state--
"correct" or not. We should not press this issue too far• for in a way the 
social ~emanticists are arguing from a strong position when they say tnat 
we should "think through" situations I taking the time to consider alterna-
tive interpretations, before we react to tnem (draw meaning from them). But, 
regardless of what we should do 1 it is clear that the indiviaual is free 
(insofar as his terministic screens allow freedom) to araw whatever mean-
ing from a situation that he might choose. 32 As ~urke puts it, 
32A friend was once involved in an incident which can pernaps nelp 
to illustrate this point. He had just moved into a house in a neignbor-
hood foreign to him. His bedroom was at one ena of the upstairs nallway, 
his baby's room was across the nall, and there was a window at their end 
of the hall. Just outside the baby's roan sat a bust of the David atop a 
column. Shortly after moving into the house he was awakened one night by 
some sort of noise. In his sleepy state he glanced out the door and saw 
what appeared to be the shadow of a mannext to the baby's room. Thinking 
that an intruder had entered the house he bound from the bed and tackled 
the first man-like figure he saw--the bust. The shadow he had seen, of 
course I was that of the .bust. The moonlignt coming through the hallway 
window was at just the right angle to make the bust appear to be a man, 
given the friend's sleepy state. The meaning he drew from.the ~ituatio~ 
was reality to him. And, acting on the basis of that reality hi~ re?ction 
was quite appropriate. In reality, there was no intruder. But in his 
symbolic reality, there was. 
Distinctions between emotion and logic, intuition 
and reason, however well they may serve in other 
connections, need not concern us here. It was in-
tuitive of the flock to fly when one of its members 
flew--and it was also quite logical of them to do 
so. They had responded to a character of events in a 
way which , generally speaking, ass is ts in preserving 
them--and I cannot conceive of anything more logical, 
even though the one bird that set them off may have 
been w~ong or perverse. 33 
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Meaning, then, should be understood as a process controlled by the 
individual symbol-user in his role as perceiver. Meaning is derived from 
his interpretation of the relationship between himself and an obJect or 
person and, in the final analysis, only he can determine wnether he has 
drawn the "correct" or appropriate meaning from the situation. 
REALITY: THE STONE BEFORE THE SCULPTOR 
Reality is the scene upon which human action takes place. It 
should be clear by now, however, that man does not act in response to all 
of the things that objectively exist "out there." Rather, ne reacts only 
to those parts of the total real world that come into his social world; 
he reacts only toward those things which have meaning for him. Thus, 
much of what will be "named" as the components and nature of reality can 
be directly implied from the preceding sections. But because scene plays 
a relatively important role in the total theory of Burke and some of the 
other symbolic interactionists, additional development seems in order. 
Our starting point is reality34 and our basic assertion will be 
33Burke, Permanence Change, p. 84. 
34To this point we have enclosed the tenn "reality" in quotation 
marks, in an attempt to hold off assumed definitions of the word. 
Having arrived at the part of this chapter wnere definitions will 
be specified, the quotation marks will now be removed. 
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that so far as man, symbol-user, in society is concerned only symbolic 
reality is meaningful. It is beyond dispute, of course, that there are 
real, concrete objects "out there." But these objects have no meaning for 
man except through the interpretation he puts on them--an interpretation 
mediated through his control over language. Duncan maintains that 
Nature may exist "outside of'' human perception, or 
be subject to "immutable laws" which we can know 
but cannot change, but in so far as we connnunicate 
about nature, we do so through symbols which we do 
create , and do change. This is not to say that 
nature and symbols are the same. • • • But as we 
symbolize nature we make it a scene or stage upon 
which we enact our drama of social order. Tnus, 
the environment of man is a symbolic environment. 35 
A tree (in nature) naturally casts a shadow when light hits it. This 
shadow is something that can provide protection for man in the heat of 
the day, for it provides a shield against the sun. In this "role" the 
tree is said to provide shade. But, though the tree and the shadow be 
real, the shadow does not take on the meaning of "cool" or "protection" 
until the man realizes, symbolically, that it can serve this function. 
Until such a realization occurs, there is only the physical reality of a 
tree casting a shadow. Much in the same way, argues Mead, "the form has 
no meaning" in mechanical science. 36 It only exists waiting for man to 
determine its meaning. 
Again, we can talk about :reality only after it has .been mediated 
through language; and we can never discuss all that there is about an 
35 Duncan, Symbols in Society, PP• 70-1. 
36George Herbert Mead, "Evolution Becomes a General Idea,•~ George 
Herbert~ .2!!. Social Psychology, ed. Anselm Strauss (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 196~), p.a. 
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object in nature, nor can we even know all that there is a.bout the 
object because of the terministic screens which language places between 
us and the object. Duncan explains that 
the purely formal aspect of a symbol system (whether 
mathematical or linguistic) in which we "report" 
what we have observed about human relationships, 
will determine what we can "report" about what 
we have observed, just as it determines what we 
have observed, for it is only as we name things 
an~ eve~;s that we can relate to them as social 
beings. 
He continues, "When we say that there is some reality in human relation-
ships which lies 'beyond I symbols, we are still bound by symbols in our 
'report' of the operations of the 'extrasymbolic' phenomena we have 
observed. 1138 
Psychologist Fritz Heider, though not necessarily working from the 
standpoint of symbolic interaction, provides an explanation of the 
stages involved in the perception of a real object, the way in wnicn it 
is altered as the person forms his impressions of it. The explanation, 
in addition, seems to mesh quite well with other assumptions of the 
symbolic interactionists. According to Heider there are five stages 
involved as the individual interprets reality: the distal stimulus 
{the object "out there"), a mediation by sowid or light waves, a proximal 
stimulus (the object after outside mediation), an internal mediation in 
which the person's constructs further "distort" the distal stimulus, and, 
37Duncan, Symbols .!B. Society, p. 51. 
38Ibid. 
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finally, a percept--the individual's impression of the distal stimulus. 39 
The two DBdiating processes necessarily change the abject from its natural 
state to something quite different as it is finally perceived. It is in 
the second mediating stage that language--terministic screens--begin to 
pick and choose the parts of the objective reality which will make their 
way into the percept. Thus we change what is in nature as we bring it 
into our consciousness. As Burke puts it, "hven if any given terminology 
is a reflection of reality, by its very nature as a ternu.nology it must 
be a selection of reality; and to this extent it must function also as 
a deflection of reality. u 4o Different people develop different meanings 
from the "same" "reality" due to the different focuses which they place 
upon it. Thus, for .Blumer, "It follows that obJects vary in their meaning. 
A tree is not the same object to a lumberman, a botanist, or a poet; a 
star is a different object to a modern astronomer than it was to a sheep-
herder of antiquity 1141 . . . 
As far as man is concerned, then, reality is a symbolic phenomenon: 
We discern situational patterns oy means of the 
particular vocabulary of the cultural group into 
which we are .oorn. Our minds, as linguistic pro-
ducts, are composed of concepts (verbally molded) 
which select certain relationships as meaningful. 
Other groups may select other relationships as 
meaningful. These relationships are not realities, 
they are interpretations of reality--hence different 
~9Fri tz Heider, Psychology £f Interpersonal Relations (New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1958), pp. 22-7. Although I have never seen 
Heider classified as a symbolic interactionist, many of his views a.bout 
the ways in which man perceives his surroundings do parallel the 
ideas of the symbolic interactionists. If he does not fully fit with 
all the symbolic interaction views of man in society, he does sub-
scribe to enough of them that I feel comfortable in including his work. 
40Burke, Language !!!. Symbolic Action, p. 45. 
41Blumer, "Sociological Implications," p. 539. 
frameworks of interpretation will lead to different 
conclusions as to what reality is. 42 
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Weaver argues that "know ledge of the prime reality comes to man through 
the word; the word is a sort of deliverance from the shifting world of 
appearances. 1143 Man does contact reality, but as Heider' s system indi-
cates, he perceives very little of what is "environmental reality." The 
extent to which language shapes our understanding of reality fa revealed 
by Burke in a particularly succinct passage: 
••• can we bring ourselves to realize just how 
overwhelmingly much of what we mean by "reality" 
has been built up for us through nothing but our 
symbol systems? Take away our books, and what 
little do we know about history , biography• even 
something so "down to earth" as a relative position 
of seas and continents? What is our "reality" for 
today ••• but all this clutter of symbols about 
the past, combined with whatever things we know mainly 
through maps, magazines, newspapers• and the like about 
the present? ••• The various courses in the curriculum 
are in effect but so many terminologies. 44 
According to Duncan, Mead called symbols the observable facts of socia-
tion. His description of the act was II in terms of significant symbols, 
an act whose beginning is determined by imagery of its end, places 
symbols within the act. 1145 This makes symbols the equivalent of reality 
and experience, so far as the act is concerned. 
Further, as man has the power to change his language system to 
eliminate symbols that are no longer needed and to invent those new 
symbols which can help interpret new developments which affect him, man 
42 Burke, Permanence ,2 Change, p. 35. 
43weaver, Ideas Have Consequences• p. 149. 
44Burke , Language !!_ Symbolic Action, p. 5. 
45Hugh Dalziel Duncan, CommWlication and Social Order (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 93. --
can also change his view of reality as conditions change. Berger and 
Luclcmann argue: 
It follows that relations with others in the face-
to-face situation are highly flexible. Put negatively, 
it is comparatively difficult to impose rigid patterns 
upon face-to-face interaction: Whatever patterns are 
introduced will be continuously modified through the 
exceedingly variegated and subtle interchange of sub-
jective meanings that'goes on. For instance, I may 
view the other as someone inherently unfriendly to 
me and act toward him within a pattem of "unfriendly 
relations" as understood by me. In the face-to-face 
situation, however, the other may confront me with 
attitudes and acts that contradict this pattern, 
perhaps up to a point where I am led to abandon the 
pattern as inapplicable and to view him as friendly. 46 
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In other words, as situations change and additional information is ac-
cepted and interpreted by man through his symbol system wnat he formerly 
perceived as the reality of a situation is changed. 
From this view of reality as symbolic we can move easily into a 
brief consideratic.m of a closely linked term--knowledge. Just as we 
concluded that reality is socially determined according to symbol systems, 
we can argue that knowledge is so determined. For at oase knowledge is 
simply the cognizance that we have of the reality arow1d us. In a way, 
once we have defined reality for man as symbolic reality, we may .be a 
bit redundant to talk about knowledge. Berger and Luclcmann a&,ree: "~ 
sociology of knowledge !!_ concerned analysis _a social 
construction .2f reality. 1147 And, just as the reality of a situation may 
46Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction 
of Reality (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1966), p. 30. 
Sociologists Berger and Luckmann are, in this book, tying together 
the ideas of Mead and Durkheim. As they explain in a rather long 
footnote to the introduction, they are attempting to integrate 
the thinking of the symbolic interactionist school to the sociology 
of knowledge. 
47Ibid., p. 3. 
appear different to two different persons, so may the knowledge they 
gain from it: 
Sociological interest in questions of "reality" 
and "knowledge" is thus initially justified by the 
fact of their social relativity. What is "real" to 
a Tibetan monk may not be "real" to an American 
businessman. The "know ledge" of the criminal differs 
from the "knowledge" of the criminologist. It fol-
lows that specific agglomerations of "reality" and 
"knowledge" pertain to specific social contexts • • • 48 
CONCLUSI01'1 
07 
For the symbolic interactionist .ooth reality and meaniug collapse 
back into language: reality exists in nature, and it is the backdrol:J 
against which man acts. But this backdrop is linguistically mediated oy 
each person as he acts, and he "performs the script" according to his 
own interpretation of it. He cannot totally ignore the realities that 
impinge upon him, but he does make significant changes in them as he 
sorts them through the terministic screens that guide his tho~ght. Tne 
same tree, or rock, or bird, or person may have a different meaning for 
a person each time he enco~ters it in a given situation. Thus, though 
the abject may remain pretty much the same in nature, it does change in 
the minds of the social beings who act in response to it. In a phrase, 
not only is man deeply grounded in language, but so is his interpretation 
of all that goes on about him. 
, Chapter 4 
ACT: THE ULTIMATE REDUCTION OF HUMAN BErlA VIOR 
Whenever man undertakes purposive, mediated .oehavior he is acting. 
The act is a great unifying concept in the study of man: .t>oth the base-
ball player attempting to steal a oase and the young lover attempting to 
"get to first oase" are involved in action; so with the marble shooter who 
has laid nis marbles "on the line" and is attempting to save them--and 
with the psychiatrist who is trying to save someone else's. We may study 
man from the standpoint of action in such a variety of situations and 
behavior patterns tnat a lifetime of cataloging them would provide only 
a fractional part of what might eventually be the total list. Bu~ Just 
as the act is a unifying concept for the study of man 9 so is it a concept 
which divides the study of man from the study of most other beings, 
objects, and "things." Man acts with purpose. He undertakes a given 
behavior in response to a problematic situation. His action is, thus, 
mediated by thought processes. When a man rises it is because he has 
willed the action; when bread rises it is the result of an "unminded" 
chemical process. 
To the symbolic interactionist, action is the adaptation of an 
organism to its environment. When the adapting organism is human, the 
actor is a determining agent. The human organism can add the element 
of determination• or willing, because of his grasp of tbe symbolic 
process. His language allows him to observe his situation, mediate it 
via comparisons with past experiences, test possible responses througn 
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that process which is so fully human, thought, and finally take some 
sort of observable (or unobservable) action as a response. It is this 
linguistic element, or symbolic action, which provides a differentiation 
between man and other animals. We need not introduce language to draw a 
difference between the action of a man and the motion of a bit of bread 
dough• but we do need the element of language to clearly distinguish 
man's actions from those of "higher" animals. Pavlov's dogs made an auto-
matic response to a stimulus I much as early man must have responded to 
the warning signal Burke calls a "primordial grunt. 11 But man's response, 
given a grasp of language, is far more complex. The idea is made clear 
by Meltzer: "All human activity other than reflex and habitual action 
is built up in the process of its execution; i.e. 1 behavior is constructed 
as it goes along, for decisions must be made at several points. The 
significance of this fact is that people act--rather than merely re-
acting.111 As sociologists Stone and Far.oennan maintain 1 "Symbolic 
interactionists repudiate tne notion that man is a passive. neutral 
agent I pushed one way or another by external or internal forces. Man 
is .both actor ( the "I") and acted upon ( the "me")• both subject and 
object. 112 
MAN AS THL CONTROLLER OF ACTION 
Basic to tne symbolic interactionist's view of action is the belief 
1.&ernard N. Meltzer 1 "Mead's Social Psychology 1 " Symbolic 
Interaction: Reader in Social Psychology, eds. Jerane G. Manis 
and aernard N. Meltzer (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 196 7) , p. 17. 
2Gregory P. Stone and Harvey A. Farberman, "Symbolic Interaction: 
Perspective and Directions," in their Social Ps¥chology Through 
Symbolic Interaction (Waltham, Mass.: Ginn-Blaisdell 1 1970), p. 18. 
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that man ultimately maintains control over his actions. This control 
begins with his selection of specific goals for a given act; human action 
I 
begins in purpose. Psychiatrist David Levy maintains that all men may be 
thought of as 
goal determined organisms, initiating goals and driven 
by goals. It may be assumed that animals are likewise 
so constituted, the difference being that in human 
behavior the goals are more numerous and more complex, 
more self-determined, and achieved by the use of 
instruments that belong to an order of symbolic 
thinking unknown in the animal world. 3 
That this view of goal-directed human behavior is deeply rooted in sym-
bolic interactionist thinking is made clear by Stone and Farberman. In 
their tracing of these roots they argue 
In his review of pragmatism, Durkheim observed 
that Peirce, James, Schiller, and Dewey were in 
agreement: no exterior, impersonal, and complete 
truth, irrespective of its source (intellection 
or sensory perception) could be a living and 
compelling truth without taking the realm of goals, 
means, and choices ( the realm of human purpose) 
into account. In fact, to conceive truth as "given," 
i.e., "out there," divorces it from human life and 
action. 4 
Man, at base, is in control of his actions--both his interactions 
with other men and his action with regard to pnysical reality. As Stone 
and Farberman put it, "man is front stage center." The universe is 
inherently 






Stone and Harvey A. Farberman, "On the Edge of Reap-
Durkheim Moving Toward the Perspective of Symbolic 
their Social Psychology Through Symbolic Interaction 
Ginn-Blaisdell, 1970), p. 107. 
meaningless and totally indifferent to the existence 
of man. While it conditions, it does not determine. 
Indeed, the universe presents itself as an occasion 
for man's creative capacities. It is there. It 
awaits his investiture of identity, meaning, value, 
sentiments, and rules. It is a convertible commodity--
a taken, not a given; a concept, not a datum. 5 
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Man, it is true , adapts to his environment. But the reverse is not true , 
except as man attempts to make the environment adapt to him. As Mead 
maintains, 11 in the case of the human form, of human society, we nave 
that adaptation expressing itself in a very high degree of control. " 6 
Stone and Farberman illustrate the uniqueness of man's method of 
adaptation: 
Man's particular style of reactivity is qualitatively 
different from that of lower forms. Only man reaches 
the stage of actual symbolic behavior where he gains 
freedom from the intrinsic properties of the universe. 
The point is reached in symbolic oehavior where individ-
uals respond to arbitrary designations of their own 
creation that stand for things but bear no intrinsic 
relationship to them--such as the American flag, and 
the American Republic.7 
Indeed, 
For better or for worse , man is the locus of purpose 
and power. He is the reality maker and the reality 
breaker. lie alone is engaged in tne "politics of 
reality." • • • But no matter what, it will be man 
who creates, sustains, and changes meaning. 8 
5Gregory P. Stone and Harvey A. Farberman, "Social Process as 
Symbol.ic Transformation," in their Social. Psychol.of. Through Symoolic 
Interaction (Waltham, Mass.: Ginn-Blaisdel.l, 1970 , p. 89. 
6George Herbert Mead, "The Problem of Society--How We Become 
Selves," George Herbert _2!!. Social Psychology, ed. Anselm 
Strauss (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), P• Jl. 
7 Stone and Farberman, "Social Process as Symbolic Transformation, 11 
p. 90. 
8Ibid. , p. 89 • 
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Human action begins with the setting of goals and it is man who 
sets those goals. It involves an adaptive response to an environment. 
He botn chooses that response and determines the nature of the environ-
ment tnrougn the assignment of meaning to it. Man is, in point of fact, 
the final determiner of his actions. Outside forces may impinge upon him 
and, to some extent, influence his choices, but they never take away from 
him completely the element of choice. 
THE SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISTS' VIEW OF THE ACT 
Traditionally, sociologists have approached the concept of human 
action in terms of social structures. By and large, they have tended to 
use "pigeon holes" consisting of various forms of social organizations 
and structures when considering the act; they have analyzed the act by 
first attempting to fit particular acts into these pigeon holes and then 
evaluating these acts on the oasis of pre-set theories about each pigeon 
hole. What this amounts to, claims Blumer, is placing the human act in 
a secondary position. 
By and large, of course, sociologists do not study 
human society in terms of its acting units. Instead• 
they are disposed to view human society in terms of 
structure or organization and to treat social action 
as an expression of such structure or organization • 
• • • These various lines of sociological. perspective 
and interest, which are so strongly entrenched today, 
leap over the acting units of a society ana bypass the 
interpretative process by which auch acting units 
build up their actions.9 
This treatment, of course, is quite far from the approach of the 
symbolic interactionists. Blumer, Mead. and other such theorists place 
9Herbert Blumer• "Society as Symbolic Interaction," Symbolic Inter-
action: Reader ..!!!., Social Psychology• eds. Jerome G. Manis and 
Bernard N. Meltzer (Boston: Allyn and liacon. 1967), p. 146. 
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the act in a primary position and analyze individual and societal actions 
in a more situational context. Blumer maintains that this is especially 
necessary in modern, complex societies. In these societies, as the 
streams of new situations arise and old situations 
become unstable, the influence of organization de-
creases. One should bear in mind that the most im-
portant element confronting an acting unit in sit-
uations is the actions of other acting units. In 
modern society, with its increasingly criss-crossing 
of lines of action, it is common for situations to 
arise in which the actions of participants are not 
previously regularized and standardized. To this 
extent, existinff social organization does not shape 
the situation.l 
The social lessons of the 1960 1 s and early 1970 1 s snould make this clear. 
Groups faced with unresponsive power structures abandoned the established 
and formalized methods of social communication and social change, turning 
instead to fresh action responses to the situations that confronted them. 
To attempt analysis of these uncharted responses in terms of established 
social patterns has proven fruitless. For these situations, as for most 
others, the symbolic interactionist would surely maintain that the best 
means of analysis would be one that featured the inter-actions of the 
acting units. Thus, at base, the symbolic interactionist views human 
action in terms of the individual actor or groups of actors responding 
to specific environmental-matrices. 
Further, these theorists reJect the notion that only "action" can 
be considered as an act and that the verbal attachment to the act is an 
entirely different matter. C. Wright Mills explains• "we need not treat 
an action as discrepant from 'its' verbalization, for in many cases, the 
verbalization is a new act. In such cases, there is not a discrepancy 
lO_!ill. • P• 147 • 
between an act and 'its' verbalization, but a difference between two 
disparate actions, motor-social and verbal. ull In addition, as Rose 
argues, symbols may be considered as incipient acts. 
A symbol is incipient telescoped ,!£!, in which the 
later stages--involving elements of both meaning and 
value--are implied in the first stage. Thus, the symbol 
"chair" implies the physical comfort, the opportunity 
to do certain things which can best .oe done while sit-
ting, and otner similar "outcomes" of sitting in a 
chair. It should be understood, as Mead points out, 
that "language does not simply symbolize a situation 
or object which is already there in advance; it makes 
possible the existence or the appearance of that situa-
tion or obJect, for it is a part of the mechanism whereby 
the situation or object is created •1112 
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. . f d 13 In other words, talking about doing a deed is, in and by itsel, a eea. 
The "interactionist", then, puts the act in the primary position as 
he views society. His method calls for the analysis of one act in terms 
of its response or responsiveness to another act. The "symbolic" inter-
actionist considers the symbolic act on an equal plane witn the physical 
act. They are different, possibly, in terms of their form .out not in 
terms of their impact on social situations. 
11c. Wright Mills, "Situatea Actions and Vocabularies of Motive," 
Symbolic Interaction: !:.. Reader in Social Psychology, eds. Jerome G. 
Manis and Bernard N. Meltzer (Boston: Allyn and Hacon, 1967), p. 359. 
12Arnold Rose, "A Systematic Summary of Symbolic Interaction Theory," 
in his Human Behavior and Social Processes (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1962), p. 5. -
13This is not a view that predominates in our society. News reports 
are full of complaints that "the President never does anything, he just 
talks about it." But in terms of social analysis, when the Pre&ident 
does talk about it he is, in fact, doing something. The very presence 
of the tal.k: indicates that, at the very least, the problem being con-
sidered is one that has commanded his attention and toward which ne is 
directing attempted solutions. 
7o 
THE STAGES OF THE ACT 
Though the act is a process with no clear oeginning and no clear 
end-one act may call out a response which is another act, and the "end" 
of one may oe the "beginning" of the other--there are certain identifiable 
stages that a person goes through in performing acts. Mead's definition 
of an act, as related here by Levy, clearly indicates the presence of 
such stages: 
We may define the act as the ongoing behavior of 
the individual, initiated by a want and directed to 
the end of satisfying that want through the use of 
suitable elements in the environment. In any act, 
the end is that which determines the direction of 
the activity, and which is present in the beginning 
as a control, defining the want and regulating its 
expression. This ~onstitutes the act as teleo-
logical activity. 1 
The act, further, contains all of those elements of human perception and 
thought which psychologists have wicovered, but as Meltzer claims it 
contains them in a slightly different way. As one would expect, the 
process emphasis of the symbolic interactionist tends to mesh these 
elements closely together: 
Within the act, all the separated categories of the 
traditional, orthodox psychologies find a place. 
Attention, perception, imagination, reasoning, 
emotion, and so forth, are seen as parts of the 
act--rather than as more or less extrinsic influ-
ences upon it. Human behavior presents itself in 
the ~orm of acts, ratger than of concatenations 
of nu.nute responses. 
The symbolic interactionist meshes all of these processes into four 
stages, each of which can probably be identified in a given act but which 
overlap severely as the act develops. As Levy maintains, the act should 
14Levy, "The Act as a Unit," pp. 295-6. 
l5Meltzer, "Mead's Social Psychology," p. 17. -
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be considered as a unit, but for purposes of analysis four parts can be 
identified. Mead, in his major treatise on the act, identifies these 
four steps as impulse, perception, manipulation, ana consummation. 16 
The impulse, according to Pfuetze, is the "felt want or the feeling 
of incompletion projecting the need of the organism into tne environment, 
relating the organism to the environment both selectively and then re-
sponsively, both actively and passively.1117 As such, the impulse operates 
as an antenna--keeping the organism alert and searching out from tne world 
of real objects those "stimuli" which are relevant to the organism's con-
tinuing emergence and interaction with its environment. ~atanson maintains 
that impulse "appears to be not the sensory content of experience, not 
sense data, but the attituae of the organism to the initial stimulus in 
so far as that attitude does not involve overt activity.1118 
Mead identifies the perception stage as 
a relation between a highly aeveloped physiological 
organism and an obJect, or an environment in whicn 
selection emphasizes certain elements. This relation 
involves a duration and a process. Tne process is that 
of action through media which affect the sense organs 
of the biological individual. The process takes time, 
and the effect produced upon the organism is later than 
the disturbance of the medium and still later than the 
influence of the object upon the medium. The customary 
interpretation of this statement identifies the perception 
16see George Herbert Mead, !!!!_ Philosophy of (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1938), pp. 3-25. 
17Paul E. Pfuetze, ~• Society. Existence (New York: Harper 
& Brothers, 1954), p. 44. Pfuetze is being included because he is, 
in this work, interpreting Mead's writing. The general tone of this 
book does indicate, further, that he is working from the perspective 
of the symbolic interactionists. 
18Maurice Na tans on, The Social Dynamics of George Her.be rt 
(Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1956), p. 21. 
with the effect within the organism, regarding these 
bodily effects as significant of the things that have 
mediately affected them, Justifying this significance by 
the fact that any object or event such as an organism is 
significant of the rest of nature and therefore of the 
particular objects whicn are involved in the process of 
perception; the selection of this particular obJect 
being due to the sensitiveness of the organism to the 
relation, one relatum of which is found in the nervous 
excitement within the organism /impulse/. 19 
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Basically, Mead is arguing that the impulse has meaiated those parts of 
reality which the organism will attend to. When the organism finds an 
element in the environment which releases or satisfies the searcn of the 
impulse, he will attend to that element. This attending is what Mead 
terms perception, which by his analysis is selective in nature. 20 
The perceptual object, though, "is primarily the organization of 
the immediate environment with reference to the organism." And, ~ercep-
tion, so conceived, "has no other significance than that of the sense 
apparatus in its adjustment to the environment, in its function in sele-
ction of the stimulation needed for the reaction of the organism thro~h 
its relation to the central nervous system. 1121 . . In the stage of per-
ception, the obJect is yet in the distance. Thus, we come to tn~ stage 
of manipulation in which the organism makes "direct" contact with the 
abject and plots out his course of action in relation to it. It is in 
this stage that the organism "handles" the o.bJect, either physically or 
19Mead, Philosophy of~ Act, PP• 8-9. 
20The reader is referred to a discussion of the manner in which 
this selective perception occurs, as detailed by psychologist Fritz 
Heider, Psychology Ef Interpersonal Relations (New York: John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1958), pp. 22-5. 
21 Mead, Philosophy ot Act, p. lo. 
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symbolically I and prepares for the stage of consummation. 22 
Pfuetze 1 in his brilliant interpretation of Mead 1 has meshed the 
stages of manipulation and consummation into a single stage that he calls 
"response." For him 1 the response is "the reply to tne stimulus terminat-
ing the chain of reactions set in motion by the impulsive act of the form 
in selecting its stimulus /its act of perceiving a segment of the 
23 environment/." Consummation I then I is the actual "reaction" to the 
env1ronment 1 tne thing which common-sense language calls an act 1 for it 
is the only part or stage of the act which is directly observable in day 
to day human interaction. 
Charles Morris does us tne favor of pulling tne act back together 
with a crystallizing example: 
The hungry animal has an impulse to eat ; this 
impulse in turn determines what stands out as a 
distant stimulus to guide the ongoing action; 
the object that is approached is clawed, bitten 1 
downed; with eating the impulse reaches its con-
summation. And similar examples could be chosen 
at the level of complex social organisms. 24 
And, it is important that we do pull the concept of the act back together 1 
.... 
for the advice of Andrew Reck is sound: 
The discrimination of these stages must not obscure 
the concrete wholeness of the act 1 for the act 1 as 
the "unit of existence 1 " is not a thin moment but 
rather "stretches beyond the stimulus to the response. 11 25 
22see .!ill.·• pp. 17-23. 
23Pfuetze, ~. Society, ~Existence, p. 45. 
24charles Morris, "Introduction.'' in George Herbert Mead's The 
Philosophy ,2!. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press-:--
1938), ix. Morris is considered to be a symbolic interactionist. 
25Andrew Reck 1 "Introduction," in his Selected Writings: George 
Herbert Mead (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1964), 
xx. Quotations are from Mead, Philosophy .2f. ~• Reck is considered 
to be a symbolic interactionist. 
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But there are potential problems in this brief description of the act. 
On its face, this explanation allows one to draw the inadequate conclu-
sion that (1) the act may be equally well performed by nonhuman organisms 
and (2) the act is necessarily short in duration. Lach of these inaaequate 
conclusions will now be dispelled in turn. 
The example which Morris gives for the act has, as its central 
character, a nonhuman form--the hungry animal. And, this hungry animal 
performs, in turn, each of the stages of the act described by Mead. I 
am maintaining that this conclusion is inadequate, not false. It is 
probably true that animals can perform an act, Lut their range of acting 
is extremely limited and it is based upon non-symbolic processes. It is 
clear from Mead's writings that he was primarily concerned with the human 
symbolic act, man interacting with other men or with his environment--what 
we shall refer to in later pages as the "social act." The basic reason 
that the act must be regarded as a typically human "action" is found in 
the concept of mediation. During the manipulatory stage the object is 
handled, toyed with. Particularly if the manipulation is symbolic, this 
handling is accomplished through thought. Meltzer explains the impor-
tance of this mediation process as he argues that the act 
is viewed as a complete span of action: its initial 
point is an impulse and its terminal point some objective 
which gives release to the impulse. In between, the 
individual is in the process of constructing, organizing 
his behavior. It is during this period that the act 
undergoes its~ significant phase _2t development. 
In the case of human behavior, this period is marked 
by the play of images of possible goals or lines of 
action upon the impulse, thus directing the activity to 
its consummation.26 
26Meltzer, "Mead's bocial Psychology," pp. 17-18. Italics are mine. 
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This mediation, again, is accomplished through thought. Mead maintains 
that, indeed, it is this aspect of the act which brings about human 
thought: "Reflective thinking arises in testing the means wnich are 
presented for carrying out some hypothetical way of continuing action 
which has been checked. 1127 
The second inadequate conclusion which coula follow from our descrip-
tion of the act concerned its time-span. Briefly, an act may be extremely 
short, as in calling out the name of a person you want to find, or it may 
be extremely long, as with conducting an exhaustive searcn for a missing 
person. Lach of these is considered an act by the symbolic interaction-
ists. As Mead has maintained, the act is the "unit of ex.1.stence. 1128 
And conceived this way, any action which constitutes a unit can be con-
sidered as an act, whether it lasts a second or a year. We should observe, 
however, that in longer acts we are likely to be talking about a number 
of shorter acts which interlock so as to serve as larger units. We can 
illustrate this notion by arguing that one speech by a civil ri&nts leader 
may be considered an act; likewise a series of speeches given by the same 
leader may be considered as a series of separate acts, and may be so 
studied; but, in addition, this series of speeches, if intended as the 
parts of a unified campaign ( a unit) may also .be considered as one larger 
act, and may be studied in this way also. 
THE SOCIAL ACT 
To tnis point the discussion has centered on what I shall term tne 
basic or 1.ndi vidual act. Such an act does have direct social goals and 
27Mead, The Philosophy of~~, P• 79. 
28 ~-, p. 65. 
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implications but it is not the same as what the symbolic interactionists 
call the "social act." The social act is of such central importance to 
the symbolic interactionists that Miyamoto has called it "the keystone of 
29 the interactionist approach." 
For human action to be termed "social," or for 1. t to have social 
impact, it need not occur in a situation involving two or more people. 
As Meltzer explains, we may call behavior social either when it is a 
response to others or "when it has incorporated in it tne behavior of 
others. The human being responds to himself as others respond to nim, 
and in so doing he imaginatively shares the conduct of others. 1130 however, 
an individual's action, replete with social implications, is not what the 
interactionists have in mind with the term "social act." 
The social act is defined, in the words of Mead, as 
one in which the occasion or stimulus which sets 
free an impulse is found in the character or con-
duct of a living form that belongs to the proper 
environment of the living form whose impulse it 
is. I wish, however, to restrict the social act 
to the class of acts which involve the cooperation 
of more than one individual, and who&e obJect as 
defined oy the act ••• is a social object. I 
mean by a social object one that answers to all tne 
parts of the complex act, though these parts are 
found in the conduct of different individuals. The 
obJective of the acts is then found in the life 
processes of the group, not in those of the separate 
individuals alone. 31 
29s. Frank Miyamoto, "The Social Act: A Re-examination of a 
Concept , 11 Social Psychology Through Symbolic Interaction, eds. 
Gregory P. Stone and Harvey A. Farberman (Waltham, Mass.: Gum-
Blaisdell, 1970), p. 293. Miyamoto is considered to be a symbolic 
interactionist. 
30Meltzer, "Mead's Social Psychology," p. 9. 
31This statement is taken from a footnote in Natanson, The 
Social Dynamics _2f George Herbert ~, p. 18. 
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The distinction that we make, then, between an act with social implica-
tions and a social act is clarified by Miyamoto. 
The term "social act" has been used with two different 
meanings. Loosely employed, it refers to any act 
occuring in a social context; that is, any act having 
a social obJect as a referent. In Mead's usage, how-
ever, it refers to a group action; specifically, to 
an organized action of two or more individuals tnat 
is directed toward some common goa1. 32 
Mead himself helps to further crystallize the relation between the two 
types of acts by suggesting that 
The perspective of the individual is, therefore, 
that of the social act--an act which is inclusive 
of the act of the individual but extends beyond it. 
The individual in assuming the attitude of the others 
assumes attitudes that are adjusted to his own par-
ticular response. In so far as these different atti-
tudes of the others call for an identical response of 
his own, the 8rganization of the social act is reflectea 
into his act. 3 
Mead is arguing here that the individual, or basic, act has a social act 
as a point of reference and that the social act is the intermeshing ot 
the acts of two or more individuals, aimed at a joint goal. 
These two types of act, then, are a bit confusing. The individual 
act is social in its nature and aims--but it is not termed "social." 
The other, also social in its nature and aims, is called the "social act" 
because it actually involves the cooperative social behavior of two or 
more individuals. In an effort to provide a more clear distinction be-
tween the two, Blumer has chosen to call Meaa's social act "Joint action.nd4 
32Miyamoto, "The Social Act," p. 294. 
33 Mead, Philosophy of~!£!_, PP• 152-J. 
34see Herbert Blumer, "Sociological Implications of the Thougbt 
of George Herbert Mead," American Journal of Sociology, LXXI (196b), 
pp. 535-44. 
Perhaps this term does help to distinguish which of the two forms of 
act we are discussing at any given time. 
At base, though, we are now turning our attention to the social act 
as Mead has defined it. It is much like the individual act in its basic 
features, but we should probe more deeply to discover how far the similar-
ities go and what the differences between the two mignt be. Miyamoto lists 
four features of the social act: 
First, the concept refers to an abstraction from a 
continuous social process. Most social acts are intri-
cately interwoven with many other acts and it is only 
by abstraction that a given instance may be singled out 
for observation. Second, a social act is conceived as 
having a beginning and ending even though it is dif-
ficult to define these boundaries in specific cases. 
Third, social acts may be subsumed within larger social 
acts. 
Fourth and most important is the assumption that the 
social act is goal-directed or functional for the group 
and that individual acts will tend to be coordinated 
toward the fulfillment of that function. 35 
Max Weber re-emphasizes this fourth feature, noting that social action 
"takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its 
course. 1136 
A fifth feature of the social act is its situational grounding. 
The symbolic interactionist does not place primary emphasis upon social 
structures. Instead, he regards human acts as responses to environment, 
considering the peculiarities of each instance of action. here we turn 
to Blumer and claim, with slightly different emphasis, that men act in 
response to specific social situations. 
35M. 11 iyamoto, The Social Act," p. 294. 
36Max Weber, !!:!! Theory~ Social and Economic Organization, trans. 
A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1947), p. 88. 
People--that is, acting units--do not act toward 
culture, social structure, or the like; they act 
toward situations. Social organization enters into 
action only to the extent to which it shapes 
situations in which people act, and to the extent 
to which it supplies fixed sets of symbols which 
people use in interpreting their situations. 37 
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The act is ultimately in tne control of the person who initiates it. 
He selects his goals, he exercises selective perception in sorting out 
the stimuli to which he will react, he selects the particular means that 
he will undertake to achieve his goals. Man always retains the element 
of choice in his actions, so long as they are acts that are internally 
mediated (as opposed to habitual action38). Choice is prominent, Blumer 
indicates, throughout the "joint", or social, act • 
• • • the career of Joint actions also must be 
seen as open to many possibilities of uncertainty. 
Let me specify the more important of these possi-
bilities. One, joint actions have to be initiated--
and they may not be. Two, once started a Joint 
action may be interrupted, abandoned, or transformed. 
Three, the participants may not make a common 
definition of the joint action into which they are 
thrown and hence may orient their acts on different 
premises. Four, a common definition of a Joint 
action may still allow wide aifferences in the 
direction of tne separate lines of action and hence 
in the course taken by the Joint action; a war is 
a good example. Five, new situations may arise 
calling for hitherto unexisting types of joint 
action, leading to confused exploratory efforts to 
work out a fitting together of acts. And six, even 
in the context of a commonly defined joint action, 
37Blumer, "Society as Symbolic Interaction," p. 146. 
38Though it is probably accurate to say that habitual acts are 
not mediated, they may still be called "acts" in the symbolic inter-
actionist sense. Habitual acts may be so considered since they were 
once mediated--indeed, they were probably mediated many times on 
their way to becoming habitual. This analysis, it would seem, must 
hold as valid unless one buys a wide range of human II instincts" as 
motivating certain human actions. 
participants may .De led to rely on other considera-
tions in interpreting and defining each other's 
lines of action. 39 
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Thus we are impressed by the importance of choice in social acts. In 
all of these ways, and probably many more, the participants in such 
action must make critical choices, choices which may well mean success 
or failure for any given act. 
But Blumer is making yet another point in this statement, namely 
that one of the unique characteristics of a social act (or, in his 
terms, joint action) is the complexity involved in these choices due to 
the presence of more than one individual in the action. When we consider 
the numerous choices involved in an "individual act" of only one person 
we must be impressed by the decisions that must be made in order for 
this relatively simple act to succeed in achieving the individual's goal. 
But in a social act it is assumed that two or more persons are coopera-
tively engaged in an act designed to reach a certain goal. Not only do 
we confront the problem of each individual charting a successful course 
to the goal, but also the problem of the proper meshing of the acts of 
the two individuals so that they will operate as an effective Joint act. 
We might be reminded that too many cooks may spoil the broth. 
Further confounding the role of choice in the social act is Levy's 
claim that the act, once started, tends "to go on to completion • • • 
As the act goes on, the energy directed toward completion increases. 
It is comparatively easy to prevent an act at the time when the impulse 
to act arises , more difficult to stop an act after it has begun, and most 
39Blumer, "Sociological Implications of the Thought of George 
Herbert Mead," p. 541. 
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difficult to stop it when the end-point, the goal, is near. 1140 In other 
words, certain options become more and more difficult to choose as an act 
progresses. Indeed, not only does it become difficult to stop an act, 
Levy maintains that it also becomes more difficult to radically snift the 
direction of an act. At times such a shift becomes nearly impossible. 
Not all acts, but 
certain kinds of goal-directed behavior, once set 
into operation, pursue their course, impelled by 
a law of their own, independent of attitudes, 
regardless of needs or wants. The individual 
is then literally caught up in the act, bound 
by it, compelled to go on and on until the act 
completes itself.41 
This statement perhaps overdraws the interactionists' position, in that 
it seems to imply that there are times when choice is removea totally 
from the individuals involved in an act. A more representative statement 
would indicate that certain kinds of goal-directed behavior~ to pursue 
their own course, compelling the act to complete itself. For the inter-
actionist, the only time that Levy's statement could be accepted at face 
value would be the instance of an act which the individual does not main-
tain conscious contact with. If the individual retains conscious contact 
with an act and it begins to produce results not desired or not antici-
pated in mediation, he could at least attempt to arrest the act and re-
direct it. 
The social act, in sum, is much like the individual act except 
that it involves two or more persons cooperatively acting to achieve a 
common goal. We have traced tnrougn both the similarities of the social 
40Levy, "The Act as a Unit," p. 297. 
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act and the individual act and the differences between the two. The 
most important distinction that can be drawn, in terms of the impact of 
the two types of act, concerns the complication of choices in the social 
act. 
THE THOUGHT ACT: A ThIRD TYPE OF ACT 
The literature of the symbolic interact1.on1sts is rich with material 
concerning the human thought processes. And, as we noticed above, thought 
is the central process involved in the internal mediation that character-
izes human acts. The symbolic interactionists, however, have never con-
sidered thought as an act in itself. It has always remainea an element 
of either the individual act or tne social act. In the following pa~es, 
I will argue that it can be productive to think in terms of a third type 
of act, a "thought act." 
Natanson offers the germ for this analysis in his review of Mead's 
thought: "In its human form, though, the act is characterized .by a 
perceptual state that contains within it the whole of the potentially 
completed act. 1142 Before any self determined act is undertaken, Thomas 
argues, "there is always a stage of examination and deliberation which 
we may call the definition of the si tuat1.on. 1143 It is this time of exam-
ination and deliberation that we may term the thought act. 
If the mediation process is truly an act in itself, then we should 
42Natanson, .!.!:!!_ Social Dynamics .2!_ George Herbert ~• p. 20. 
43William I. Thomas, "The Definition of the Situation," Symbolic 
Interaction: A Reader in Social Psychology, eds. Jerome G. Manis 
and Bernard N.-Meltzer (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1967), P• 31!:>. 
Thomas is considered to be a symbolic interactionist. 
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be able to identify the four stages of the act in it. If we assume that 
man, as the basic act suggests, does wish to maintain control over his 
actions then we have found the impulse stage of the thought act. The 
impulse is an antenna, and in the thought act it seeks release so that 
the overt act may be carefully considerea before it is undertaken. Percep-
tion was defined as simply attending to a particular aspect of the environ-
ment which the impulse has sought out. Again, if we assume that the act 
itself takes place we may conclude that perception is present in the 
thought act, for as the impulse seeks to have the overt act carefully 
considered it will cause perception of the beginnings of an overt act. 
The stage of manipulation is clearly present in the thought act, since 
it is in this stage that the actual handling and testing of the alterna-
tives takes place. Finally. consummation in the thought act would simply 
involve "giving the o.k." to a particular course of action. Thus, to the 
outside observer the thought act has no directly identifiat>le consummation 
stage: the consunnnation stage is there 1 but it never appears overtly 
except to the individual involved in t.t1e thought act. 
Although I nave maintained that the symbolic interactionists nave 
not clearly treated thought as an act in itself, there are strong impli-
cations that it is an act. Meltzer. for example, implies this in speaking 
of tne difference between animal and human reactions to bloci<ed acts. 
"When the act of an animal is checked," he says, "it may engage in overt 
trial and error or random activity. In the case of blocked human acts, 
tne trial ana error may be carried on covertly, implicitly. Consequences 
• • • I • d t I • d "44 can be imaginatively trie ou in a vance. And Desmonde also makes 
44Mel tzer • "Mead's Social Psychology•" P • 14 • 
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this implication: "As a result of the internalization of the social act, 
the 'inner forum' comes into being. The organism rehearses internally 
various types of possible social relations. 1145 
One final point needs to be made here: the thought act, even though 
we consider it an act per se, can exist only in relation to either an 
individual act or a social act. Its role is to service one of these 
other act forms. Just as action is undertaken only in response to a 
problematic situation, so is thought a problem-solving activity. Let us 
take the case of thought which is not followed by an observable act (or, 
at least, a positive observable act). In this case the thought act has 
probably produced a conclusion that no "action" need be taken on the 
matter under consideration. But the thinking itself was stimulated by 
a situation in which there was originally a question as to whether some 
sort of overt action would be appropriate. 
Now, why is 1.t important that we consider thought as an act in 
itself? Basically, I shall argue, thought plays such a central role 1.n 
the symbolic interactionists' analysis of human action that it should ~e 
called an act for emphasis. As Rose claims, "Thinking is the process by 
which possible symbolic solutions and other future courses of action are 
examined, assessed for their relative advantages and disadvant~es in 
terms of the values of the individual, and one of them chosen for action. 1146 
45William H. Desruonde, "The Position of George Herbert Meaa," 
Social Psychology Through Symbolic Interaction, eds. Gregory P. 
Stone and Harvey A. Farberman (Waltham, Mass.: Ginn-Blaisdell, 
19 70 ) , p. 60 0 
46Rose, "A Systematic Summary," p. 12. 
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The odds are good that if a particular act fails to achieve its goal, 
the mediation that preceded the act was faulty (either in choosing too 
difficult a goal or in charting a weak strategy). By elevating thought 
to the level of an act we place enough "symbolic" importance on it to 
cause the individual to examine more closely the ways that he thinks 
through problems, thus increasing the likelihood that he will be better 
able to mediate other future actions. Second, by identifying stages in 
tne tnought act we make it possible for the individual to "break down" 
nis thought p?:'ocess to more closely examine its varying stages. This 
should allow the person to give closer analysis to the various stages 
and to pinpoint particular weaknesses. 
THE. ACT AS FORM 
Hugh Duncan argues that in communication such things as wnere some-
thing is said, by whom, how, when, and for what purpose ultimately deter-
mine meaning for the symbolic act. 47 These elements make up the form of 
a given communicative act. People respond to acts of various sorts not 
only in terms of the "idea" presented in the act, but also in terms of 
the way in which the idea is presented. Furtner, form has a shaping in-
fluence on the way in which the agent conceives and develops the act: 
II . . . 2 we communicate determines we communicate • • • 1148 
I have argued in this chapter that the symbolic interactionists 
reject the pigeon holing practices of many sociologists. They tavor, 
rather, the examination of social acts in terms of the peculiarities of 
47ttugh Dalziel Duncan, Communication and Social Order (l~ew York: 
Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 146. 
48Hugh Dalziel Duncan, Symbols Society (Hew York: Oxforo. 
University Press, 1968), p. 32. 
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eacn situation. This viewpoint places prime value on the notion of 
process, but it does not rule out form as an important part of numan 
interaction. The interactionists argue that the past actions in whicn 
we have been involved have provided certain patterns which serve as 
points of reference for us in current actions. Duncan fairly well repre-
sents this position in his analysis of symbolic action: "Every act contains 
a past, present, and a future, but the temporal structure and function of 
symbolic actions is determined by our need to act in a present. We turn 
to the past, as well as to the future, to create ~orms in which we can 
act." 49 Forms , then, are internally create<l by eacn actor througn a 
reconstruction of his past relevant experiences. This differs from tne 
overriding concept of form which the symbolic interactionists reJeCt in 
that tne other concept of form is imposed upon situations with relatively 
little regard for the individual actor. The other approach, in other 
words, places primary emphasis upon forms that are superimposed on situa-
tions by an outside observer. The interactionists' approacn, on the otner 
hand, places primary emphasis upon process and talks of forms only as a 
specific means for each individual to implement a particular action. 
Through his experience in social action, man has come to place 
certain "formal" expectations on individual actions in certain types of 
situations. According to Fogarty, we have each developed "certain innate 
and internal patterns of expectancy • 1150 . . Thus, many in society re-
acted angrily to groups who, in the early 19b0 1s, began to place their 
49Ibid 48 _., p. • 
50D . 1 anie Fogarty, Roots f2!:. .!_!!!!!.Rhetoric (New York: Russell 
& Russell, 1968), p. 78. 
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public appeals in "strange" forms of protest. The patterns of experience 
for much of society had no point of reference for such forms of communi-
cation and the adjustment to this form of appeal was difficult. Then, 
after the nonviolent protests of the civil rights movement began to oe 
accepted as a legitimate form of appeal by many in society, more violent 
forms of protest began to emerge. Again, the public was not prepared for 
the newer form. Some even asked why the nonviolent form (which tney had 
not accepted only a few years earlier) could not be used. Along much 
the same lines, when some groups began "demanding" certain things from 
society many reacted against the form of the demand. In the experience 
of most of these people tne request was a legitimate form, while the 
demand was not. Often the ideas that are presented in new forms are 
ignored by those who are not used to the form; they react, instead, to 
the form itself. 
Form, tnen, carries important implications for the act. Basically, 
not only must an individual decide what "kind of'' a reaction to give to 
some "stimulus" in the social environment. He must also decide what form 
he will use to express his reaction. The five elements in Burke's pentad 
(what we may term the elements of dramatistic action) combine to suggest 
both content and form in a given action. Scene provides the impetus to 
action--it sets the act in motion. Through an assessment of the agents 
who are part of the scene, the actor can determine both what types ot 
ideas he needs to represent with his action and what forms the audience 
will understand as appropriate. Further, the actor as an agent must 
determine the forms of action which oest suit his capabilities in a given 
situation. Agency--which may be considered another word for form--
includes tne full range of forms that the agent has at his d.l.sposal. 
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And, all of these elements tie together in a final act designed to 
achieve some purpose. In short, an act can take many forms. Burke's 
pentad suggests the elements that an indiviaual must consider in choos-
ing the form any particular act will take. 
Finally, the notion of form is extremely important to7social (or 
Joint) acts. The social act, to be effective, requires that the indivi-
duals who are sharing the act somehow manage to "get together" in their 
presentation of it. It is necessary that their individual actions mesn 
in a progress toward their shared goal. Not only, then, do the indiviaual 
actors need to "get their ideas together;" they also must get tne forms 
in which the ideas are presented "together." Duncan Wlderlines the impor-
tance of form to social acts: "Social forms • • • determine the satis-
faction of the needs. Neeas are always satisfied in relationships; 
relationships, in tum, are possible only because we understand what 
people mean by the forms in which they play their roles. nSl 
CONCLUSION 
The act is one of the most cr•i tical elements of the symbolic inter-
actionist' s approach to human .oehavior. It is the minded, purposive 
nature of the act which provides a clear distinction between the actions 
of man and the motions of other beings that may, on their face, resemble 
actions. We have identified three types of acts. The most basic act is 
the individual act, undertaken by a single person but with social goals 
or aims in mind. We can call this individual's action social in nature 
because he is part of society and any action he takes can potentially 
51ouncan, Symbols in Society, p. 49. 
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have an influence upon others in society. Further, this individual act 
may be addressed to other individuals, but insofar as there is only one 
person primarily involved in the act it is not regarded as social or 
joint action. The social act, on the other hand, involves two or more 
persons cooperatively acting to achieve a common goal. In its basic 
form it closely resembles the individual act, in that it is little more 
than the individual acts of two persons meshed together in a Joint effort 
to reach a common goal. But in the meshing of the acts of two or more 
persons, the problems involved in controlling the action increase tre-
mendously. Finally, we have identified the tnought act by arguing that 
the process of thought does involve all of the stages of the basic act. 
By raising thought to the level of act we have given it added emphasis 
and have pointed to its signal importance in all human action. 
Chapter 5 
PURPOSE: THI. "WhY" OF HUMAN INTERACTION 
My purpose in this chapter is to discuss purpose, that element of 
the pentad which for Burke provides the "why" of human nehavior. It is 
in terms of purpose that the concept of motive (or motivation) will be 
developed, as the symbolic interactionists view it. There is little 
doubt that motive is central to the ideas of the symbolic interactionists. 
But it is only recently that they have taken up the task of developing a 
theory of motives. For that reason, the view of motives and of purpose 
which will be unfolded in this chapter must be either sketchy or unclear, 
depending upon the perspective of the reader. 
It is my contention, though, that although these theorists have not 
long worked directly at the task of understanding motives, they have long 
had a groundwork from which a theory of motives can grow. Therefore, 
after we have begun to understand their approach to motives, attention 
shall be turned to the background leading up to this understanding of 
motivation: role-taking and the self. These two concepts ~rovide the 
basis for motivated behavior. And, these two, along with motive, make 
up the basis for an understanding of purpose. Tne motive itself is a 
reason for doing something. Role-taking and the operations of the self 
aid man in his choice of reasons for undertaking a given act. But, 
through role-taking and the operations of the self man also decides upon 
his goals--goals which he has "reason" or "motive" to achieve. Put 
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another way, both motive and purpose arise in the thought that precedes 
an overt act; they are identified in the internal drama of role-taking 
and the interaction of the "I" and "me" of the self. 
MOTIVE: THE ANATOMY OF PURPOSE 
Any discussion of motive necessarily places emphasis upon the "I." 
It is in the "I" that man's impulses to action reside and it is here that 
the final steps leading to action are taken. Thus it is in the "I" that 
we find the final determination of motive--the application of a motive in 
terms of motivated behavior. 
The previous chapter was concerned primarily with action. As motive 
is so closely tied to action (for one concept to be present, the other 
is required also), it is well to begin our treatment of motive with an 
additional comment about action. Max Weber describes four types of action, 
each delineated according to its orientation. These types of action are 
taken 
{l) in terms of rational orientation to a system of 
discrete individual ends ••• that is, through expec-
tations as to tne behaviour of objects in the external 
situation and of other human individuals, making use of 
these expectations as "conditions" or "means" for the 
successful attainment of the actor's own rationally 
chosen ends; (2) in terms of rational orientation to an 
absolute value ••• involving a conscious belief in 
the absolute value of some ethical, aesthetic, religious, 
or other form of behaviour, entirely for its own sake 
and independently of any prospects of external success; 
(3) in terms of affectual orientation, especially emo-
tional, determined by the specific affects and states 
of feeling of the actor; (4) traditionally oriented, 
through the habituation of long practice.l 
1Max Weber, "Types of Rationality," Theories of Society, Vol. II, 
ed. Talcott Parsons et al (Glencoe: The Free Press," 1961), PP• 19b3-64. 
Weber is one of a group--;f theorists whose ideas come quite c~ose to. 
those of the symbolic interactionists. Many of the symbolic interaction-
ists seem to refer to Weber's work and, oy implication, seem inclined to 
include him within their school. 
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Among the things that can be identified as a common bond among these 
four types of action is the concept of motive. In each case the action 
is undertaken not only "for a purpose," or to reach a goal, they are also 
undertaken for a reason which lies behind the goal itself. All four 
types of action feature, in brief, motivated behavior. In fact, it might 
not be wireasonable to claim that most human action is motivated. It is 
important, then, to take a close look at motivation for it must certainly 
play a critical role in any theory of human action. 
"The sociological approach to motivation," say Stone and Farberman, 
"begins with an innocuous-looking proposition: Man is active naturdlly. 112 
Dewey agrees: "It is absurd to ask what induces a man to activity gener-
ally speaking. He is an active being and that is all there is to be 
said on that score. 113 What is pertinent is the matter of why people act 
in one way rather than another; or, how we may go about getting people to 
act in one way instead of the other. This view of man, argue Stone and 
Farberman, 
••• relegates to the scrap heap of elegant tautology 
and/or compelling mystery all attempts to explain 
action by inside urges and outside attractions--
pushes and pulls are pre-emptea. 4 
As White notes more succinctly, "there is evidence of deepening discontent 
with theories of motivation based upon drives." Again, "Something impor-
tant is left out when we make drives the operating forces in animal and 
2Gregory P. Stone and Harvey A. Farberman, "Motives and Motivation," 
in their Social Psychology Through Symbolic Interaction (Waltham, Mass.: 
Ginn-Blaisdell, 1970), p. 467. 
3John Dewey, "On Motive," Social Psychology Through Symbolic lnter-
action, eds. Gregory P. Stone and Harvey A. Farberman {Waltham, Mass.: 
Ginn-Blaisdell, 1970), P• 471. 
4stone and Farberman, "Motives and Motivation," P• 4b7. 
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human behavior. 115 
If the symbolic interactionists reject drives and related terms as 
the basis for a complete theory of motivation, where does their theory 
of motive start? Stacey and DeMartino give us that starting point: 
First, motivation is concerned with the "why" rather 
than with the "how" of human .behavior •••• Second, 
it is always the total organism in a social environ-
ment that responds or reacts, not Just one segment of 
it. Third, motives can only be inferred from behavior; 
they are not directly observable. • • • Fourth, the 
"why" of a specific act may be due primarily to physio-
logical factors, or to socigl factors, or more often to 
the interaction of the two. 
Physiological factors and intense psychological leanings, then, can 
operate as motives, but so can the social conditions in the environment. 
Indeed, because the act begins with the impulse stage and because the 
impulse can be re leased only if the "antenna" pick up a signal in the 
environment, we can trace the concept of motive back to the situation 
in which the individual finds himself. Burke has traced this course and 
his conclusion basically equates motive with situation: 
••• man's words for motives are merely shorthand 
descriptions of situations. One tends to think of 
a duality here, to assume some kind of breach between 
a situation and a response. Yet the two are identical. 
When we wish to influence a man's response, for instance, 
we emphasize factors which he had understressed or 
5Robert White, "Motivation Reconsidered: The Concept of Competence," 
Understanding Human Motivation, eds. Chalmers L. Stacey and Manfred F. 
DeMartino {Cleveland: Howard Allen, Inc., 1963), p. 43. White's work 
is used here because of his rejection of drives as the basis of human 
action, a view shared by the symbolic interactionists. 
6 Chalmers L. Stacey and Manfred F. DeMartino, "CuITent Status," 
in their Understanding Human Motivation (Cleveland: Howard Allen, 
Inc., 1963), pp. 1-2. These writers have been included in this chapter 
because their basic notions concerning motivation mesh quite well 
with the basic assumptions of several of the symbolic interactionists. 
neglectedt and minimize factors which he had laid 
great upon. This amounts to nothing other than an 
attempt to redefine~ situation itself. 7 
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To support this view that "motives and situations are one t" Burke offers 
an example: an alarm clock as motive. A man's need to arise at a certain 
time is a situation. The alarm clock is the motive of his rising. Its 
ring is nothing more nor less than a shorthana term for "the situation 
which we have JUSt described. 118 It must be rememberedt thought that the 
"situation" is not 11 obJective reality t" but rather is subJectively de-
fined by the actor. 
Thus, at base, the symbolic interactionist grounds motive in situation--
situation of any kina insofar as it influences human action. Further, as 
the symbolic interactionist searches out motives in given actions he is 
guided to find the "why" of that action. 
This, then, is the basis upon which the symbolic interactionists 
have begun exploring the concept of motive. In the brief time that their 
attention has been directed to motive, a variety of definitions for the 
concept have been put forth. Though the definitions are by no means 
uniform, they are instructive in suggesting the other factors which these 
thinkers believe belong with motive. To begin with, Newcomb, Turner, 
and Converse use motive 
to refer to a state of the organism in which bodily 
energy is mobilized and directed in a selective 
fashion toward states of affairs, often thougn 
7 Kenneth Burke , Permanence and Change (Indianapolis: The ooobs-
Merrill Company, Inc., 1965), p. 220. 
8Ibid., p. 221. 
not necessarily in the external environment, 
called goals.9 
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They also draw a distinction between motive and motivated behavior, 
calling the .latter "all the various forms of behavior in which a person 
engages as he strives to reach a goa1. 1110 These autnors, then, place an 
emphasis upon the relation between purpose (goal) and motive. 
Dewey places more emphasis upon the time relationship between the 
motive and the act: "A motive does not exist prior to an act and produce 
it. It is an act plus a Judgment upon some element of it, the Judgment 
being made in the light of the consequences of the act. 1111 With this as 
a basis, he further defines motive as 
that element in the tota.l complex of a man's activity 
which, if it can be sufficiently stimulated, will 
result in an act having specified consequences. 
And part of the process of intensifying (or re-
ducing) certain elements in the total activity 
and thus regulating actual consequence is to 
impute tnese elements to a person as his actuating 
motives. 12 
Dewey, then, stresses tne mediated nature of motive; he argues that 
motives are careful.ly chosen on the basis of anticipated consequences. 
Foote adds the importance of the situation out of which an act 
arises, the basic point behind the thinking of most of these men: 
In a sentence, we take motivation to refer to the 
degree to which a human being, as a participant in 
the ongoing social process in which he necessarily 
finds himself, defines a problematic situation as 
9Theodore M. Newcomb, Ralph H. Turner, and Philip E. Converse, 
Social Psychology: !!:!!, Stuay of Human Interaction (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1965), p. 22. This book is clearly an 
approach to social psychology through the symbo.lic interaction lens. 
lOibid., p. 21. 
11newey, "On Motive,"' p. 471. 
12Ibid. -
calling for performance of a particular act, 
with more or less anticipated consummations and 
consequences , and thereby his organism reJ..eases 
the energy appropriate to performing it. 13 
Finally, Meltzer defines motivation as simply "a process of defining 
(symbolically, of course) the goal of an act.1114 
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At the beginning of this chapter I noted that the symbolic inter-
actionists have not outdone themselves in working toward an understanding 
of motive. I believe that this variety of definitions will support that 
contention. The concept of goal runs tnroughout the definitions, but it 
is perhaps the only common thread among all of them. Only recently have 
these students of society begun to work in earnest on a definition and 
relatively full outlining of the concept of motive. Tneir efforts seem 
to not yet be in concert. But it is possible to conclude, witn the var-
ious offerings we have before us, that motive is goal oriented, ana that 
it is at least grounded in the situation which provides the background 
for action. 
But we still do not have anything approaching an understanding of 
what motive really means to the syuwolic interactionists. These aefini-
tions stress certain concepts, but their lack of consensus still leaves 
us feeling not unlike the man in a haunted house whose flashlight JUSt 
burned out. There are several additional features of the concept ot 
motive which can be mentioned and these should bring us closer to a 
feeling for the general viewpoint that the symbolic interactionists are 
1 3Nel.son Foote, "Identification as the .Basis for a Theory of 
Motivation," American Sociological Review, XVI (1951), P• 15. 
14Bernard N. Meltzer, "Mead's Social Psychology, 11 5ymbolic Inter-
action: !:!,_Reader~ Social Psychology, eds. Jerome G. Manis and 
Bernard N. Meltzer (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1967), p. 18. 
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working toward. 
FiI\st, motive guides the achievement of purpose. Foote speculates 
that "motivated behavior is distinguished by its prospective reference to 
ends in view, by being more or less subject to conscious control through 
choice among alternative ends and means. 1115 Motive is, then, based in 
part upon the end an individual cnooses in a given action and the means 
he chooses to achieve it ( "means" may also be identified as an action--
a smaller unit of action contributing toward the achievement of the 
larger end.) For Weber such choices of ends and means enter into motives 
when they are thought through: 
Action is ra1ionallyoriented to a system of discrete 
individual ends ••• when the end, the means, and the 
secondary results are all rationally taken into account 
and weighed. This involves rational consideration 
of alternative means to the end, of the relations of 
the end to other prospective results of employment 
of any given means, and finally of the relative im-
portance of different possible ends. 16 
Further, we may not say that these "individual ends" operate as motives 
until the individual freely determines them as initiators of action. 
Burke draws a critical distinction here between coincidental (or 
"statistical") chartings of motives that a!Jpear, to an outsider, to be 
actual motives because of the number of times the observer may notice 
them in conjunction with a given type of action and "chosen" ends and 
means. Only the chosen ends and means can be truly considered motives, 
for until a person "is specifically indoctrinated with such a concept, 
it does not figure as a motive in his acts, so far as he personally is 
15roote, "Identification," P• 15 • 
.l6weber, "Types of Rationality," P• 1064. 
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17 concerned." What all this means in terms of the core element of motive 
" is clarified by Stone and Farberman: . . • motivation is a question of 
direction, not origination of action •1118 
Next, the symbolic interactionists view motives as social instruments. 
This view comes out of a combination of two factors: motives are springs 
to action and action is social in nature. c. Wright Mills explains this 
position: 
Max Weber defines motive as a complex of meaning, which 
appears to the actor himself or to the observer to ~e 
an adequate ground for his conduct. The aspect of 
motive which this ~onception grasps is its intrinsically 
social character. 1 
And since motives are social in nature there is often the desire for an 
actor to declare to the society around him what his motivation for taking 
a particular action was. In so doing he makes an appeal to the community, 
above and beyond the appeal of his larger action alone, to accept his 
action for one reason or another. According to Burke, 
Any explanation is an 'attempt at socialization, and 
socialization is a strategy; hence, in science as in 
introspection, the assigning of motives is a matter of 
appeal--and the distinction between a Pharisaic account 
of one's motives and a scientific motivation of one's 
argument may involve merely a difference in the scope 
of the orientation witnin which the tactics of appeal 
are framed.20 
17 Burke, Permanence and Change, p. 219. 
18stone and Farberman, "Motives and Motivation," p. 467. 
19c. Wright Mills, "Situated Actions 
Symbolic Interaction: ! Reader in Social 
G. Manis and Bernard N. Meltzer (Hoston: 
p. 358. 
and Vocabularies of Motive, 11 
Psychology, eds. Jerome 
Allyn and Bacon, 1967), 
20Burke, Permanence and Change, PP• 24-5. 
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Accordingly, the public explanation of a person's motives may differ to 
an extent from those things which a person consciously recognized as 
motives at the time the action was undertaken. Indications of tnis nave 
come out of the work of Jean Paiget. In an attempt to make an action 
palatable to the public a person maneuvers to find "motives" whicn will 
satisfy others. He may spontaneously announce "many points and progres-
sions of thought which had never even occurred to him until he sat down 
to the business of motivating his argument for nis public." Many times 
the "reasons" he will announce publicly were totally skipped over in 
his thoughts before undertaking an action. 21 Peters makes much the same 
point in drawing a rather lengthy distinction between tne motive which 
guided an action in reality and the motive which a person claims (for 
public purposes) guided it. 22 
A distinction has been drawn here which should perhaps be oriefly 
spelled out. First we were to understand that motives constituted the 
"why" of an individual's behavior. Now, though, it becomes clear that 
motives also can refer to someone's explanation of the "why"--or, if 
you will, the "why" once removed. And in this way motives are used by 
man as more than a simple "motivator of action." They .become, according 
to Mills, social instruments which are used to influence the person 
himself or other people. 23 Motives, when used in this second way, take 
21Ibid., p. 24. 
22see R. s. Peters, !h!. Concept .9.!_ Motivation (London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, 1960), pp. 1-9. Peters is not a symbolic interactionist, 
but his views on this particular matter are instructive in that they 
do closely parallel the thoughts of the symbolic interactionists. 
23Mills, "Situated Actions," p. 358. 
on a particularly rhetorical flavor. Burke backs into this idea by 
disdainfully noting the contradictory claims of the scientist: 
As for the logical arguments of science, they are 
based upon elaborate rationalizations which seem to 
go beyond mere self-deception and come close to 
downright hypocrisy. For note the purest diplomacy 
in the choice of motives which the scientific author 
offers as grounds for his beliefs, when he seeks to 
make his p~int of view as appealing to the reader 
as he can. 4 
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We must also understand that both in the case of motive for action and 
motive for public explanation of action, a man is not "stuck" with the 
first motive he chose. Rather, motives may shift both in the middle of 
an act and in the middle of an act's explanation. Thus Mills argues that 
A man may begin an act for one motive. In the 
course of it, ne may adopt an ancillary motive. 
This does not mean that the second apologetic 
motive is inefficacious. The vocalized expecta-
tion of an act, its "reason," is not only a 
mediating condition of the act but it is a prox-
imate and controlling condition for which the 
term "cause" is not inappropriate. It may 
strengthen the act of thg actor. It may win 
new allies for his act. 2 
At the beginning of this chapter I noted that the symbolic inter-
actionists have not outdone themselves in working toward a definition of 
motive. The variety of definitions we considered a few pages back sup-
ports this position. However, we can now identify several trains of 
thought that do tie together the current state of symbolic interactionists' 
thinking about motives. First, motive is goal orien1ted. !)eyond that, 
it is the "why" of human action, it is grounded in the situation which 
provides the background for action, it may change as an act progresses, 
24Burke, Permanence !!!!!! Change, PP• 23-4. 
25Mills, "Situated Actions," P• 358. 
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and all of these things may be considered either from the point of view 
of the motive as leading to action or the motive as used to publicly 
exp lain action. 
SYMBOL AS MOTIVE: A UNIQUE POINT OF VIEW 
All of the preceding views of the nature of motive are, in their 
totality, a bit unique. Other theorists may have hinted at the develop-
ment of motives in terms of one or two of these components, but the 
degree to which the symbolic interactionists stress the particularly 
social nature of motive through a combination of all these features sets 
them a bit apart from the older psychological theories of motive. But 
their truly unique contribution to the theory of motive springs from 
their notion that language itself can be a primary source of motives. 
Because of the importance of language to their overall view of human 
action, they have developed the notion of symbol.!!. motive. 
The action of a non-symbolic animal is most often of a physical 
nature (hunger, thirst, etc.). On the other hand, man's symbols them-
selves can serve as motive to him. In no other way could pride, hate, 
love, and other such feelings (which have no equivalent in the world of 
physical reality) serve as the motives for human behavior that they so 
often do. These feelings which often act as motives, really, have no 
physical equivalents. Rose argues that "Man lives in a symbolic environ-
ment as well as a physical environment and can be 'stimulated' to act 
by symbols as well as by physical stimuli. 1126 In an earlier chapter we 
26Amold Rose, "A Systematic Summary of Symbolic Interaction Theory," 
in his Human Behavior and Social Processes (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1962), p. s. -
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discovered that man interprets even the physical stimuli that impinge 
upon his senses through his language. Thus the contention of Burke that 
"motives are distinctly linguistic products1127 makes a good deal of sense. 
In this way, symbol is motive, and motive is symbolic. A symbol functions 
as motive when the meaning it stirs causes one to seek the fulfillment of 
a goal. Further, as I have previously claimed that motive is shorthano 
for situation, I can now claim that motive is shorthand for symbolically 
\ 
mediated situation • 
• • • our introspective words for motives are rough, 
shorthand descriptions for certain typical patterns 
of discrepant and conflicting stimuli? If we say that 
we perform an act under the motivation of duty, for 
instance, we generally use the term to indicate a 
complex stimulus-situation wherein certain stimuli 
calling for one kind of response are linked with 
certain stimuli calling for another kind of response. 
We act out of duty as against love when we finally 
respond in the way which gives us less immediate 
satisfaction (we do not throw up our job and elope) 
though promising more of the eventual satisfactions 
that may come of retaining the goodwill of irate 
parent or censorious neighbors. 28 
In the words of Mills what this choice of action and motive amounts to 
is the "controlling speech form which was incipiently or overtly 
presented" 29 in a given act or preparation for it. Duncan provides 
further insight: 
The heart of Burke's argument is simple enough, 
namely that symbolic forms affect conduct because 
of the ways in which they affect communication, and 
thus all action. He is saying that motives ll.e not 
only in some kind of experience "beyond" symbols, 
27Burke, Permanence~ Change, P• 35. 
28Ibid., p. 30. 
29Mills, "Situated Actions," P• 361. 
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but also in symbols. In sum, symbolism is a 
motive be~use symbolism is a motivational 
dimension in its own right.30 
So the central issue here is that man selects his motives in terms 
of his language and the only way that he can explain the motives, if called 
upon to do so, is through a linguistic device. If a man acts out of "duty," 
he acts out of a set of meanings that he has developed for the term "duty." 
If he acts in response to a specific environmental situation, he acts in 
response to that situation as he has linguistically mediated it. As Mills 
says• rather directly, "Motives are words. 1131 Foote puts the matter a little 
differently. Names, he says, motivate human behavior. Through an analysis 
of language functions we can abandon predispositional theories of motive and 
yet maintain a theory which can be empirically tested. 32 Thus, the symbolic 
r 
interactionists reject the predispositional "spring" theories which other 
theori~ts have posited. They insist, instead 1 that motives are linguistically 
mediated. Once this assumption is made, it is necessary to add the assump-
tion that symbols--the mechanism of mediation--form the basis for motives. 
But there is yet a second aspect to the concept of symbol as motive: 
symbol as situation. Situation as motive, when cast in terms of language 
as motivation, 
means the language act as a whole construed as a 
situation. In Burke's terms language-using Tsan 
act. The motive is the situation in general. 
Thus, words act upon us as the result of an agent 
who uses them, the scene out of which they grow, 
the purpose for which they are intended, and the 
strategies that are employed in manipulating them. 
Translating still further, a symbolic situation 
30Hugh Dalziel Duncan, "Introduction," in Kenneth Burke, Permanence 
and Change (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1965), xx-xxi. 
31Mills, "Situated Actions," p. 356. 
32roote, "Identification," p. 18. 
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represents a co-ordination or interrelationship 
of act, agent, agency, purpose, and scene.33 
Once we accept the concept of situation as motive and concede that symbols 
may be motives, we must then agree that purely "symbolic situations" 
occur. These symbolic situations may be, for example, conversations in 
which only language-related matters are of primary importance, or they 
may be "physical happenings" which have real meaning only after a linguis-
tic translation. But it is also clear that the symbolic interactionists not 
only accept the idea of symbol as situation, they base a vast number of 
other ideas around it. 
The very act of defining man as a symbol-using animal requires that 
we take a view naming symbol as motive, for "if we regard man as a symbol-
using animal we must stress symbolism~.! motive in any discussion of 
social behavior.1134 As it is language that separates man from other 
animals, so does language-as-motive separate man's motivations from those 
of other animals: 
••• these theorists and critics take an original 
view of human motivation. They contend that human 
motivation is distinct from that of other beings 
because the nature and structure of language are 
themselves motivating forces and because the inter-
action between man and his language profoundly 
transforms his physical, biological, and animal 
needs, drives, and desires. The motive forces 
within language arise from its nature as an instru-
ment of transcendence, as in naming, man not only 
draws arbitrary boundaries about an event or 
object, but goes beyond it to speak of the event 
or obJect in terms of what it is not, a word, by 
which he codifies his experiences into meanings which 
reflect his and his group's perspectives and 
33Marie Hochmuth Nichols, Rhetoric and Criticism (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1967) , -;.-90. 
34ttugh Dalziel Duncan, Communication .!!!.Cl Social Order (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 114. 
attitudes •••• Language urges man toward ever 
higher moments of symbolic transcendence, a motive 
mythicall~ represented in the story of the tower 
of Babel. 5 
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And in this way language operates as motive to man, removing him from 
the "drive" world of physiological needs and moving him to what Maslow 
nas termed the "higher needs. 1136 Deeply imbedded in the higher needs 
of, say, self-actualization are goals which can be defined only linguis-
tically. These needs are so far removed from the physical bases of 
biological necessity that the motives which guide us toward them can be 
nothing more nor less than symbolic motives. 
ROLE-TAKING: THE INTERNALIZATION OF THf. OTHER 
In the previous chapter the nature of the act was outlined in some 
detail. One of the primary arguments put forward there concerned the 
central importance of thought to all human action. Thought was seen as 
so central to action that an argument was made for identifying thougnt 
as an act in itself. But even in the individual act, it is in the mani-
pulatory stage that tne final choice of means and ends is made--a choice 
which is then "acted out" in the consummatory stage. And, this choice 
of ends and means is made as the individual looks to tne future and pro-
Jects the several available choices onto society as he imagines it. He 
35Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, "The Ontological Foundations of Rhetorical 
Theory," Philosophy and Rhetoric, III (1970), p. 10~. 
36see Abraham H. Maslow, "A Dynamic Theory of Human Motivation," 
Understanding Human Motivation, eds. Chalmers L. Stacey and Manfred 
F. DeMartino (Cleveland: Howaro Allen, Inc., l9b3), p. 85. Maslow 
is not a symbolic interactionist. However, reference is here made 
to his hierarchy of "needs" to serve as an illustration. Thougn 
Maslow does not work from the symbolic interactionist perspective, 
this hierarchy, used for illustrative purposes only, does not 
seriously violate the symbolic interactionist perspective. 
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tnen weighs the results of tnese projections and picks the one course of 
action that he will take overtly. We may translate the desire to reach 
the chosen goal as a purpose; the reason for choosing that goal as a 
motive. Role-taking provides the means by which these choice-producing 
thought processes are carried out in the manipulatory stage of the act. 
This "imaginative completion of an act ••• necessarily takes place 
through role-taking," Meltzer argues. This is &o because for a person 
to complete the act in his mind and then attempt to gauge the results it 
will bring, "the individual must put himself in the position of the other 
person, must identify with him. 1137 
here we have, in effect, a microscopic definition of role-taking. 
Sociologist Walter Coutu provides a more complete aefinition. He argues 
that role-taking is a 
phase of the symbolic process by which a person 
momentarily pretends to himself that he is another 
person, proJects himself into the perceptual field 
of the other person, imaginatively "puts himself 
in the other's place," in order that he may get an 
insight into the other person's probable behavior 
in a given situation. The purpose of this is to 
enable him to get the other person's "point of 
view" so that he can anticipate Jhe other's be-
havior and then act accordingly. 8 
Thus, an individual may be said to take the role of the other whenever 
he uses that role to interpret a s1tuation and guide a response to it. 
The accuracy with which one performs role-taking is basically irrelevant 
to the social impact of role-taking itself, since once an individual has 
37Meltzer, "Mead's Social Psychology , 11 p. 9. 
3 8Walter Coutu, "Role-Playing vs. Role-Taking: An Appeal for 
Cl.arification," American Sociological Review, XVI ( 1951), pp. 180-81. 
Coutu, who can be classified as a symbolic interactionist, is here 
attempting to more clearly define one of the interactionists' more 
important concepts. 
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drawn his picture of the other's role, he acts on the basis of tnat 
picture "unaffected by the accuracy or inaccuracy of that conception." 39 
Ralph Turner summarizes role-taking, then, as a "process of looking at or 
anticipating another's behavior by viewing it in the context of a role 
imputed to that other.1140 
Role-taking is a process which requires development in the inaiviaual--
i t is not an instinct which he was born with, nor does it come into bloom 
at the magic age of three years and 45 days. This development begins as 
the child begins to gain a command of language. Desmonde, in an explica-
tion of Mead's thinking, says it is through his ability "to use signifi-
cant symbols Lthat/ a given organism can take two or more roles simul-
taneously. u 4 l 
At the heart of this developmental process is the child's ~rasp of 
language. Role-taking capabilities improve as a child gains a greater 
command of language. It is only through the symbolic process, says Coutu, 
that man can "pretend momentarily that he is another person. 1142 The 
young child, relatively unskilled in language, is unable to separate tne 
role of the other from his own role. The two roles, in tnis early stage 
of development, become intertwined. The child will either totally forget 
39Ralph H. Turner, "Role-Taking, Role Standpoint, and Reference-
Group Behavior," American Journal of Sociology, LXI (1956), P• ,HS. 
Turner is considered to be a symboITc interactionist. 
40 Ibid., p. 316. 
41william tl. Desmonde, "The Position of George herbert Mead," 
Social Psychology Through Symbolic Interaction, eds. Gregory P. btone 
and Harvey A. Farberman (Waltham, Mass.: Ginn-Blaisdell, 1970), 
p. 59. Desmonde is considered to be a symbolic interactionist. 
42coutu, "Role-Playing vs. Role-Taking," p. 181. 
11.;S 
his own identity and act as he sees the other acting, or he will forget 
the other's identity and proJect the other's actions to mirror his own. 
In later stages the child becomes able to separate the other-role from 
nis own--he becomes capable of taking the role of the other while still 
viewing the world from his own perspective. In addition, as time passes 
and the individual gains a greater command of language he becomes aole to 
take the roles of several others simultaneously, keeping them separated, 
and speculating on the possible reaction to be drawn from each of them 
in response to a given act. 43 Finally the individual becomes gradually 
capable of discriminative or selective role-taking: "• •• one's orien-
tation determines that only certain attitudes of the other-role will be 
especially relevant to the determination of his own behavior. 1144 Selective 
role-taking is important because it involves an ability to discriminate 
among situations confronting the individual in different environments. 
In these different situations, of course, different sets of other-
attitudes may need to be discovered. 
After a person has achieved a relatively full development in the 
skills of role-taking, he will participate in the activity from one of 
three points of view outlined by Turner: adopting the other's standpoint 
as his own and allowing it to become an automatic determinant of his own 
behavior; viewing the other-role from the standpoint of a third party, 
gathering data for an "objective" decision; and ascertaining the other's 
role in terms of its effect on interaction between one's self and the 
other, studying the impact of the other on the achievement of some personal 
43Turner, "Role-Taking," p. 319. 
44Ibid., p. 321. 
114 
or shared goal. 
Each of these perspectives, in addition, carries with it different 
implications for human action. When the first viewpoint is taken, one 
simply acts as the other would act in the same situation. On the other 
hand, when the second standpoint is adopted the actor learns "what De-
havior is expected of the actor, depending upon the inferences maae con-
cerning the role of the other." Tnis tells the actor now ne ougnt to act 
toward the other. The third point of view is only slightly aitferent. 
It indicates to the actor how he may expect tne otner to act in a given 
situation. 45 It is clear that individuals use all three stanc11,>oints 
constantly, switching from one to another as needed. Indeed, all tnree 
may be considered in any action a person undertakes: e.g. , if I were 
him, what would I do in this situation; wnat would he expect me to do in 
this situation (or, which of my actions will he predict, given my assess-
ment of his role); and if I choose "this" action, what may I expect by 
way of a counter action from him? 
Thus, role-taking is an activity which consists of one person 
imaginatively projecting certain sets of attitudes, feelings, and the 
like from another person into his own mind. It is designea to ~ive one 
person a "feel for" the way that another person tninks and acts. On the 
basis of his imputation of the role of an other, an actor chooses from 
among a variety of possibilities the specific course of action ne shall 
follow in a given situation. Of course, Just as one may take the role 
of tne single other, he may also attempt to take the role of a "generalized 
45Materials in this and the preceding paragraph are based upon 
the ideas of Turner, "Role-Taking," pp. 319-21. 
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other," the community of persons around nim. 46 
THE FUNCTIONS OF ROLE-TA~ING 
It is clear that role-taking is a necessary prerequisite tor effec-
tive social action, and that--more specifically--it is a necessary pre-
requisite tor the manipulatory stage of the act. £ut beyond this it is 
possible to identify more directly some of the specific functions tnat 
role-taking plays in assisting and, to an extent, directing human 
.oehavior. 
Most .oasically, role-taking is the primary venicle for human tnougnt 
about projected actions--the choosing of purposes and the actions attendant 
to achieving them. Mead makes this clear as he maintains that when we 
have an argument we plan to present someone 
we thin~ how we will present it to that individual. 
As soon as we present it, we know that he would 
reply in a certain way. Then we reply in a 
certain fasnion to him. Sometimes it is easier 
to carry out such a conversation oy picking out a 
particular protagonist we know. In that way in 
the night hours we are apt to go through distress-
ing conversations we have to carry out the next 
day • • • • That is the process of thougLl t. It is 
taking tne attitude of others, talking to other people, 
and then replying in tneir own language. 47 
Mead seems to be saying that role-taking, in addition to being a prere-
quisite for thought ( or functioning so as to allow thought), is also a 
prototype of thought. Perhaps it is more "accurate" to claim that it is 
the mechanism which allows social thought, but more is involved in thougnt 
46Rose, "A Systematic Swnmary," pp. 8-9. 
47George Herbert Mead, "The Problem of Society--How We Hecome 
Selves," George Herbert £!!. Social Psychology, ed. Anselm ~trauss 
(Cnicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 33. 
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than role-taking. Social thinking, in short, would be impossible with-
out it. And this process of social thought allows the individual to 
think through arguments and actions which he might later use in the 
consummatory stage of an act. 
Second, role-taking functions to implement both the individual act 
and the "social act." This claim can be illustrated and supported in 
several ways. To begin with, role-taking helps to determine the purpose 
an individual will identify in a given action and it helps to guide him 
in choosing the best means to achieve that purpose. This is so, main-
tains Turner, because it allows him to project upon a situation the 
purpose which has the greatest chance of being achieved and to test in 
advance the best ways to attempt the gaining of the purpose. 
The Actor must examine the probable interaction between 
the self-role and the other-role in terms of the pro-
motion of purpose. He lacks a specific or detailed 
directive supplied by the standpoint of a third party 
and consequently must shape his own role behavior 
according to what he judges to be the probable effect 
of interaction between his role and the inferred role 
of the other. 48 
Second, role-taking facilities the coordination of the actions of 
-
individuals involved in a social act. When an actor participates in a 
social act he must be able to identify what his role in the development 
of the Joint goal should be. Turner argues that role-takin~ helps to 
implement the social act in this way because the self-other relationship 
can "be viewed as an aspect of the total social act, 1149 allowing the 
adJustments that each party needs to make so as to oetter mesh with 
48Tu:rner, "Role-Taking," p. 320. 
49Ibid., p. 317. 
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the other party. Only if one can predict what an other will do can the 
two hope to come close to meshing their actions in the manner required 
for effective social acts. 
Third, role-taking functions in the implementation of the social 
act in that it allows the development of significant conununication--a 
necessary prerequisite to social intercourse. According to Natanson, 
Mead's theory suggests that the understanding of a gesture is 
a double process which requires the "addressee" to 
take the place of the "addresser" of the gesture as 
well as the reverse situation. Thus, "significance 
from the standpoint of the observer may be said to be 
present in the gesture which calls out the appropriate 
response in the other or others within a co-operative 
act, but it does not become significant to the 
individuals who are involved in the act unless the 
tendency to the act is aroused within the individual 
who makes it, and unless the individual who is directly 
affected by the gesture puts himself in the attitude 
of the individual who makes the gesture. 11 50 
This argument is clarified by Cottrell: 
••• in most current theory regarding human inter-
action there is the basic assumption that as the 
individual reacts in his various life situations he 
not only develops those responses appropriate to 
his own part in the relationships but also incor-
porates in his reactive system the responses of the 
others in the situation. Only as this takes place, we 
say, can the individual acquire a system of significant 
symbols by means of which true communication takes 
place. 51 
50Maurice Natanson, Social Dynamics of George Herbert Mead 
(Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1956), p. 8. Quoting-
Mead. 
51Leonard s. Cottrell, Jr., "Some Neglected Problems in Social 
Psychology," Social Psychology Through 5ymbolic Interaction, eds. 
Gregory P. Stone and Harvey A. Farberman (Waltham, Mass.: Ginn-
Blaisdell, 1970), p. 63. Cottrell is considered to be a symbolic 
interactionist. 
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Finally, and acting as sort of an overview, role-taking is a prere-
quisite to effective interaction itself, for it is only if one partner 
in a social act understands the role of the other partner(s) that true 
interaction can take place. As Desmonde says, it is through role-taking 
that "the unification of roles or perspectives occurs, and common view-
points become possible. u 52 For interaction to occur between an organism 
and an object, says Natanson, it is necessary that "the organism get 
'inside' the interior of the object and 'take the attitude of acting as 
the physical thing will act.• 1153 
Dewey approaches this same point from a slightly different perspec-
tive, holding that 
There is no miracle in the fact that if a child 
learns any language he learns the language that 
those about him speak and teach, especially since 
his ability to speak that language is a pre-con-
di tion of his entering into effective connection 
with them,5\Yaking wants known and getting them satisfied. 
The child, then, in learning interaction learns to take the role of the 
parent in terms of the parent's language and the parent's meanings. 
Blumer "finalizes" this explanation of the close link between role-
taking and interaction. He explains, as was noted in the previous chapter, 
that group action basically is a fitting together of individual lines ot 
action. To do this with any degree of effectiveness, 
52Desmonde, "The Position of George Herbert Mead," P• 60. 
53Natanson, The Social Dynamics 2!_ George Herbert ~, p. 31 • 
Quoting Mead. 
04John Dewey, "Communication, Individual and Society," Symbolic 
Interaction: !, Reader in Social Psychology, eds. Je~ome G. Manis 
and Bernard N. Meltzer ofoston: Allyn and Bacon, 1967), P• 142. 
eac•h individual aligns his action to the action of 
others by ascertaining what they are doing or what 
they intend to do--that is, by getting the meaning 
of their acts •••• He forms and aligns his own 
action on the basis of such interpretation of the 
acts of others. This is the fundamental way in 
which group action takes place in human society. 55 
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A fourth function of role-taking is the provision of social control. 
Social values, according to Mead, provide a mechamism for social control: 
There is a common attitude, that is , one which all 
assume under certain habitual situations. Through 
the use of language ••• the individual does take 
the attitude of others, especially these common at-
titudes, so that he finds himself taking the same 
attitude toward himself that the community takes. 
This is what gives the principle of social control, 
not simply the social control that results from 
blind habit, but a social control that comes from 
the individual assuming the same attitude toward 
himself that the community assumes toward him. 56 
Thus, if a community's values identify a certain act.1.on as against the 
community's best interests, the individual senses this value and chooses 
not to take that particular action--to do so would place him in disfavor 
and would bring re-actions against him that would not be in his best 
interests. 57 
Fifth, and for present purposes last, role-taking is the basic 
process out of which the self and the self-concept develop. Certain 
types of role-taking are reflexive--the individual takes the role of the 
other in order to see how he, himself, appears to others. And when 
55Herbert Blumer, "Society as Symbolic Interaction," Symbolic 
Interaction: A Reader in Social Psychology, eds. Jerome G. Manis 
and Bernard N.-Meltzer (Hoston: Allyn and Bacon, 1967), p. 142. 
56Mead, "The Problem of Society," p. 35. 
57rt is when these values are in periods of change that massive 
social upheaval, conflict, and polarization occur--for there may be 
many different sets of values guiding the various groups in the 
community. 
120 
role-taking is reflexive, says Turner, "the individual is led not merely 
to consider the effects of his action or their compatibility with some 
standard or code but to picture himself specifically as an object of 
evaluation by someone else. 1158 When this occurs, "the role of the 
other is employed as a mirror, reflecting the expectations or evaluations 
of the self as seen in the other role •• 1159 . By using the other-role 
as a mirror, Meltzer claims, 
the individual can come to see himself as an object. 
The standpoint of others provides a platform for get-
ting outside oneself and thus viewing oneself. The 
development of the self is concurrent with the develop-
ment of the ability to take roles.60 
Thus, the final function of role-taking, as far as the present study is 
concerned, is the development of the self. To the symbolic interactionist, 
an individual's self (and his self-concept) is a product of his inter-
action with others and of his ability to see himself through the eyes 
of the other person. 
THE SELF: "I" THE ACTOR AND "ME" THE INTERACTOR 
The self, argue the symbolic interactionists, is a social product. 
Again, it develops through interaction with other persons as these other 
persons act as a mirror, letting the individual see himself as the com-
munity sees him. Mead defines the self as "an individual who affects 
himself as he affects another ••• 1161 He is one who gathers the same 
meanings from his speech as do others, who assumes the attitudes of the 
58Turner, "Role-Taking," p. 321. 
60Meltzer, "Mead's Social Psychology," p. 10. 
61Mead, "The Problem of Society," p. 40. 
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other with whom he is communicating. Thus , as Nat ans on argues , language 
is a prerequisite to ~he full development of the self: 
Significant gesture is a necessary condition for 
the development of the self, since Mead considers 
tne self to be an emergent from social experience. 
Through language the individual gains the capacity 
to grasp his self as an obJect observed from the 
standpoint of another person. 62 
The self, then, is an extremely important concept for the symbolic 
1.nteraction1.st. It means that not only can others exercise some degree 
of control over an individual (through the individual's role-taking be-
havior) , but the individual himself can exercise control over lus own 
actions (through the internalization of outside controls from the past). 63 
And by having a self, the person can act toward himself just as he can 
act toward other persons: if you will, he can interact with himself. 
Blumer makes this aspect of the self a key one to lus analysis of tiuman 
oehavior: 
He can act toward himself as he might act toward 
others. Each of us is familiar with actions of 
this sort in which the human being gets angry with 
himself, rebuffs himself, takes pride in himself, 
argues with himself, tries to bolster his own 
courage, tells himself that he should "do this" or 
not "do that," sets goals for himself, makes com-
promisgij with himself, and plans what he is going 
to do. 
This capacity for self interaction is the capacity which gives man the 
capability of minded action--as opposed to automatic response. 
The symbolic interactionists posit two parts in the self: an 
"I" and a "me." N atanson draws a cl.is tin ct ion between these two parts 
62Natanson, The Social Dynamics George Herbert Mead, p. 12. 
63cottrell, "Some Neglected Proolems 1.n Social Psychology," p. 6b. 
64Blumer, "Society as Symbolic Interaction," p. 140. 
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by arguing that "from the point of view of the connnuni ty and its mores, 
the self is a 'me.' In its individual aspect, i.e., from the standpoint 
of the unique person, the self is an 'I.' 1165 Stone and Farberman help to 
clarify the meaning of these two parts as they talk of the emergence of the 
self in toto. 
This conception emerges as one takes over others' 
reactions toward himself in the form of a "me." 
The "me" is given full expression when one takes 
over the attitude of the "generalized other," the 
community, or a social world, and regulates his 
own conduct in terms of such organized expecta-
tions •••• Because these attitudes have been 
incorporated, the "I" is engaged in constant con-
versation with the "me"--the internalized attitudes 
of others. One thinks, and thought is an inter-
nalized forum--an ongoing conversation between the 
"I" and the "me"--between experience and concept-
ualization. 66 
Thus the "me" is that part of the self which contains the attitudes of 
single others and of the generalized other with which a person comes in 
contact. It is the internalization of social values and it exercises 
social-self-control upon the individual's actions. The "I," on the other 
hand, is that part of the self which initiates an individual's actions. 
An "I" unregulated by a "me" is something like existential man, unfettered 
by those around him. 
As the "I" and the "me" interact with one another, the individual 
actor decides upon the specific actions which he will initiate. Rose 
explains that the "I" is the "response of the organism to the attitudes 
of the others" which.,are mirrored in the "me." An act .1.s chosen as the 
person tests the response sets of the "I" against the community as con-
65Natanson, The Social Dynamics of George Herbert ~, p. 1~. 
66Gregory P. Stone and Harvey A. Farberman, "Symoolic Interaction: 
Perspective and Directions," in their Social Psychology Through 
Symbolic Interaction (Waltnam, Mass.: Ginn-blaisdell, i970), p. 17. 
tained in the "me. 1167 Desmonde indicates that the "me" causes adjust-
ments in the ongoing behavior of the "I •11 
It is in this manner that it is possible for other 
people to influence permanently our lives. A person 
who is important to us is internalized in the form 
of a "me" which modifies the course of our ongoing 
behavior. The altered, or adjusted, response of the 
organism to the imported reaction of the other is 
termed by Mead the 11 1. 11 68 
CONCLUSION 
12.; 
In sum:, purpose represents the goals that man addresses himself to; 
. motive is the reason that the goals are chosen; and role-taking and the in-
ternal dialogue of the "I" and the "me" are the mechanisms by which various 
motives are "played off against one another" in the determination of which 
goals to choose in a given situation. And, because the symbolic interaction-
ists are ever-concerned with the influence of symbols in human interaction, 
this entire process is accomplished through linguistic mediation. Action, 
the subJect of the previous chapter, concerns the attempt to achieve the 
chosen goals. To recast the process of motivation in terms of the act, 
motive states may be considered as basic to the impulse stage of the act, 
for they are the felt needs which seek release through action. The deter-
mination of which motives will be enforced in a given situation, and of 
which goals will be chosen, take place in the manipulatory stage of the 
dct--the time during which the internal dialogue chooses the prospectively 
most productive course of action. So, purpose--made up of motives, role-
taking, and the dialogue of the self--is a prior matter, addressed to dis-
covering the directions that action should take. 
67Rose, "A Systematic Summary," pp. 11-12. 
68Desmonde, "The Position of George Herbert Mead," p. 60. 
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IMPLICATIONS OF SYMBOLIC INTERACTION: 
THE NATURE OF RHETORIC 
I have a rather strong urge to entitle this chapter "The .New 
Rhetoric," but to do so would now be somewhat old. Marie Nichols nas 
twice pre-empted that option, 1 as has Chaim Perelman in his exhaustive 
/ 
one-shot effort. 2 But symbolic interaction theory does indeed provide 
a "new" basis for theories of rhetoric. In fact, such an orientation 
is at the heart of Kenneth Burke's work and has guided the thoughts of 
several recent contributors to the journals. It remains a "new" basis, 
though, because so much of the thinking done by rhetorical scholars 
remains firmly grounded in Aristotle and because those who look at 
rhetoric from other disciplines fail to perceive that there has been an 
ever accelerating move toward re-casting the foundation upon which rhe-
torical theory is built. In a way, the formulation of the new rnetoric 
is a public relations problem, for as Winterowd has discovered, 
To the great majority, rhetoric means (a) handbook 
rubrics on "how to" write or "how to" speak; (b) 
mendacious bombast. Even avowed rhetoricians limit 
themselves to narrow ranges of their subject, as, 
for instance, the methods of writing good sentences 
1see Marie Hochmuth Nichols, "Kenneth Burke and the 'New 
Rhetoric,"' Quarterly Journal 2.f. Speech, XXXVIII ( 1952), pp. 
133-44, and "I. A. Richards and the 'New Rhetoric,'" Quarterly 
Journal of Speech, XLIV (1958), pp. 1-lb. 
2see Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, 
trans. John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver (South Bencrr University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1969). 
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and paragraphs, the art of public speaking, or the 
study of figures.3 
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A theory of rhetoric must be a theory of all instrumental use of language. 
The symbolic interactionists provide the backdrop for such a theory, whetner 
the rhetorical scene be one speaker addressing an audience of many, one 
writer addressing a national readership, one person conversing with 
another, one person writing to a close friend, or even one person ad-
dressing n1mself. 
For most of this century the basis of the teaching of rhetoric nas 
been predominantly Aristotelian. In the field of speech communication 
the theory of Aristotle and his Roman followers has reigned over all. 
Basic speech texts for "speaker-audience" classes4 have been firmly 
groWlded in Aristotelian rhetoric--so much so, in fact, that one is 
tempted, to ask wny we have not cut out the middlemen and used the orig-
inal Rhetoric or a derivative Roman work as the text for these courses. 
Courses in rhetorical theory have centered around Aristotle to the point 
that even modern rhetoric has often been taught in a 11neo-Aristotelian11 
vein. The classic critical efforts sponsored by the now renamed Speecn 
Association of America--the volumes of the History~ Criticism of 
American Public Address5 and ~Slavery and Disunion°--containetl cnapter 
3w. Ross Winterowd, Rhetoric: ! Synthesis (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1968), v. 
4see, for example, Alan H. Monroe and Douglas l.hninger, Principles 
and Types Speech (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman an<1 Company, 19b7). 
5see W. Norwood Brigance, ed. , History and Criticism of American 
Public Address, I and II (New York: McGraw-fill!, 1943) andMarie 
Hochmuth (Nichols), ed. , History Criticism of American Punlic 
Address, III (New York: Longmans, Green, 1955). 
6see J. Jeffery Auer, ed. , Anti-Slavery and Disunion, 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1963). 
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after chapter modeled in some form of Aristotelian schema. Indeed, 
the most acclaimed text in rhetorical criticism, Thonssen and Baird's 
Speech Criticism,7 reads like a history of rhetorical theory and strongly 
recommends the use of Aristotelian forms in speech evaluation. 
Change has come slowly to the students of rhetoric housed in depart-
ments of speech. Though Kenneth Burke's strikingly different Rhetot'ic 
/ 
of Motives 8 appeared in 1950 it was slow to have significant impact in 
our fie1d. Marie Nichols, true, did formally introduce the readers of 
the Quarterly Journal~ Speech to Burke only two years later. But her 
treatment of Burke, and that of her student Virginia Holland 9 , made 
broad attempts to "marry" Burke to Aristotle. The terministic screens 
constructed over a half-century of Aristotelian rhetoric courses and 
books have been hard to break indeed. Not until recently have writers 
in speech Journals begun to regularly take excursions into rhetorical 
theory without leaning on a refinished "olive-branch" cane. 10 
Few theorists argue that the Aristotelian approach should be 
7see Lester Thonssen and A. Craig BcU.rd, Speech Criticism (New 
York: Ronald Press, 1948). 
8see Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (Berkeley: The University 
of California Press, 1969T. -
9see Virginia L. Holland, "Kenneth Burke's Dramatistic Approach 
in Speech Criticism," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLI (19b5), pp. 
352-58. 
10several excellent examples of the newer approach have recently 
appeared in the journals. Among them are herbert Simons, "Toward 
a New Rhetoric," Pennsylvania Speech Annual, XXIV (1967), pp. 7-20; 
Otis M. Walter, "On Views of Rhetoric, Whether Conservative or 
Progressive," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLIX (1963), PP• 367-82; 
and Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, "The Ontological Foundations of Rhetorical 
Theory," Philosophy Rhetoric, III (1970), PP• 97-108. 
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abandoned. But many now agree with Brockr1.ede's dictum that "Because 
Aristotle's Rhetoric was so appropriately related to the relatively simple 
Greek society of his day, it predictably is less suited as a theory to 
explain the more complex and very different rhetorical practices of 
today • nll . . A rhetoric based in symbolic interaction theory fits 
quite well with Brockriede's position here: it does not deny Aristotle 
that which is Aristotle's, but it does go far enough beyond the classical 
approach to be appropriately temed "new" or "different." It supplements 
the standard term "persuasion" with the broader term "identification." It 
takes our horizons past the "speaker-to-audience" relationship so often as-
cribed to Aristotelian theory to include as a direct part of the theory all 
instrumental use of discourse. Thus, the rhetoric that will .be described 
in the remaining chapters does not reJect Aristotle. Rather, it sort of 
incorporates him into a larger whole, relying upon his assumptions where 
they are applicable and going beyond them where they are not. 
The times that we live in are, as Brockriede says, far more complex 
than were the times of Aristotle. Further, they are far'more complex than 
the days in the earlier parts of this century. With the complexity of the 
times have come problems in society that simply would not yield to older 
means of solution. In such times, says Johnstone, "the need for a pniloso-
phical examination of rhetoric is most acute • • • " 12 
Kenneth Burke is a social critic who agonized through the harsh 
realities of the twenties and thirties and suffered through the tyranny 
11Wayne Brockriede, "Toward a Contemporary Aristotelian Theory 
of Rhetoric," Quarterly Journal~ Speech, LII (1966), p. 34. 
12Henry W. Johnstone, Jr., "The Relevance of Rlfetoric to Philosophy 
and of Philosophy to Rhetoric," Quarterly Journal ,.2t Speech, LII 
(1966), p. 44. 
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of the war years. In the decay he perceived in those years he saw the 
failure of older means of social management. His writings, touched with 
a clearly moral and humanistic intent, are predominantly aimed at proauc-
ing a new approach to social order. Out of the search for this approach 
has come what Brockriede--as well as many others--describes as "the 
closest attempt to formulate a contemporary theory" of rhetoric. 13 His 
approach to rhetoric bears much the same relationship to the classical 
theory that we have already described. According to Fogarty, "His work 
is an extension of Aristotelian rhetoric rather than a conflicting theory. 
The extension, however, is so vast ••• that he calls it a 'new' rhe-
toric. nl4 In a recent lecture, still somewhat overly emphatic in an 
attempt to join Aristotle and Burke, Nichols provides a fairly clear 
overview of the liurkean approach: 
Burke does not throw out the old rhetorical devices 
that many of us have sometimes thought to be the 
whole of rhetoric. What he does is to provide a 
rationale. All of structure as we know it, whether 
in speech, or story, is treated as a mode of identi-
fication ••• One identifies himself by thinking 
of structure in terms of the psychology of the 
audience.15 
Burke might be appropriately described, in his words, as the ''key 
term" in theorizing about rhetoric from the symbolic interactionists' 
point of view, and the "key term" in his theory is identification. liut 
Burke is not the sum total of that theoretical position. Simons widens 
the angle of vision crediting "the joint efforts • • • of small group 
13Brockriede, "Toward a Contemporary Aristotelian Theory," p. JS. 
14 Daniel Fogarty, Roots !2!:, .! !!!!:!_ Rhetoric (New York: Russell 
and Russell, l9b8), p. 57. 
15Marie Hochmuth Nichols, Rhetoric and Criticism (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1967), P:-aa. 
theorists, of clinical psychologists and psychiatrists, of industrial 
sociologists and political scientists ancl. of persons in Speech" with 
providing the bases upon which this broader theory of rhetoric can be 
built. The hallmarks of this theory, he says, are made up of 
The shared concern with interactive rhetorical dis-
course, and the consequent reformulation of speech 
principles and redirection of teaching and research 
energies ••• Still another defining feature of the 
new rhetoric that has been referred to is its objective 
of judiciously "managing" social problems, a normative 
goal orientation, which is contrasted with the norma-
tive framework of neo-Aristotelian rhetoric ••• 16 
Karlyn Campbell capsulizes the symbolic interactionists approach to 
rhetoric a bit differently: II • • • the discipline of rhetoric is 
generally the study of the ways in which one man's symbolic behavior 
influences that of another man." 17 
"RHETORIC": THE. RANGE. OF MEANINGS 
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"So let Rhetoric .oe defined as the faculty of discovering in tne 
particular case what are the available means of persuasion. 1118 From 
this short sentence came the definition of rhetoric that scholars in 
our field turned to with amazing regularity for nearly nalf a century. 
Those addressing the subject of rhetoric who felt moved to aefine it 
have generally either quoted Aristotle directly or nave fashioned a defini-
tion derived from this stem. Rhetoric nas been persuasion centered. 
The first apparent break from this position occurred in Donald 
16Herbert W. Simons, "Toward a New Rnetoric," Contemporary 
Theories of Rhetoric: Selected Readings, ed. Richard Johannesen 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 55-6. 
17Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, "The Ontological Foundations of 
Rhetorical Theory," Philosophy and Rhetoric, III (1970), p. 103. 
18Aristotle, The Rhetoric of Aristotle, trans. Lane Cooper (New 
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1960), p. 7. 
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Bryant's 1952 re-naming of the function of rhetoric as "adjusting ideas 
to people and of people to ideas. n 19 While this conception may seem 
broader than the Aristotelian view, it was not meant to be. Bryant else-
where in the article declared rhetoric to be the "rationale of informa-
tive and suasory discourse," and made clear his Aristotelian stance by 
explaining "This rhetoric has been, at least since Aristotle • • • Its 
lirni tations are historical rather than philosophical. 1120 More than a 
decade later Richard Ohmann still echoed this position: 
Great though the difference is between rhetoric as 
mysterious power and rhetoric as calculated pro-
cedure, these two conceptions share one feature 
which ••• is the most important one: both take 
rhetoric to be concerned, fundamentally• with 
persuasion. 21 
And philosopher-rhetorician Maurice Natanson agrees: in identifying 
four senses in which the term "rhetoric" is used he simply approaches 
rhetoric-as-persuasion from four different angles. 22 
Persuasion, then, has been at the core of twentieth century rhetoric. 
But though this has been the predominant definition, other authors have 
parried with contrasting definitions, some close to the more accepted 
definition and some relatively far removed. Ohmann reviews tlus variety 
of alternate definitions: 
19oonald c. Bryant, "Rhetoric: Its Function and Scope," 
Province of Rhetoric, eds. Joseph Schwartz and John A. Rycenga 
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1965), p. 19. 
20Ibid., P• 7. 
21Richard Ohmann, "In Lieu of a New Rhetoric," Contemporary 
Theories of Rhetoric: Selected Readings, ed. Ricnard Johannesen (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. b4. 
22Maurice N atanson, "The Limits of Rhetoric," Philosoth~, Rhetoric 
and Argumentation, eds. Maurice Natanson and Henry W. JotitiS 6 e::, Jt•., 
{University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1965), 
p. 101. 
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I. A. Richards has it that rhetoric "should be a 
study of misunderstanding and its remedies," ••• 
Daniel Fogarty in a book called Roots for a New 
Rhetoric: rhetoric is "the science of recognizing 
the range of the meanings and of the functions of 
words, and the art of using and interpreting them in 
accordance with this function." • • • Korzybski and 
Hayakawa: the rhetorician, in their view, should 
work to quiet the insistent clamor of words, which, 
if left to themselves, tend to drown out experience 
and reality. Kenneth Burke takes a different line: 
according to him, "The key term for the •new' rnetoric 
would be 'identification.'" Rhetoric should be built 
on the "consubstantiality" of men, their shared modes 
of feeling, thought, and action. Its goal is cooperation. 23 
Ohmann lists several other competing definitions, but the implication of 
this cataloging should be clear: from time to time scholars have found 
the old definitions wanting and have set out to re-define the field, 
hoping to make it more serviceable to the "man" each of them sees. 
The definition that the symbolic interactionists might seek for 
rhetoric must flow from the Burkean notion of identification, consub-
stantiality, and cooperation--the Joining of man in the searcn for "a 
better life." Karlyn Campbell has become one of the loudest of the 
recent advocates of this orientation. In her new text she defines rhe-
toric in a seemingly Aristotelian fashion as "persuasive discourses, written 
and oral, that alter attitudes ana actions." But her point of view is 
only seemingly Aristotelian. She further explains: 
At times the term can and should be used in a 
much broader sense. That usage includes functions 
other than persuasion such as interpersonal identi-
fication, confrontation, self-identification, 
alienation, negotiation; and it includes forms 
other than written and oral discourse such as 
gestural communication, the use of space, and 
certain dimensions of music, dance, painting. 24 
23ohmann, "In Lieu of a New Rhetoric," pp. 64-5. 
24Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, Critiques of Contemporary Rhetoric (Belmont, 
Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1972), p. 2. 
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Thus this "new" rhetoric ventures far beyond the "persuasive use of language" 
which is generally seen to bound the more classical sense of the term. 
McNally chooses to approach the subject from the standpoint of semiotic. 
Of the three divisions of semiotic, semantics, syntactics, and pragmatics, 
McNally chooses to place rhetoric at home in pragmatics: "Thus, if 1 t can 
be determined that the 'sense' of a piece of discourse resides chiefly 
in ••• the address to interpreters' responses, it is 'pragmatically 
oriented discourse. 111 25 
What, then, can we include in rhetoric so conceived? Certainly, 
as Burke claims, instruction--which is surely a pragmatic use of discourse--
introduces "a principle that can widen the scope of rhetoric beyond per-
suasion." Add to that "exposition, description, communication in general." 
Indeed, "~ou can derive contemporary 'semantics' as an aspect of rhetoric,1126 
for semanticists are certainly concerned with the pragmatics of discourse. 
Herbert Simons adds to the list: the rhetorician is concerned with "promo-
ting understanding," "reconciliation of viewpoints," "negotiations of compro-
mise," arbitration, and "de-escalation of conflict. 1127 !3eyond this .Burke 
even calls "belonging" rhetorica128--group affiliation has quite pragmatic 
aspects. And, of course, the idealist's view of the pragmatist's downfall, 
"sly design," must also be "named" as rhetoricai. 29 
If rhetoric is, as claimed here, a rationale for pragmatically oriented 
25James Richard McNally, "Toward a Definition of Rhetoric," 
Philosophy and Rhetoric, III (1970), PP• 76-7. 
26llurke, Rhetoric~ Motives, P• 77. 
27simons, "Toward a New Rhetoric," pp. b0-1. 
28Burke, Rhetoric of Motives, PP• 27-8. 
29~. • P• 37. 
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symbolic behavior (including, of course, both verbal and non-verbal "dis-
course"), are there any clear boundaries that separate what discourse is 
"rhetorical and what discourse is "extra-rhetorical?" Or, is rnetoric some 
amorphous blob that is determined to become all at the risk of being nothing? 
Surely a pragmatic angle can be found in practically any piece of discourse. 
The line that must be drawn is admittedly an unclear one. The posi-
tion I am arguing can be summed up briefly: (1) Most all aiscourse is, in 
some way, rhetorical in that it has a pragmatic side to it; but, (2) most 
discourse also has non-pragmatic aspects. Burke has delineated three angles 
from which language can be viewed--grammar, symbolic, and rhetoric. 30 Thus, 
a given piece of discourse has grammatical or logical aspects, symbolic or 
aesthetic aspects, and rhetorical or pragmatic aspects. Therefore, (3) not 
all aspects of language fall into the realm of rhetoric. One ma1 studJ ldil-
guage from any of the three angles. In this way I claim that rhetoric may 
be relevant to all given instances of the use of language, but so may grammar 
and symbolic. A poem, a speech, an essay, a play, a protest march, or even 
silence may be studied from all three perspectives. Rhetoric, then, is not 
all inclusive of language. It is simply one way of looking at language tnat 
happens to allow us to look at most all instances of language usage. 
Put another way, we may begin with language as the given. Because 
language may be used in a pragmatic, or social, sense for the fulfillment 
of social goal through a social act it may oe used rhetorically and sucn 
usage may be studied from the standpoint of rhetoric. (The distinction here 
between use and study is the distinction drawn by Burke between rhetorica 
30ror a more complete explanation of the approaches to language 
represented by grammar, rhetoric, and symbolic, see Kenneth Burke, 
A Grammar of Motives (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 
nsg), xv-xxiii. 
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utens and rhetorica docens. 31) The same instance of language usage may, 
however, also be studied from the "logistic" standpoint of grammar; how the 
word unit operates structurally. Likewise, this example of language use can 
be studied under the heading of symbolic, with primary attention being given 
to the aesthetics of the discourse. As the old professor might say, clearly, 
the lines marking off the three areas are unclear. As we look at language 
gramatically, it is most difficult to ignore totally its rhetorical aspects; 
and as we look at language rhetorically it is most difficult to ignore its 
"symbolic" aspects; and so on. But back to tne main point: we can look at 
most any instance of language usage rhetorically, .out language nas clearly 
extra-rhetorical aspects. 
At base, then, • the theory of rhetoric posited by the symbolic inter-
actionists• perspective emphasizes the pragmatic aspects of language usage: 
the use of language to achieve social goals through social action. The key 
term for this outlook on rhetoric is identification, not persuasion. And 
this key term .oroadens the scope of rhetoric f~r beyond the boundary, normally 
associated with persuasion, of acquiescence to the persuader's position. 
THE CONSTITUENTS OF PRAGMATICS AND THE NATURL OF RHLTORIC 
Pragmatic orientation, at the base of the symbolic interactionists' 
approach to rhetoric, implies several related components of a theory of 
rhetoric. These components, put together, form an outline of the basic 
nature of rhetoric. The remainder of this chapter is addressed to an ex-
plication of these constituents of pragmatics. 
Directly implied by a pragmatic orientation is tne concept of 
audience. The pragmatic orientation requires the presence of social 
3lsee Burke, Rhetoric of Motives, p. 36. 
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action, and for "social" action to take place an audience must be involved. 
(This audience may be, of course, many other people, one other person, or 
the "me" as with an internal dialogue of the self.) The rhetorical use of 
discourse, then, requires that the discourse be "addressed" to some sort of 
audience. 32 Addressed language is not only language which is "aimed at" an 
audience (intended for a specific audience to hear) nut it is also "tailored 
to" that audience. Thus, in the words of Fogarty, to proceed by argwnenta-
tion a speaker must "proceed according to their way of thinking." And, "If 
he persuades by emotion, he must somehow, sincerely or not, feel the way 
his audience will be expected to feel. nJJ 
Language which is addressed, then, requires that the language user 
be active in role-taking behavior; for it is only through role-taking that 
one person can discover another's way of thinking or that he can "feel the 
way his audience will be expected to feel." According to Wilkerson, 
Communicative activity is seen to originate in 
the interaction of a person with his social 
environment which ordinarily includes other per-
sons. Certain features of the communicated 
message ~ill be determined by this initial 
interaction •••• The message is highly 
determined by the combination of circumstances •• • J4 
The symbolic interactionists' concept of audience, or address, is 
slightly different than the one derived from Aristotelian principles. The 
Aristotelian position urges the rhetor to conduct an "audience analysis," 
true, but the type of thing most often recommended by most speech texts is 
less inclusive than that recommended by the present broader theory. We are 
32Ibid., p. 38. 
JJ Fogarty, Roots !£!:,!_New Rhetoric, p. 75 • 
.34K. E. Wilkerson~ "On Evaluating Theories of Rhetoric, .. Philosophy 
and Rhetoric, III (1970J, p. 90. 
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told, most often, to search out the audience's age, sex, group affiliation, 
occupation, and other such characteristics. We are then urged to shape our 
messages in a way that will make them appeal to the qualities and beliefs 
related to the characteristics we have discovered in a particular audience. 
But never is it clear that we are to go oeyond the cognitive level in 
carrying out this operation. Role-taking, which is at the very heart of 
pragmatic "address" forces us to actually play the role of the person or 
group we plan to later communicate with. It caJoles us not only to realize 
that a man is a coal miner, but to also try to catch tne feelings of the 
coal miner and "live his life" for at least a brief moment. Obviously such 
an approach cannot be successfully executed each time it is tried, out tne 
instruction that it puts before us is more complete and gives the rhetor a 
deeper goal to try to reach. 
A second constituent of pragmatic orientation is "identification," 
that elusive Burkeian term which can encompass all that "persuasion" includes 
but can also go far beyond. 35 In one of his more direct moments, Burke at-
tempts to set down the delineation he has drawn between persuasion and 
identification: 
All told, persuasion ranges from the bluntest quest 
of advantage, as in sales promotion or propaganda, 
through courtship, social etiquette, education, and 
the sermon, to a "pure" form that delights in the 
process of appeal for itself alone, without ulterior 
purpose. And identification ranges from the politician 
who, addressing an audience of farmers says, "I was a 
farm boy myself," through the mysteries of social 
status, to the mystic's devout identification with 
the source of all being. 36 
35The concept of identification will be more fully explored in 
ensuing chapters. The purpose for including it here is merely to 
note its place in a pragmatically based view of rhetoric. 
36Burke, Rhetoric .2f. Motives, xiv. 
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Rhetoric involves both persuasion and identification, with Burke claiming 
that the latter tem can include the former. Identification is, at .base, 
a partial unity of men. It provides the means by which the rhetorician may 
"feel" as another faels. As such, it is a key to role-taking behavior. As 
Fogarty says, "Burke's identification is really consubstantiality. It means 
that things or people, different in other ways, may have one common factor 
in which they are consubstantial or substantially the same. 1137 In the thought 
stage of the social act a person seeks out the point(s) of consu.bstantiality 
he and the "audience" share. Having found these "substantially alike" .be-
liefs or feelings he can test his ideas against the "internalized other" ana 
project the likely reaction to them. 
But identification can also serve as a technique of persuasion in 
the traditional sense. For example, says Burke, 11a speaker persuades an 
audience by the use of stylistic identifications," or for the purpose of 
"causing the audience to identify itself with the speaker's interests," 
or he may draw "on identification of interests to establish rapport between 
himself and his audience."38 
Thus identification c~n .be a pre-commUilicative means of testing an 
idea on an internalized audience. In this role, Fogarty explains, it "1.s 
temporarily and topically assuming t~e rational, emotional, and motivational 
level of one's audience for tne purpose of commwiicating motivational 
meaning. 1139 Or, 1.t can be a means of producing persuasion in the communi-
cative act itself. In this sense, it 
is a belonging to a group of people or becoming 
one with them through at least some one formality 
37Fogarty, Roots~!.~ Rhetoric, P• 74. 
3BBurke, Rhetoric of Motives, P• 46. 
39Fogarty I Roots .!!. Rhetoric, p. 76. 
of common purpose or ideal. As applied to rhetoric 
in this sense, identification says everything that 
persuasion says ••• 40 
In a way, identification serves both as a primary mechanism of 
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rhetoric and as the prime rhetorical motive. Identification is a state of 
being that man constantly seeks. But to Burke we can never think long of 
identification without alba encountering division. Division is tne "stimulus" 
that sets off man's specific searches for identification. Thus rhetoric 
arises out of division; rhetoric is spawned by division; or, in Lhninger's 
analysis, rhetot•ic is a social force "arising out of an atmosphere of di-
visiveness /which/ can promote consuostantiality and peace through the process 
of identification.1141 As Burke puts it, the study of the actions ct an in-
dividual will fall under the Jurisdiction of rhetoric "insofar as the 
individual is involved in conflict with other individuals or groups. 1142 
As we base rhetoric in division, a third derivative of the assumption 
of a pragmatic base for rhetoric arises: its problem-solving nature. Division 
among men implies disharmony. When social disharmony exists the constant 
search for consubstantiality and "the better life" is thwarted. Rhetoric, 
as a means of establishing identification in society (and, concomitantly, as 
a means of moving man toward this basic motive), provides the way to 
lead us through the Scramble, the Wrangle of the 
Market Place, the flurries and flare-ups of the 
human Barnyard, the Give and Take, the wavering 
line of pressure and counterpressure, the Logomachy43 the onus of ownership, the Wars of Nerves, the War. 
40~. t p. 75. 
4loouglas Lhninger, "On Systems of Rhetoric," _c_o_n_t_e_m_ ..... -~ Theories 
of Rhetoric: Selected Readings, ed. Ricnard L. Johannesen York: 
Harper and Row, 1971), p. 334. 
42Burke, Rhetoric .2f. Motives, P• 23. 
43Ibid. 
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The pressures and divisions we experience in everyday life, in the conduct 
of business, and in the halls of government are rife with proolems. Rhetoric, 
in its power to guide us through these pressures and proolems--in its power, 
if you will, to use smaller identifications to lead us to larger and more 
satisfying ones--is problem-solving by nature. Ana this problem-solving 
nature of the new rhetoric again marks a slight departure from tne persua-
sion centered nature of the old. True, persuasion qua persua&ion canoe and 
often is considered as problem-solving. But tne problem that is often solved 
with the classic conception of persuasion is the problem facing the spea.Ker--
and he solves it by caJoling the audience to "come over" to his point of 
view. Certainly this is within the realm of the new rhetoric. ~urKe is 
careful to clearly retain most of what was contained in the Aristotelian 
system. But the new rhetoric places a slightly different emphasis which 
is, again, broader in scope. As Simons interprets this new emphasis, the 
concentration of the "new rhetoric is on proolem-solving or problem-reduc-
tion rather than persuasion; on mutually satisfactory resolutions of differ-
ences rather than victory for one party." 44 
Now, any time a person faces a problem and attempts to solve it he--
of necessity--lays out some sort of plan to guide him. If he did not, he 
would nave to take purely random stabs, retreating from conscious action to 
animal-like "motion," helplessly prooing again and again unti.l lle, quite by 
accident, made the "right" move. The plan that he lays out, whether simple 
or complex and whether carefully thought through or undertaken "haoi tually ," 
is nothing more nor less than a strategy. And this is the fourth derivative 
of a pragmatic orientation to rnetoric: rhetorical acts are strategic acts. 
44simons, "Toward a New Rhetoric," P• 58. 
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Strategy has, of late, fallen on bad times in the dictionary ot 
moral judgments. Honesty and openness have become tne words of the day, 
thankfully. But too many of those who have brought openness to the 
forefront of human action have chosen to define it as the opposite of 
strategy. Strategy has come to be viewed as "pure manipulations," sneaky, 
cruel, and cursed. This dichotomy is clearly a false one, and one which 
must be done away with. 
The new rhetoric of the symbolic interactionist nas the capability 
to remove these unsavory labels from strategic action and, heuce, from 
much of rhetoric. This is so because this rhetoric, according to Onmann, 
emphasizes cooperation and social cohesion, identification, and common 
action as the means of overcoming resistance to desirable or desired 
courses of action. 45 Such cooperative action is clearly strategic: in 
a previous chapter I argued that of all the types of action available to 
us, Joint action was by far the hardest to successfully accomplish. This 
is so because the separate efforts of two persons must be coordinated. 
Such coordination coula hardly be achieved if strategies were not plannea 
by the participants in the action. 
A second, similar problem has recently beset students of "speech," 
"rhetoric," and "communication." The journals and convention rooms have 
been more than spotted with "disgruntled rhetoricians," those who came to 
regret what they perceived to be an over-emphasis on manipulation in the 
practice of rhetoric. Throwing out the baby with the bath tney abandoned 
the term "rhetoric" and pretended to abandon all that is included witnin 
45Richard L. Johannesen, Contemporary Theories of Rhetoric: &elected 
Readings (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 63. 
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that term. "Communication," for them, has become the word of the day. 
And, naturally, since they rebelled against manipulation they deny the 
presence of manipulation in "communication." With it, some also deny 
the efficacy of persuasion, strategy, and the other terms that may be 
similarly clustered. The result of all this, of course, has been a 
rather nasty split in the field. Again, the dichotomy is a false one 
which many perceive to be true. The problem may well be a matter of 
emphasis and, likewise, a shift in emphasis may hold at least a partial 
solution. 
The new rhetoric provides the emphasis which might heal the wound. 
Brockriede helps to provide the explanation of this. First, he reminds 
us, the setting out of which classical rhetoric developed was a "one-to-
many" public address situation. The techniques and strategems which 
exemplified that rhetoric were appropriate to that situation, and still 
are. However, mhey are not appropriate to the more interactive nature 
of today's problem-solving methods. Even the television set has a 
strangely "person-to-person" quality about it. Brockriede concludes: 
If contemporary practice is essentially inter-
active, the theorist, accordingly, might appro-
priately be concerned along a personal dimension 
with the images that speakers and audiences have 
of themselves and of one another, along an ideational 
dimension with the strategies for material and formal 
identification, and with the conditions under which 
the reciprocal images and attitudes of speaker and 
audiences may change.46 
Further, because of the emerging openness of communication in our 
society high status persons may address lower status persons, low 
status persons may address higher status persons, and persons of 
46Brockriede, "Toward a Contemporary Aristotelian Theory," PP• 35-7. 
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approximately equal status address each other. To complicate matters, 
a person's relative status changes as he moves from situation to situation. 
Thus the rhetorician may well speak in all three status relationships in 
a given day. In Brockriede's words, "Classical rhetoric provides no 
precepts of which I am aware to account for these complexities in status 
relationship. 1147 Rhetoric based in identification and cooperation can 
, provide a means to bridge these status relationships. As individuals 
participate in role-taking in a joint effort to solve their problems we 
observe a cooperative rhetoric in operation, one in which status differ-
ences have little impact. 
We can further clear up this "communication-rhetoric" dichotomy by 
recalling the view of language that the symbolic interactionist and nis 
pragmatically based rhetoric holds. Language, in this theory, is con-
sidered as "a moral, suasive act. 1148 Language is persuasive by its very 
nature. As Burke puts it, the essential function of language is its use 
"as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature 
respond to symbols." 49 Thus, appeal becomes the essence of communica-
tion. It cannot be avoided, as the words we use are charged with moral 
overtones and emotional loadings. And, for Burke, appeal is the 
"rhetorical function of language. 1150 The point is simply this: if lan-
guage is viewed as inherently persuasive, then it is not possible to 
47Ibid., p. 37. 
48Winterowd, Rhetoric: !_ Synthesis, p. 14. 
49Burke, Rhetoric 2!,Motives, p. 43. 
50Nichols, Rhetoric~ Criticism, p. 83. 
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achieve "transfer of information, and nothing else." Any "transmission" 
of language carries with it certain persuasive images. Each person, 
through his past experiences with language, has built up meanings for 
terms that are emotionally charged. When a given phrase is again heard 
in a familiar situation many of these stored up meanings are released, 
and the discourse becomes persuasive whether the speaker intended it to 
be or not. Thus ~ny separation of "rhetoric" from "communication" in 
an attempt to get rid of the persuasive and strategic connotations is 
futile. 
CONCLUSION: RHETORIC AS A THEORY OF SOCIAL INTERACTION 
The rhetoric of the symbolic interactionist is, as Ehninger says, 
social or sociologica1. 51 Its orientation 1is pragmatic, meaning that it 
emphasizes tne use of language for the achievement of both individual 
and joint social goals. The basic function of such a rhetoric, according 
to Burke , is "the use of words by human agents to form attitudes or in-
duce actions in other human agents." 52 The primary motive guiding man 
in the use of rhetoric is identification, which Burke has called the 
primary force behind most all human action. Rhetoric, then, is used by 
} 
man in a search for "the better life" achieved through increasing levels 
of consubstantiality. Further, as man seeks ever increasing identifications 
with his fellows he bases his appeals on the lesser identifications that 
have developed in the past. Thus as prior goals of consubstantiality 
have been met they have turned into appeals designed to meet present 
51Ehninger, "On Systems of Rhetoric," p. 333. 
52Burke, Rhetoric .2f Motives, p. 41. 
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and future goals. 
The rhetor in such a system "searches out" present points of identi-
fication with his "audience" so that he may tailor his appeal specifically 
to them. This we have termed "address." Because men have not reacned a 
satisfactory stage of identification or consubstantiality, society is in 
a constant state of division. This division, of course, produces uneasiness 
because of the strength of man's identificatory motive. And, as rhetoric 
operates to allay the divisions it works in a problem-solving manner. 
In addition, because man is by nature an "actor" he most commonly "plots 
out" his approaches to a problematic situation, acting in a strategic 
manner. His primary agent in carrying out a strategy is a language which 
is filled with persuasiveness and emotion. 
In sum: the new rhetoric of the symbolic interactionists shifts the 
emphasis from what Simons calls the "personal effectiveness of a speaker" 
to "the social effectiveness of alternative patterns of managing social 
problems. 1153 We may conclude with Ehninger, then, that this rhetoric is 
"an instrument for understanding and improving human relations. 1154 
53simons, "Toward a New Rhetoric," p. 56. 
54Ehninger, "On Systems of Rhetoric," p. 333. 
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THE NATURE OF THE RHETORICAL ACT 
It should be clear by now that rhetoric is an act, in the symbolic 
interactionists' sense of the term. First, as Bitzer maintains, rhetorical 
acts grow out of the situation a person perceives himself to be in. 1 
A rhetorical act begins with an impulse--a "felt want" in the form of a 
motive--searching the environment for a situation which will r•elease it. 
The individual perceives the "stimulus" in the environment which will set 
the impulse on course. He next tests ways of satisfying the impulse by 
_,/ 
"internally manipulating" the environment. Having found what he believes 
to be the most effective way of satisfying the impulse, he then consum-
mates the act by making an overt symbolic response to the situation. 
The rhetor' s behavior is both minded and purposive; both motivated and 
mediated. Indeed, to call rhetoric an act may well be an understatement. 
We might more accurately maintain that all true "acts" are in some sense 
rhetorical, for all acts can be symbolic and--as was claimed in the pre-
ceding chapter--all symbolic behavior can be interpreted in a rhetorical 
sense. 
But rhetoric so considered becomes a "fuzzy" discipline, one which 
overlaps so badly with other disciplines that its focus may sometimes 
be lost. It is the purpose of this chapter to define more closely the 
1see Lloyd F. Bitzer, "The Rhetorical Situation," Philosophy~ 
Rhetoric, I (1968), pp. 1-14. 
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scope of rhetoric and to examine those elements the symbolic inter-
actionists might name as its component parts. 
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Karlyn Campbell maintains that a symbolic interaction based rhetoric 
must always have unclear boundaries because it is "in effect the study 
' of all language." But to her this is not a weakness which should thwart 
the development of the theory. Rather, it is "precisely the price we 
shall have to pay in order to have the latitude needed to theorize about 
and examine the many language acts which do not fall easily into neat 
classifications of purpose or genre. " 2 One of the criticisms most re-
cently leveled at traditional theories of rhetoric is its inability to 
account for many types of symbolic behavior which bear a striking resem-
blance to rhetoric, but which cannot be catalogued as rhetoric in the 
old terminology. A Burkeian rhetoric, growing out of and coordinated 
with the social theories of symbolic interactionism, widens the bounaaries 
so as to account for these other types of symbolic behavior. 
But though Campbell sees value in "blurred boundaries," some attempt 
must be made to clarify at least minimal limits; otherwise a "theory" 
of rhetoric would be an impossibility. In this chapter two of Wilkerson's 
"desiderata" for a theory of rhetoric will be set forth: the scope of 
rhetoric will be examined to make clearer the natural boundaries of the 
theory and some of the components of rhetorical behavior will be described 
to "specify a set of phenomena which can be readily observed • • .. a . 
2 Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, "The Ontological Foundations of Rhetorical 
Theory;'Philosophy Rhetoric, III (1970), p. 106. 
3K. E. Wilkerson, "On Evaluating Theories ot Rhetoric," Philosophy 
~Rhetoric, III (1970), pp. 83-4. 
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THE SCOPE OF RhETORIC: PRAGMATIC SYMBOLIC rlBHAVIOR 
In the previous chapter rhetoric was grounded in the pragmatic use 
of symbols. Fogarty summarily explains the oreadth that tnis grounding 
gives rhetorical theory; " ••• the whole range of this activity, from 
a man's inner, subconscious conflicts to the nighest kind of conscious 
abstraction, is rhetoric. 114 More specifically, according to Nicnols, tne 
scope of rhetoric includes "any and all symbolic resources that function 
to promote social cohesion, and all symbolic resources that induce atti-
tude or action. 115 
More specifically, Wilkerson presents a seven element model of 
communication, noting that four of its elements are uruquely rhetorical. 
The elements of tne model which are essential to any act of communicdtion 
are a message produced with which the speaker responds to his social 
context, an external feedback loop, and an audience--actual or anticipated. 
To these he adds the four features which are "fundamentally rhetorical 
ones." These are: an internal feedback loop, or anticipation mechanism; 
communicative problems which impede the message; a speaker's control 
mechanism; and choice from among a variety of possible message features 
which could eliminate or modify the problem.b All uses of language which 
contain the latter four features can be considered rhetorical • 
.But we can approach the "scope" of rhetoric in other ways. Rhetoric 
has traditionally been viewed as operating most clearly in a persuasive 
speaker-audience situation. For the most part, though not universally, 
4Daniel Fogarty, Roots .!.2!:!.New Rhetoric (New York: Russell & 
Russell, 1968), p. 70. 
5Marie Hochmuth Nichols, Rhetoric and Criticism (tiaton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1967),P. 84. 
6Wilkerson, "On Evaluating Theories of Rhetoric," pp. 92-3. 
interpersonal and intrapersonal communication have not been regularly 
included under the rubric of rhetoric. 
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The scope of the symbolic interactionists' rhetoric, however, empha-
sizes that both interpersonal and intrapersonal communication can be 
rhetorical. McNally, first of all, argues that rhetoric is concerned 
with "those aspects of education, behavior, or linguistic usage wherein 
symbols are regarded ••• as mediators between men rather than as pure 
symbols or as mediators between men and things." 7 By such a definition, 
interpersonal communication must clearly be rhetorical in nature. Don 
Burks furthers the argument by applying the concept of risk to conversa-
tion or negotiation: 
In an argumentative situation where risk is estab-
lished, where there is willingness for individuals 
to engage in mutual persuasion, the affective world 
of feeling and attitude or "the total subtle range 
of /the self's/ affective and conative sensibility" 
is ,-in Natanson' s phrase, "existentially disrupted." 
Here, surely, are important insights into the nature 
of the type of rhetorical discourse which Natanson 
calls the "rhetoric of persuading": ( 1) it directs 
itself to the conative ••• as much as to the cog-
nitive, and (2) such a persuasive situation is 
mutual--one who would persuade the Other must be 
willing to be persuaded by the Other. 8 
Viewed in this way, interpersonal rhetoric is a certainty. 
Likewise, intrapersonal communication is rhetorical, for just as 
we may attempt to persuade or increase identity with an other or a grou~ 
of others, we may also attempt to persuade ourselves or bring our own 
constructs, beliefs, and attitudes into greater harmony. Burks argues 
7 
James Richard McN ally, "Toward a Definition of Rhetoric," Philosophy 
Rhetoric, III (1970), p. 72. 
8Don M. Burks, "Persuasion, Self-Persuasion, Rhetorical Discourse," 
Philosophy~ Rhetoric, III (1970), p. 111. 
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the point, going so far as to claim that no real difference exists be-
tween "the persuasion of another and the persuasion of self." Further, 
he says, 
once a position is arrived at through investigation 
and/or argument, there often needs to be an urging 
or appeal to take action in accord with or to accept 
a commitment to the finding. The urging or appeal-
ing may be to self or to others or to both at once.~ 
The symbolic interactionist's theory of action, implemented through role-
taking and an internal dialogue of the self makes the rhetorical nature 
of intrapersonal communication inunediately apparent. The internal dialogue 
is conducted in order to choose a course of action which is most likely 
to achieve a set goal. Thus, the dialogue itself has a goal which is 
social in nature, bringing it into the realm of pragmatics or rhetoric. 
But the symbolic interactionists' emphasis of the motive of identification 
also makes clear the rhetorical nature of intrapersonal communication. 
As Burke comments , 
The individual person, striving to form himself in 
accordance with the commuqicative norms that match 
the cooperative ways of his society, is by the same 
token concerned with the rhetoric of identification. 
To act upon himself persuasively, he must variously 
resort to images and ideas that are formative. 
Education ( 11 indoctrination") exerts such pressure 
upon him from without; he completes the process 
from within •10 
The notion of intrapersonal rhetoric may be summarized by noting the work 
of Charles Stevenson, as mediated through the screens of Don Burks. He 
argues that people "argue" in pretended social settings both in rehearsal 
9~., p. 112. 
1°Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1969), p. 39. 
for coming interpersonal interaction and in an attempt to sway them-
selves .11 
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To this point a strong implication may have developed that one of 
tne boundaries of rnetoric is "consciousness of action." Interndl dia-
logue aimed at finding sound courses of action, interpersonal rhetoric 
which--via the previous chapter--involves the setting and execution of 
strategies, and attempts to convince oneself of something somehow imply 
that the rhetor is in conscious control of his actions. But the new 
rhetoric does not recognize consciousness as a boundary line. This theory 
of rhetoric, according to Ehninger, includes "appeals which are at least 
partially 'unconscious' • " . . This provides, agdin, "a more comprehen-
sive picture of the role which rhetorical forces play in promoting social 
cohesion and effecting social control. 1112 This inclusion of the "uncon-
scious" in the field of rhetoric originated with .l)urke. We can, therefore, 
better understand how man's unconscious "actions" can be considered as 
actions per se by turning to Burke's statement: 
••• there is a wide range of ways whereby the 
rhetorical motive, through the resources of ident-
ification can operate without conscious direction by 
any particular agent •••• one can systematically 
extend the range of rhetoric, if one studies the 
persuasiveness of false or inadequate terms which 
may not be directly imposed upon us from without by 
some skillful speaker, but which we impose upon our-
selves, in varying degrees of deliberateness and 
unawareness, through motives indeterminately self-
protective and/or suicidal.13 
11Burks, "Persuasion, Self-Persuasion," p. 115. 
12Douglas Ehninger, "On Systems of Rhetoric," Contemporary Theories 
of Rhetoric: Selected Readings, ed. Richard L. Johannesen (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 334-35. 
13Burke, Rhetoric of Motives, P• 35. 
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Ehninger wams that allowing totally unconscious actions to be considered 
as rhetorical might well cause rhetoric to "lose it's identity as a dis-
d . . 1· .. 14 crete iscip ine. His fear is that pure stimulus-response situations 
might come to be considered as rhetorical. The Burkeian position, however, 
does not go far enough into the realm of the unconscious to face this 
danger. As he says, "There is an intermediate area of expression that 
is not wholly deliberate, yet not wholly unconscious. It lies midway 
between aimless utterance and speech directly purposive." 15 Burke never 
classifies the "unconscious" as rhetorical, only the "not-conscious." 
Things would probably be simpler if Burke more often chose directly mean-
ingful and identifiable terms, in this case "sub-conscious." 
The key to understanding "sub-conscious" rhetoric lies toward the 
end of this long statement of Burke. For even as he speaks of actions 
of which we are not wholly conscious, he still indicates that motives, 
not drives or "instincts," are responsible for these actions. Motives 
can become so ingrained and deep-seated that we eventually become unaware 
that they are operating to guide our actions. Motives, in other words, 
can become habitual. In the earlier description of the act, which we 
determined was mediated and proJected in a thought stage, room was left 
for subconscious action: actions in response to a situation undertaken 
so often that they become habitual. In the case of these actions, man 
does not fully mediate or think through them each time the appropriate 
environmental situation arises--he "knows" from past experiences that a 
14Ehninger, "On Systems of Rhetoric," p. 335. 
15Burke, Rhetoric -2£_ Motives, xiii. 
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c1ertain action is the appropriate one. At one time in the past these 
actions were mediated each time they were undertaken, but they have been 
repeated so often that such mediation is no longer necessary. In iden-
tical manner, motives which guide rhetorical behavior which were once 
brought to conscious attention each time they were applied to a situation 
come to be habitual. Thus, "not-conscious" or "sub-conscious" rhetorical 
acts are still strategic acts, but the strategies were decided upon long 
in the past. Now they are simply applied as a routine matter of course. 
Now, it is possible to view the scope of rhetoric from yet another 
angle: the forms in which rhetorical communication takes place. At one 
point Burke describes rhetoric as "essentially a realism of the act • • 
As such , it can be found in one way or another in most any act. Thus , 
rhetoric.:: can range from magic to formula, from witchcraft to medicine. 
As Wilkerson argues, "rhetorical activity cuts across the human communi-
cative spectrum. nl7 . . 
• nl6 
We may begin by noting that rhetoric is involved in all symbolic acts 
involving human choice and will. According to Burke, "Persuasion involves 
choice, will; it is directed to a man only insofar as he is £!:!!.. 1118 
16.!lli· , p. 44. 
17Wilkerson, "On Evaluating Theories of Rhetoric," p. 83. 
18Burke, Rhetoric of Motives, p. 50. It may appear that rhetoric 
and persuasion are beingequated here. They are not. Burke is 
writing, here, in that section of Rhetoric called "Traditional Prin-
ciples of Rhetoric." Hence, he is talking of a system in which the 
two were basically considered to cover the same range. For example, 
he makes the statement that "Only insofar as men are potentially 
free, must the spellbinder seek to persuade them. Insofar as they 
must do something, rhetoric is unnecessary ••• " In this way, while 
Tt'may sound as though I am equating the two terms, I am not. The 
view of the present study remains that persuasion is one rhetorical 
motive, but it does not encompass the whole of rhetoric. 
Further, "insofar as a choice of action is restricted, rhetoric seeks 
rather to have a formative effect upon attitude. 1119 And, as attitude 
is an incipient act held through the use of symbols,, rhetoric seeks to 
have a formative effect upon symbolic action. Second, in the internal 
dialogue of the self during which a specific rhetorical act is selected 
to be later addressed to a specific audience, the rhetor himself exer-
cises choice and will. Thus in two ways rhetoric is marked by the presence 
of these two elements. 
It may be readily apparent that rhetoric, then, is involved in all 
forms of public deliberation. But it is well to list at least a few of 
these forms and explain how rhetoric operates in them. First, this rne-
toric includes within its scope the various types of literature, insofar 
as they are "addressed" to a given audience. This is the other side of 
the coin which Wichelns once exploried as "The Literary Criticism of 
Oratory. 112° For the symbolic interactionist, prose and poetry alike can 
be rhetorical. As Burke argues, "The prose reference is clearly rhetor-
ical. It occurs in a work written with a definite audience in mind, and 
for a definite purpose." 21 Often the "poet," in the broader sense of 
the word, writes with double meaning, as in Biblical parables: 
In saying with fervor, that a blind Biblical 
hero did conquer, the poet is "substantially" 
sayini'that he in his blindness will conquer. 
This is moralistic prophecy, and--rs-thus also a 
kind of "literature for use , " use at one remove , 
19Ibid. -
2Osee Herbert A. Wichelns, "The Literary Criticism of Oratory," 
Studies ,!E_ Rhetoric~ Public Speaking~ Honor~ James!:_ Winans 
{New York: Century Company, 1925), pp. 181-216. 
21Burke, Rhetoric .2£. Motives, P• 4. 
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though of a sort that the technologically-
minded would consider the very opposite of use, 
sin~e ~; is wholly in the order of ritual and 
magic. 
The moralistic message of this type of "poetry" is clearly rhetorical 
in that it is a symbolic urging to incipient action. And, poetry in the 
more narrow sense of the term can also be considered rhetorical: 
••• the notion of persuasion to attitude would 
permit the application of rhetorical terms to 
purely poetic structures; the study of lyrical 
devices might be classed under the head of 
rhetoric, when these devices are considered for 
their power to induce or communicate states of 
mind to readers • • • u23 
Further, the claims of ethnologists, anthropologists, psychologists, 
and other such "social healers" may be considered rhetorical in that they 
"bear upon the persuasive aspects of language, the function of language 
as addressed, as direct or roundabout appeal to real or ideal audiences, 
without or within. 1124 Johnstone adds to this list with his argument that 
"Politics and commerce use rhetoric to produce action. . . A political 
proposal which required no action would be a contradiction in terms, as 
would an item on the market which required neither seller nor buyer. 1125 
Johnstone goes on to argue that a philosophical conclusion, calling for 
no action at all, is independent of rhetoric. He claims that "philosophy 
literally has no need for rhetoric. 1126 This claim can be refuted in two 
22~., P• s. 
23~•, P• 50. 
24Ibid., PP• 43-4. 
25ttenry W. Johnstone, Jr., "The Relevance of Rhetoric to Philosophy 




ways. First, philosophy is by most accounts a humanistic study. The 
philosopher "philosophizes" so that he may make improvements upon the 
social order. His conclusions are utterly worthless unless otners learn 
about them and attempt to apply them. So to claim that ~hilosophy, so 
firmly grounded in and owing to society, has no need for rhetoric is an 
incensingly chauvinistic statement, unless the philosopher speaks only 
in caves to muses. And, if that were true, the philosopher could not 
have become a philosopher in the first place. His work centers in man, 
his materials come from the study of man. In this way alone his work is 
rhetorical. But there is a second way in which we cari consider the 
philosopher a rhetorician. Even if he does make no attempt to apply his 
conclusions to other men, he has arrived at those conclusions through the 
inner dialectic of symbolic action. At the very least, he practices 
intrapersonal rhetoric. Intrapersonal rhetoric is necessary for reflec-
tive thought, and I doubt that even Johnstone would argue that the philo-
sopher does not practice reflective thought. In like fashion we can also 
name the conclusions of all other social scientists and natural scien-
tists as rhetorical. 
To this point, the examples of rhetoric we have considered have 
been verbal ones. The rhetor was either using symbols to influence him-
self or others, consciously or subconsciously. Now we come to the realm 
of the non-verbal. In the chapter on language I argued that man draws 
meaning from the non-verbal world of "reali ty11 only through language. 
Thus, non-verbal communication may be considered verbal communication 
once-removed. The "sender," to use a familiar pigeon-holing term, may 
consciously or sub-consciously "transmit" non-verbal messages to which 
he himself attaches "verbal" meanings. Likewise, the "receiver" 
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attach symbols to non-verbal cues if he is to draw any meaning from them. 
Burke makes the point in much the same way: "For non-verbal conditions or 
objects can be considered as signs by reason of the persuasive ingred-
ients inherent in the 'meaning' they have for the audience to which they 
are 'addressed. 11127 So, we may consider non-verbal rhetorical efforts in 
much the same way that we consider verbal ones--with the exception that 
we never can be quite as sure of the meanings the sender and receiver 
attach to the cues: we never hear clues to those meanings. Johnstone 
provides an example--dealing with another at pistol point. This act nas 
rhetorical elements in it because of the linguistic meanings attached to 
"guns." Such a non-verbal act can be considered rhetorically only be-
cause man is grounded in,his language. In the words of Johnstone, "the 
threat is a form of persuasion, albeit a degenerate form, and could not 
be applied to a mere animal. 1128 
The preceding pages have provided a skeletal outline of the elements 
and operations contained within the scope of rhetoric, whether we con-
sider it verbal or non-verbal, conscious or subconscious, interpersonal 
or intrapersonal. Included within its range are not only the conclu-
sions and advocated positions of social and natural scientists, social 
analysts, and social critics, but also such operations as magic and 
witchcraft, the latter two being means of promoting social cohesion in 
more primitive societies. 29 As Walter Fisher maintains, "There would 
27Burke, Rhetoric .2f. Motives, P• 161. 
28 Johnstone, "The Relevance of Rhetoric to Philosophy," P• 45 • 
29Burke, Rhetoric £t Motives, PP• 40-3. 
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appear to be as many different functions of rhetorical communication as 
there are ways of affecting the existence and vitality of the values 
that are the subject of public discourse. 1130 The difference between the 
range of this rhetoric and the more traditional theory is rather neatly 
summarized by Simons: 
The new rhetoric owes its impetus to what has 
familiarly become referred to as the "communications 
boom, 11 dating from the late forties, a period 
partially marked by two complementary trends: (1) 
Among those concerned with the causes and ameliora-
tion of man's problems, psycho-social concepts have 
been reformulated to reflect greater sensitivity to 
the influence of communication patterns on thought 
and action; and ( 2) Whereas earlier efforts among 
those previously interested in rhetorical discourse 
had focused on the platform speaker, the attention 
of some of them has shifted since the forties to the 
communicator, a "speaker-listener" who reciprocally 
interacts with others, usually in informal settings. 31 
THE COMPONENTS OF THE RHETORICAL ACT 
Kenneth Burke's dramatistic model of human behavior is made up of 
five elements--act, scene, agent, agency, and purpose--which were dis-
cussed at some length in chapters two through five. These elements form 
the basis for the components of the rhetorical act, for all five are 
involved in one way or another in any rhetorical effort. Act represents 
the totality of the rhetorical thrust; the scene provides the background 
out of which the felt need for rhetoric develops; scene and purpose 
combine to suggest the direction that the act will take; agent and 
30walter R. Fisher, "A Motive View of Communication," Quarterly 
Journal. .2f Speech, LVI ( 1970) , p. 132. 
31Herbert W. Simons, "Toward a New Rhetoric," Contemporary Theories 
of Rhetoric: Selected Readings, ed. Richard Johannesen (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1971), p. 53. 
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agency combine to fashion the peculiarly appropriate symbolic response 
to the felt need; and so on. In these various combinations, or ratios as 
Burke calls them, the elements of the pentad work together to produce 
the rhetorical act. Wilkerson is talking of much the same thing when 
he tries to explain how the interactionist bent provides a different 
perspective than an earlier theory: 
This formulation then locates the specific impetus 
to rhetorical activity within the perceptual 
orientation of the speaker, but the impetus is 
related to the influence of external factors. The 
latter include all the parts of the situation 
noted by Bitzer--exigence (prior events), audience, 
and constraints--but the account emphasizes that 
it is the speake~•s perception of these which gives 
rise to any rhetorical features his message may 
contain. 32 
The remainder of this chapter will emphasize some of the specific compon-
ents of the rhetorical act implied by the symbolic interactionists' 
position. The next chapter will consider purpose, agent, and agency 
in a broader sense through an investigation of the role of rhetoric 
l.n social change and social order. 
The interdependence of act and scene in rhetorical efforts provides 
us with several implications for a theory of rhetoric. The importance 
of "address" has already been established. Burke argues that an "act 
of persuasion is affected by the character of the scene in which it takes 
place and of the agents to whom it 1.s addressed. 1133 The act which is 
addressed must take into account the scene the actor perceives and the 
audience to which the appeal is being made. In no other way can the 
32Wilkerson, "On Evaluating Theories of Rhetoric," p. 92. 
33Burke, Rhetoric~ Motives, p. 62. 
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hoped for identifications be achieved. 
The need for the rhetor to handle all of these elements in order to 
produce a single rhetorical act brings thought to a point of central im-
portance. The rhetor must plan strategies based upon his understanding 
of his purpose and the nature of the audience. Take away the strategies, 
which rely upon thought processes, and the heart of rhetoric has been 
removed. Wilkerson goes so far as to suggest that if all cotmnunication 
were spontaneous (not requiring or allowing the internal dialogue which 
works out such strategies) there would never have been a basis for the 
development of rhetoric. 34 
Traditionally, the concept of audience has been of critical impor-
tance to the rhetorician. Its importance is not dulled, but rather is 
heightened by the new rhetoric. As we have noticed before, the symbolic 
interactionists' position requires that the speaker "become" his own 
audience momentarily: In this theory the interaction between speaker 
and audience is assumed to be at an extremely high level. Burke indicates 
that the nature of this interaction is such that the speaker must be 
willing to meet certain of the audience's identification needs in order 
to get them to meet some of his: 
••• the rhetorician may have to change an audience's 
opinion in one respect; but he can succeed only insofar 
as he yields to that audience's opinions in other 
respects. Some of their opinions are needed to support 
the fulcrum by which he would move their opinions.3 b 
The rhetorician must always be aware that each agent or group of agents 
in his audience are individual interpreters of reality. Lach has learned 
34Wilkerson, "On Evaluating Theories of Rhetoric," p. 90. 
35Burke, Rhetoric~ Motives, p. 56. 
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to interpret reality in the way that both serves him best and makes the 
most sense (makes for "order" in his world). Put another way, all of 
these agents will have developed vocabularies 
that will be faithful reflections of reality. To tnis 
end, they must develop vocabularies that are selections 
of reality. Any any selection of reality must, -1.n 
certain circumstances, function as a deflection of 
reality.36 
These vocabularies become terministic screens. Therefore, the rhetor 
must attempt to "feel" his way into the vocabularies of his auditors if 
he is to hope to achieve his goals with them. To fail to do so would ul-
timately result in misunderstanding and reJection of his ideas. Burke 
comments: "You can persuade a man only insofar as you can talk his 
language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, 
identifying your ways with his. 1137 In the Grammar _2.t Motives ne strongly 
implies that the critic's job involves finding the representative anec-
dote which will "stand for" the essence of the piece of discourse he is 
investigating. In much the same way, it would seem that the rhetorician 
must search for the "anecdote" which is representative of his audience, 
for the anecdote is considered as a key to the vocaoulary which grows 
from it. 
What we are really searching for in looking for this anecdote is 
the system of motives which our auditors have cnosen as the oases fol' 
their actions. Once we have discovered what we believe to be that basic 
36Kenneth burke, A Grammar of Motives (Berkeley: The University of 
California Press, 19b9), p. 59. 
37Burke, Rhetoric of Motives, P• 55. 
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system of motives, we can expand the analysis of the audience outward: 
In any term we can posit a world, in the sense that 
we can treat the world in terms of it, seeing all 
as emanations, near or far, of its light. Such 
reduction to a simplicity being technically reduction 
to a summarizing title or "God term," when we con-
front a simplicity we must forthwith ask ourselves 
what complexities are subsumed beneath it. 38 
Further, looking at the audience in terms of a representative anecdote 
makes the task of carrying on the internal dialogue of the "I" and the 
"me" a more meaningful operation. Herein lies a critical difference 
between the audience analysis of the traditional theory of rhetoric and 
the "audience analysis" of the new rhetoric: the theory of the old rhe-
toric asks us to find out certain features of the audience and fashion 
the message after those features; the new rhetoric asks us to find the 
basic motives of the audience, momentarily take those motives as our own, 
and "act out" the interaction of our appeal and those motives. Using, 
atypically, a Freudian vocabulary Burke lends support to this treatment 
of the internal dialog: "The ego with its g confronts the super-ego 
much as an orator would confront a somewhat alien audience, whose sus-
ceptibilities he must flatter as a necessary step towards persuasion. u 39 
As the rhetorical exchanges between "speakers" and "audiences" 
increase the importance of more fully understanding the "other's" point 
of view, so does the concept of argument shift from the rather heavy 
emphasis upon "logical argument" in traditional rhetoric to "psychological 
argument" in the newer theory. The ideational basis for rhetorical acti-
vity, then, becomes an active 1.ntermeshing of what have traditionally been 
38Burke, Grammar .£f. Motives, P• 105. 
39Burke, Rhetoric ,2!. Motives, pp. 37-8. 
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termed "logic" and "imagination." The symbolic interactionists' theory, 
then, tends to reverse what Donald Salper views as a lacking of traai-
tional theory: II . . . rhetoric and poetic seem to be following separate 
and distinct paths that diverge from one another at an increasing rate. 1140 
Charles Sears Baldwin places the origin of this dividing of rhetoric and 
poetic firmly in classical writings: 
The movement of the one /rhetoric/ the ancients 
saw as primarily intellectual, a-progress from idea 
to idea determined logically; that of the other 
~oetic/, as primarily imaginative, a ~rogress from 
image to image determined emotionally. 1 
Following this traditional format, in Salper's words, has resulted in 
"a lamentable lack of balance in the practice and teaching of rhetoric1142 
so far as the integration of the rational and the imaginative are 
concerned. 
Many writers have, in recent years, begun to challenge the asswnp-
tion that rhetoric, or even argumentation, need be grounded firmly in 
the traditional system of logic. 43 Campbell draws attention to the weak-
ness of the traditional view, insisting that it prevents students of 
rhetoric from viewing obJectively many of the various persuasive uses 
of language: 
40 Donald Salper, "The Imaginative Component of Rhetoric," Quarterly 
Journal .2.!_ Speech, LI (1965), p. 309. 
41Charles Sears Baldwin, Ancient Rhetoric ~Poetic (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1924), p. 3. 
42Salper, "Imaginative Component of Rhetoric," p. 308. 
43see, for example, Ray Anderson and C. David Mortensen, "Logic and 
Marketplace Argumentation," Quarterly Journal .2£. Speech,. L~II (1967), 
pp. 143-51, and Jesse G. Delia, "The Logic Fallacy, Cognitive Theory, 
and the Enthymeme: A Search for the Foundations of Reasoned Discourse," 
Quarterly Journal .E£_ Speech, LVI (1970), pp. 140-48. 
The primary objection to the rationalistic inter-
pretation of human persuadabi li ty is that, by its 
very nature, it cannot provide a basis from which 
to scrutinize all persuasive uses of language; 
it cannot generate a complete theory of the rhe-
torical dimensions of language usage •••• Critics 
and theorists who adopt the rationalistic perspec-
tive are led invariably to denigrate or ignore 
those genres of discourse seeking acquiesence 
primarily through means other than appeals to 
reason. 44 
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Substituted for this perceived over-reliance upon the purely logical 
uses of language, Otis Walter says, is the logical security contemporary 
rhetoric finds "in amplification--endless examples, authorities, statistics, 
and analogies." 45 Salper characterizes those who seek to expand the role 
of what has traditionally been called "poetic" in rhetoric, to "Justify 
a fuller role for the imaginative within rhetoric." Consider, for 
example, Weaver's claim about the metaphor: " metaphor is itself 
a means of discovery. 1146 Salper draws much the same conclusion regarding 
the figurative analogy, noting that "The very point of figurative analogy 
is that it observes similarities between otherwise dissimilar things. 1147 
At the base of this belief we can find the symbolic interactionists' 
view of the operation of human thought, mediated through language. Lach 
individual develops his own thought processes, his own "psych- and/or 
socio-logical" patterns of thought. Reality and truth can be Judged 
44 Campbell, "Ontological Foundations of Rhetorical Theory," p. 98. 
45otis M. Walter, "On Views of Rhetoric, Whether Conservative or 
Progressive," Contemporary Theories ,2!_ Rhetoric: Selected Readings, 
ed. Richard L. Johannesen (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 25. 
46Richard M. Weaver, The 1thics of Rhetoric (Chicago: Henry 
Regnery & Company, 1953), W:- 203-4. 
47Salper, "Imaginative Component," p. 309. 
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only in terms of the way that a given individual perceives them. Reality, 
remember, is mediated through language. Language is, in a sense, each 
person's own "reality." Thus, if an individual nas come to tnink largely 
through analogy or metaphor, so be it. If he often makes "emotional" 
responses that seem "illogical" to a "logician" he is, nonetheless, opera-
ting within his own system of "logic." Most recent writers have, at the 
base of their attempts to expand the scope of argwnentation, a belief 
that people simply do not think and argue in a fashion that "fits" or "is 
patterned after" the classical forms of logic or the more modern attempts 
to establish alternate forms. Fortunately, individuals develop their 
thought processes through interaction with those around them so in the 
end the individual patterns of thought are similar enough that communica-
tion between persons can take place. But the basic point is clear: what 
may appear "logical" to one person may be pure nonsense to another. When 
one person makes the fantastic logical leaps often associated with ana-
logical reasoning another may think him slightly imbalanced. But to the 
symbolic interactionist, the other should not be so quick to Judge--he 
should attempt to "get inside" the other, to take his role, and find out 
how the other person's thought processes work. 
Thus, a symbolic interaction based ~hetoric expands the scope of 
logic beyond the purely "mathematical" relationships among parts of 
speech and semantic meanings. The newer point of view allows each in-
dividual's psychological processes to alter the more formal mathematical 
relationships. In this way I the nature of "logic" .becomes "psycno-logic" 
or "socio-logic" and we can concomitantly expand the ideational aspect 
of rhetoric to include the imaginative. A pragmatic outlook practically 
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requires that we expand our view of idea past the more idealistic forms 
used in traditional rhetoric. 
CONCLUSION 
Almost by definition, a pragmatically based rhetoric expands the 
scope of rhetoric to any use of symbols that contributes to the social 
order. So considered, rhetoric includes not only speaker-audience inter-
action but also interpersonal and intrapersonal messages. In each of 
these three forms of communication, participants plan strategies to 
achieve certain goals. Each participant, to one extent or another, 
attempts to "take the role" of the other participants and internally 
rehearse the various means of achieving his goal in a given situation. 
Though this statement may imply total consciousness of action, the sym-
bolic interactionists recognize a "sub-conscious" application of rhetori-
cal motives--motives that have become so ingrained through past conscious 
use that they are now basically habitual. 
The symbolic interactionist, further, recognizes each individual 
as a separate locus of motives and a separate interpreter of reality. 
Thus, for effective communication to take place--and for any rhetor to 
have hopes of achieving his goals--each participant in a given rhetorical 
act must attempt to locate the system of motives active in the members 
of his "audience." After fin ding this sytem of motives, the rhetor has 
a far greater chance of drawing the desired identifications between his 
own motives and those of the persons with whom he is speaking. Also 
growing out of this recognition of individuals as separate loci of motives 
and interpreters of reality is a broader based "logic," one which meshes 
the "traditionally" logical with the traditionally "poetic." The logicdl 
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has generally been considered as the ideational aspect of rhetoric. This 
expanded concept of "the logical" thus brings the imaginative within the 
ideational bases of rhetoric, allowing the student of the field to con-
sider a much broader range of the thought processes that make up the 
rhetorical act. 
Put simply, then, a rhetoric based in symbolic interaction extends 
the boundaries of rhetoric far beyond those generally recognized in more 
traditional theories of rhetoric. Thls broader scope enables, for example, 
the rhetorical critic to join forces with the sociologist and investigate 
non-oratorical forms of address in terms of their social impact; it 
re-makes the rhetorical critic into a social critic. For, as we investi-
gate the ways in which individuals expand their social identifications 
with other individuals, we are investigating the ways in which the social 
order forms and is changed. 
Chapter 8 
IDENTIFICATION AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 
Hugh Duncan writes that the "social end of all communication is the 
consensus that is reached through the establishment and maintenance of 
attitudes, beliefs, and knowledge, as these are expressed in roles whose 
successful performance guarantees social order."1 Since the symbolic 
interactionists, from whom the rhetorical stance of this study is being 
taken, are primarily interested in the ways in which society operates, 
it is imperative that the new rhetoric be examined in terms of its social 
force. Basically, I shall maintain in this chapter that identification, 
the key term in the new rhetoric, provides the primary link among persons 
that leads to renewed attempts at maintaining some form of social order. 
Further, I shall relate this to the ways in which division attempts to 
"tear at" the fibre of social order, causing society to "regroup" and 
establish a new order. 
My basic concern is both with the ways in which rhetoric works to 
establish and change social goals, and with the mechanics involved in 
maintaining social order. As Duncan claims, a theory of rhetoric will 
be of no real value "unless it can be applied to the affairs of men in 
society.112 Symbolic action will be examined insofar as it is used in 
1Hugh Dalziel Duncan, "The Search for a Social Theory of Communica-
tion in American Sociology," Human Communication Theory, ed. Frank E. X. 
Dance (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1967), P• 240. 
2Hugh Dalziel Duncan, Communication and Social Order (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1962), p. IJ2. -
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acts of "identification with good, dubious, or bad principles of social 
order." 3 It is here--in tne social battles involving order and disorder, 
"between good and bad principles of social order as personified in neroes 
and villains, Gods and devils • • • "--that symools reach into their most 
important realm. 4 
IDENTIFICATION AND DIVISION: THE. BACKDROP FOR ORD~R 
At the base of all human motivation in social circumstarices lies a 
goal of interpersonal identification. The writings of both bur~e and 
Duncan are rich with this implication. Though man may have other specific 
motives in any given symbolic act, somewhere within his action he is seek-
ing to reaffirm the nature of his relationship with other men. 
At the most personal level, we all develop certain parts of our 
individual personalities through identification with family, nation, 
political ties, cultural surroundings, church--those social institutions 
and those persons closest and most important to us.~ The very nature of 
identification suggests that this is so: "In being identified with B, A 
is 'substantially one' with a person other than himself. Yet at tne 
same time he remains a unique, individual locus of motives. 116 We are 
all, then, "substantially one" w1.th the significant others who hcive had 
a shaping influence upon our lives; and at the same time we remain 
3hugh Dalziel Duncan, Symbols in Society (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1968), p. 22. 
4Ibid., p. 23. 
5Kenneth Burke, Language~ Symbolic Action/(Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1966), p. 301. 
6Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (iierkeley: University 
of California Press, 1969}, p. 21:-
different in many ways than each other person, no matter how close he 
may be. 
lb9 
Leadership in a society emerges only when some powerful person or 
persons manage to cast an image with which a significant portion of the 
public can feel "substantially one." Lacking tnis sort of iaentification 
with the public, a "leader" cannot lead. Duncan argues that because social 
action is dramatistic, in that all persons can become active in maKing 
rules and appointing leaders, the massed individuals have the final say 
in determining the courses a leader• may follow and in deciding whicn 
leader will follow such courses. 
All legitimation of power rests, in the last cmalysis, 
on the acceptance of a style of life. We may usurp 
power through force, but we secure victory only when 
the vanquished admire, honor, and finally, imitate 
our way of life •••• The people do not want infor-
matio~ about, but identification with, community 
life. 
In this way, people "choose up sides," identifying with certain leaders 
and rejecting certain others as unfl. t because they are "too unlike." 
Further, as individuals move from one issue to the next they may gather 
forces behind different leaders. Iaentification, as we have argued, is 
not total. While I may be "substantially the same" as one leader on one 
particular social issue I may also be quite aifferent from him on another 
issue. Thus, my allegiance will be split among a number of various leaders 
at any given time. The doctrine of substance, then, implies both 
identification and division. A society based upon such a notion is more 
than an "aggregate of people." It is an aggregate of people, divided in 
many ways, who are unified by some quite abstract goal or ideal. 8 Put 
7nuncan, Symbols!!!, Society, P• 34. 
8Marie Hochmuth Nichols, Rhetoric~ Criticism {Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1967), P• 86. 
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another way, each of us identifies with certain "specialized activities" 
which are in some way divergent from other such activities. Society is 
formed out of these activities which participate in "a larger unit of 
action. 'Identification' is a word for the autonomous activity's place 
in this wider context •• 
cohesion in anotner way: 
• n9 Burke explains this base for social 
As regards "autonomous" activities I the principle of 
Rhetorical identification may be summed up thus: The 
fact that an activity is capable of reduction to intrin-
sic, autonomous principles does not argue that it is 
free from identification with other orders of motivation 
extrinsic to it. Such other orders are extrinsic to 
it, as considered from the standpoint of the special-
ized activity alone. But they are not extrinsic to 
the field of moral action as such, considered from the 
standpoint of human activity in genera1.lO 
In this way, different movements led by different leaders may be appar-
ently at odds but be consubstantial when "reduced" to a broader motive. 
Thus, both the conservative "patriot" and the anti-war "patriot" engaged 
in "battle" for the past few years have oeen concerned with what each 
considered the "best image" for the country to put forth. Substantially 
different on one level, these two movements have been "substantially 
alike" at another level--though tney have seldom .been willing to acknow-
ledge the latter. 
In short, identification between persons is never canplete. They 
may agree on one idea, but disagree on many others. They may have nearly 
identical feelings toward a third person, but feel differently about a 
fourth. As Burke says, "In pure identification there would be no strife." 
9Burke, Rhetoric ,2!. Motives, p. 27. 
lOibid. -
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But since there is no "pure" identification, strife is ever-present in 
human interaction. And it is out of this strife that rhetoric develops. 
In Burke's words, "since opponents can Join in battle only through a 
mediatory ground that makes their communication possible ••• " there must 
be neither absolute identification nor absolute division. "But put iuenti-
fication and division ambiguously ,together, so that you cannot know for 
certain JUSt where one ends and the other begins, and you have the char-
acteristic invitation to rhetoric. 1111 
Division is the counterpart of identification. It is imposswle to 
clearly define one in the absence of the other. Fogarty relates the 
two in the field of human interaction by noting that "it is division and 
partisanship that provide the situations where iaentification becomes a 
human need." 12 Identification, the primary rhetorical motive, arises in 
human affairs seeking solutions to the problems posed by division. As 
we have previously "named" rhetoric a problem-solving activity, such a 
problem-solution relationship between division and identification is 
quite appropriate. Burke claims "Identification is affirmed with earnest-
ness precisely because there is division. Identification is compensatory 
to division. If men were not apart from one another, there would be no need 
for the rhetorician to proclaim their unity. 11 13 
Division is confronted in rhetoric through wnat Burke calls the 
two main aspects of rhetoric: "Its use of identification and its nature 
11Ibid., p. 25. 
12oanie l Fogarty, Roots !!. Rhetoric (New York: Russell 
& Russell, 1968), p. 75. 
13Burke, Rhetoric of Motives, p. 22. 
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as addressed. 11 14 Thus social action in pursuit of the social oroer is 
grounded in the interplay of the forces of identification and tne forces 
for division. Duncan provides the commentary for Burke's "battle." 
Thus, Burke begins his system with acting (that 1.s, 
communicating) individuals who are at odds with one 
another and who become identified with groups "more 
or less at odds with one another." He seeks ways in 
which to confront the implications of division, not 
to explain them away, or to disregard them, or to 
reduce them to an "abnormal" condition of loving 
cooperation.15 ' 
"INTERLOCKING MOMENTS" AND THE DRAMA OF 
MAINTAINING SOCIAL ORDLR 
According to Duncan, Burke posits four basic motives 1.n hwnan com-
munication: guilt, redemption, hierarchy, and victi.mage. "By this, ne 
means that in human relationships these four motives are the keys to tne 
grand design of all human motivat1.on. 11 l 6 To these four basic motives 
he adds three more elements making up what .Burke calls the "interlocking 
moments:" the negative, mortification, and catharsis. Rueckert explains 
how these seven "terms" inter-lock in human action to create a drama of 
human relations: 
they are "interlocked" because all of them belong to 
the "Order" or "Covenant" cluster of terms and any 
one of them "logologically" implies all the others. 
Briefly, the seven moments are related to each other 
in the following way: the wnole drama is made pos-
sible--or inevitable--by language, which introduces 
tne negative into human experience; with language 
14Ibid., p. 45. 
15Duncan, Communication and Social Order, p. 159. 
16Hugh Dalziel Duncan, "Introduction," Permanenc~ and ChaI.Lg~, 
au. Kenneth Burke (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrili Compa'iiy, inc., 
196 5) , xxxi. 
and the negative man creates various kinds of hier-
archic orders, all of which have hundreds of "thou-
shalt-nots" in them; every hierarchy is experienced 
by a man as a kind of covenant, but no man is capable 
of meeting all the terms of the agreement and in some 
way he will fail or disobey. Failure and disobedience--
the "fall"--cause guilt, which in turn makes necessary 
the whole machinery of catharsis. The two principle 
means of purification are mortification and victimage; 
and the end result of both is redemption, or the 
alleviation of guilt.17 
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Social order cap be found, basically, in the hierarchies which man estab-
lishes and which he attempts to uphold. In search of these covenants man 
I 
falls, producing guilt. Failure to live up to the old social order de-
mands that the guilt be purged. Aiter redemption is achieved man 
establishes new hierarchies which make up a new "social order" for him. 
And so the cycle goes on without end. Out of the relationships among 
these seven "moments" arises all of the give-and-take of social inter-
action, and out of these relationships grow the terms which must be used 
in an analysis of social action in pursuit of social order. 
Hierarchy is perhaps the most important of these seven "moments," 
particularly in a discussion of social order. Each individual sets his 
own hierarchies by ordering his goals in social interaction. Social 
order and societal goals evolve from these individual hierarchies when 
enough members of a "culture" advocate similar goal systems. Hierarchy 
itself, claims Fogarty, refers to "the overall pattern of ••• constant 
and universal strivings after identification.1118 Social hierarchies are, 
as interpreted by Rueckert, filled with "movement and rest I flux and 
17William H. Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human 
Relations (Minneapolis: University of Minn8So~Press 1 1903) 1 p. 131. 
18Fogarty, Roots £2!: ~~Rhetoric, p. 76. 
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fixity, division and merger • • • 1119 in that man is constantly rearrang-
ing hierarchies. 
Change is inherent is a society's chosen "ordering of priorities," 
because man consistently fails to fulfill the hierarchies he hclS estab-
lished--identification never reaches perfection in the realm of human 
affairs. And, failure to live up to the rules established in attempting 
to fulfill any covenant (hierarchy) fills man with guilt which he must 
purge. Rueckert, in a long statement here included because of its ex-
planatory value, maintains that the hierarchy is 
equivalent to the "covenant." The pre-existing orders 
tell man what he should and should not do and be: they 
provide him with his ideals (economic, sexual, social, 
familial, intellectual) and with a number of alternative 
selves from which to choose; they offer a complete set 
of values in terms of which he can find himself, measure 
success and failure, goodness and evil. The first or 
original "temptation" and "fall" are automatic; that is, 
they are inherent in man's nature as a symbol-using 
animal, for language, which has iulbedded in it a driving 
impulse towards abstraction, enables man to construct 
ideal selves and ideal modes of behavior which are 
never capable of attainment, but on the basis of which 
he nevertheless judges himself and others. 20 
Duncan maintains that there are five basic types of hierarchies to 
which man pays homage: 
There are ultimates of the person, as when the per-
sonal authority of parents, prophets, or gods is 
invoked; of laws and codes, as when we say that 
"laws, not men, uphold social order"; of nature 
and environment, as when we ascribe causes of 
order to "tendencies," "processes," or "laws" in 
nature; of means, as when we turn to methods, 
tecnniques, instruments, or magic; and, finally, 
19 Rueckert, Kenneth Burke ,!!!!. Drama .££_ Human Relations, p. 140. 
20,!lli., pp. 1a2-a. 
of the perfected end or ideal of social order 
whose immanence infuses social relationsnips 
with meaning.21 
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Faced with covenants with each of these forms of "ultimates," the inaivi-
d1ual must "pyramid" those ideals to which he pays homage. Wi tnout such 
a "rank-ordering" of "priori ties" a person would not long remain sane; 
if you answer to five masters and each of them passes out dlfferent orders 
at the same instant how can you possibly respond? 
However, if one person is to interact effectively with others who 
may not have constructed the same hierarchic "gods" he must retain a 
feeling for the other person's covenants and he must remain flexible 
enough to openly discuss the other's goals. Only if such flexibility 
is present can one's hierarchies change and "grow" in response to changes 
in others around him. On the other hand, "when the enactment of hier-
archy becomes so dogmatic and the stages of development so rigid that 
doubt, question, or creation of new hierarchiee are no longer possible. 
we ente1" the realm of hierarchal psychosis." 22 We become so attached. to 
single "god-terms" that we cannot operate without them. And, viewed fran 
the other perspective, when a society becomes "set in its ways" with 
laws that many consider to be archaic it, too, suffers from hierarchal 
psychosis. Typically, a person or society bestruck with such a "social 
disease" finds itself in trouble for it becomes bent upon enforcing a 
law, value, or whatever to which others no longer pay allegiance. The 
person who attempts to enforce such "outdated" covenants upon others 
becomes frustrated; the society which attempts it opens itself to revolt. 
2 louncan, Symt>ols in Society, p. 115. 
22Duncan, Communication~ Social Order, p. 132. 
• • 
17b 
One of the particular types of hierarchy noted by Duncan is the 
"ultimate of tne person." It is singled out for special attention here 
because of the symbolic interactionists' primary concern with interaction 
among persons. Person hierarchies are characterized by something akin to 
( though enforced somewhat less rigidly than) India's "besmirched-lJy-the-
history-books" caste system wherein persons exist on different levels of 
social position and influence. Particularly in the case of government, 
some few individuals hold great quantities of power, others hola some 
power but not as much, and others (by far the larger number) are rela-
tively powerless. Rhetoric conducted in such a setting is a delicate 
operation, for persons on different power and status levels must attempt 
to promote identification with persons on other levels--and tne latter 
may not be interested in the appeals of the former. 
Courtship is the form that rhetoric takes in such person hierarcnies. 
In courtship, "we plead with superiors, inferiors, and equals as a speaker 
pleads with his audience. In such courtship the response of the audience 
is given, never taken. 1123 The superior must persuade the inferior to 
trust in him and accept his rule. According to Duncan, "This is done 
through the glorification of symbols of majesty and power as symbols of 
social order ••• wherein the power and the glory of the ruler. 
/is/ a 'representative' of some transcendent principle of order. 1124 . . 
Inferiors, on the other hand, "must persuade superiors to accept them 
as loyal followers, but in doing so they must subordinate themselves to 
principles of order, as well as to the personal will of their superiors. 11 25 
23ouncan, Symbols in Society, p. 127. 
24Ibid. , p. 53. 
25Ibid. 
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And the granting of wishes by either tne superior or tne inferior is 
never to be assumed. 
Courtship , sexual or social, brings us immediately 
into the realm of persuasion. We cannot "make" or 
force the other to give us honor, reputation, love, 
or hate. We cannot even make him attend to us , Wlless 
he wants to.26 
In fact• the actors in this drama "keep a wary eye on eacn otner to 
guard against threats to the glory of principles of social oraer 
as each of them views it. 
. . . 
Hierarchy, then, represents the com~lex social allegiances that 
each individual draws up for himself. The nierarchy each person forms 
determines many of his social actions in that it provides an ordering 
1127 
of his goals and motives. The actor makes a covenant witn tnose things 
he values and he strives to accomplish them. But when he fails to 
achieve one or more of them, "hierarchic eml>arrasment" sets in--he feels 
guilt. 
According to Duncan, "Guilt arises out of negation of the princi~les 
of social order, and their expression in hierarchy. We believe we should 
be identifying with such a principle, but we are' not. 1128 These moments 
of guilt are times of deep social disrelationship. Such guilt can work 
in two ways. First, each of us may "feel" our own guilt because we fail 
to identify with major social covenants (or, because we fail to strive 
hard enough in their" behalf). Or, alternatively, we may imbue others 
with guilt because we observe their actions as being contrary to the 
26Duncan , Communication~ Social Order, p. 196. 
27Duncan, Symbols~ Society, P• 54. 
28nuncan, Communication~ Social Order, p. 121. 
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principles of social order. In this way, due to severe societal stereo-
types, "Jews, Negroes, and minority groups are branded as evil .before 
they act at all. 1129 
Guilt is purgatory--it is only a stopping place in a continw.ng 
journey. And just as division and identification are "pair terms," so 
does guilt imply redemption. Redemption revitalizes us, sets us in a 
renewed position of social grace so that we may make new covenants DY 
establishing new hierarchies. Redemption is accomplished oy a process 
involving, usually, both mortification and victimage. 
Mo1"tification, the first' step towards redemption, is basically a 
means of readying oneself for the purge. It is during the period of 
mortification that the individual internalizes and intensely contemplates 
his seeming violations of the social order. At base, it is an internally 
oriented phenomenon. Duncan clearly places it inside the individual: 
••• penance, or abstinence, or the self-punishment 
of mortification, do not occur merely when we are 
"frustrated" by some external interference. Frustra-
tion must come from within. When we accept command-
ments of authority as our duty, we kill within us 
motives we think unruly or impious. 30 
But in addition to placing mortification inside the individual, Duncan 
also seems to oe saying that it can be a full means of redemption in 
itself. If we can accept the wrongness of an act we have .basically re-
pledged allegiance to the social order and we feel pardonea. Ana, indeed, 
mortification can serve to assuage guilt by itself. But this involves 
the cracking of some often strong ego-defenses. Because of this 
29_!lli., p. 122. 
30_!lli., p. 395. 
mortification is more often a first step towards redemption, closely 
followed oy victimization. Duncan contl.Ilues: 
We seek to overcome the deep pain of inner con-
tention by projecting it upon a scapegoat ••• 
who becomes the sacrificial vessel upon which we 
vent, as if from without, a turmoil that is 
actually within. When we cannot do this, the 
body itself may be victinu.zed, as in psycho-
genic illness: our socially goaded entangle-
ments literally tear us to pieces as we suffer 
from "stress" diseases. 31 
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Viewed this way, mortification may be a two-step process in which we 
assign guilt not to ourselves, but to another person. In this way, the 
second step is a form of victimization. But the whole process may be 
Ke?t internal. The implication of Duncan's latter statement is that we 
often "conjure up visions" of another person and "internally" place the 
blame on him. 
But purely external victimization can foilow from mortification. 
Again, Duncan makes the tie for us: 
Victims exist within the self, as well as in society. 
But for the purposes of constructing a model of human 
relationships based on communication, tne "inner 
victims," the inner selves whom wa punish and mortify 
in various ways, may be considered as re-enactments of 
"outer" or social selves. Where there are "total" 
victims available to us, we turn inward only to 
marshal our strength against a known enemy. We turn 
inward to prepare for outward action, not to stay 
within the self in reverie or fantasy. 32 
When we do tum outward for release from guilt we search for the perfect 
"sacrificial lamb." We can begin to understand how victimage assigns 
blame to others when the social order is disrupted by turning to a 
particularly cogent statement of Duncan: 
3llb.d 
--2:....·' p. 396. 
32Duncan, Symbols Society, pp. 147-48. 
Burke argues that such absolution is "contrived 
through victimage." This involves the "choice of 
a sacrificial offering that is correspondingly 
absolute in the perfection of its fitness." ••• 
Victimage is the means by which we cleanse the group 
of tribal or "inherited" guilt •••• The sacrifice 
of the virtually perfect victim, in so far as it 
affects social order, can then be thought of as 
a kind of purge. The victim, of course, must be 
prepared for his ritual role, for only a powerful 
victim can effectively purge the community of 
great evi1.33 
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The social observer can continually see victimage operating at all levels 
of social interaction. 
I 
The schoolboy who spills his ink has violated 
the "social order" of the classroom. How often he is quick to point an 
accusing finger at a classmate saying that a paper wad "let fly" by the 
second boy made him jump and knock the ink off the desk (onto the teacner's 
shoes l). If the scapegoat he nas chosen is a worthy victim ( as with the 
"hellion" of the second grade), his guilt is purged and he once again 
takes his rigntful position in the social order. 
Or, we can view victimage in operation on the larger social scene 
as with student dissenters and administration officials doing verbal 
battle over the Indochina war. There was no doubt that social disorder 
had replaced social order on the national scene in the late 1960's and 
very early 1970 1s. But who had broken the covenant? The administration, 
often through the "pithies and pungents" of the Vice-President, looked 
upon the disorder as a direct result of the "rabble-rousing" dissenters 
and the "effete snobs" who spurred them on. The dissenters, on the other 
hand, pointed a finger of blame at the "war machine" administration 
claiming that the governmental actions had .brought on disorder. Each, 
33nuncan, Communication .!lli!, Social Order, p. 125. 
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to the satisfaction of itself, managed to alleviate guilt feel.l.ngs by 
victimizing the other. And in this way, each could go on pursuing the 
hierarchical arrangements to which it had pledged allegiance. 
So, we have come full cycle. Men establish nierarchies which tney 
pursue as covenants. Inevitably, the covenants are broken and guilt 
feelings set in. As guilt is a fall from grace, an attempt is begun to 
redeem oneself and re-Join the social order. Identification, as man's 
primary social motive, essentializes this attempt. Through mortifica-
tion and victimage man gains :redemption and chooses new covenants. And 
the cycle repeats itself again and again, each time re-adJusting the 
hierarchies that'the individuals and the society they represent choose 
to honor. 
ORDER, DISORDER, AND SOCIAL CHAL1GE 
Social order is based in the hierarchic constructions that the 
members of a society have chosen. The total social order is made up 
of man's allegiance to persons, laws, nature, means, and a cultural 
ideal. The simplicity of these statements belies the complexity of 
social order in any cultural setting, though. All of man's perceptions 
are mediated through his language. Each individual may have slightly 
different concepts of what given words in a language mean. Further, in 
any cultural setting there are masses of individuals who place these 
differing constructions and interpretations on tne events around them 
and the goals that they strive to achieve. In short, the presence of 
any sort of social order can hardly be accoWl.ted for by chance. Out of 
the wide variety of social constructions in a culture some means must 
emerge to form order. The mutual oenefit of the meml>ers of a society 
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argues for the establishment of order, and the motive of identification 
for mutual benefit urges the society to become "suostantially one" on 
at least the issues most important for the society's existence and growtn. 
In short, as Marie lh.cnols says, "we have in a society whose direction 
is co-operation, people who are apart. Different nervous systems, througn 
language and the ways of production, erect various communities of interests 
and insights, social communities varying in nature and scope. 1134 
Order develops out of the divergence found in indiviaual members of 
a culture through three primary forces: lan~uage, leadership, and rules. 
Overriding all three of these forces, of course, is man's means of social 
address--rhetoric. According to Fogarty, 
man pours all his energies into establishing and 
maintaining his'personal world of hierarchic order. 
His survival depends on it. And rhetoric is his 
specific means of seeking or keeping that order • 
• • • Rhetoric, then, is the instrument of strife, 
because it is the means of defending and competing 
for this order. But it is also the means of ac-
complishing order, because, for Burke, entreaty, 
overture, politeness, and diplomacy are all forms 
of a rhetoric of courtship that promotes union for 
the sake of order. 35 
The language of a culture will determine, to a large extent, the 
specific form its social order will take. As Duncan explains the func-
tion of language in establishing social order, "Symbolic integration is 
achieved through naming •••• A style of lJ.fe, like any style, is an 
expression through symbols of appropriate and inappropriate ways of 
acting. These 'ways' are carried out under names which are ••• goads 
34Nichols, Rhetoric~ Criticism, p. 82. 
35rogarty, Roots ~.!.~Rhetoric, p. 56. 
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to action." 36 In a society, such as ours , which sees the communist as 
"enemy" to order, "Those whose acts are named 'communistic' must be 
killed by those whose acts are named 'democractic.' What is a 'communist' 
or a 'democrat'? • They are simply god and devil tenns u37 . . . 
And, if we are to maintain the social order we have pledged ourselves to 
the devils must be exorcised and the gods lauded. 
Such is the nature of language as a force for hierarchy. But lan-
guage sets up a wall between man and the environment and our terministic 
screens may lead to witch hunts in a community of innocents. Hierarchic 
psychosis can so focus attention on the covenant, and a society's screens 
can-so fog actions that are only mildly divergent that we may forever be look-
ing under beds and in attics in the style of the McCarthy communist purge 
of the fifties or the "detention camps" of the war years. Thus, while 
language provides a means for forming the social order, it also has the 
force, through its inherent ambiguity, to so tie us to a covenant that we 
feel threatned by anyone who does not "bow thrice upon entering." 
Further, social order is enforced and, to a large extent, shaped u~on 
the advice of a culture's leaders. "The basic sociological question in 
the analysis of any social drama is: How is the principle of social order 
represented? ••• Who is the hero, and who is the villain, of social 
order • • • 1138 Because of the possible ( or probable) mass confusion anu 
disorder that could result if no one attempted to bring together the 
hierarchies of tne individuals in a society, we can create social order 
36Duncan, Symbols .!!!_ Society, p. 21. 
37Ibid., p. 23. 
38Ib 0 d 92 --2:_•. p. . 
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and sustain it only through a distribution of authority. 39 Indeed, in a 
way, 
Order in society comes from resolving conflicting 
claims to power. There are three basic modes of 
adjustment to those who seek to legitimize their 
power over us in the name of some principle of 
IJ 
social order. We may accept their commandments as 
our duty; we may doubt their commandments, in the 
hope that in doubt and inquiry we can overcome 
incongruity; or we may reject them. 40 
In each case the social order is built, for even in reJecting one leader's 
claims we by implication accept another's. 
But, just as language could operate against the best interests of 
the community, so can a leader become overzealous in pursuit of the "Social 
Order" and bring division to the surface. Much of comedy is a chiding of 
the excesses to which principles of order can be taken. When leaders at-
tempt too-strict enforcement of their view of order, part of tne community 
comes to see them in an almost comic light. And though we may laugn at 
the comic, we seldom entrust him with the substantial decisions involved 
in moving a society forward. Further, as part of the community sees the 
leader being over-zealous, another part will see him as an apt leader 
leading us on a path toward righteous principles. And when the two forces 
eventually come in conflict only disorder can result. Thus tne leader who 
pursues the covenant to the point of psychosis may end up destroying the 
principle he was hoping to protect. 
The third major element contributing to the social order is the 
"rule." It is only through rules, formal or informal, that we manage 
to create and sustain a social order. Without them, there would be no 
39Duncan, Communication Social Order, pp. 112-13. 
40nuncan, Symbols.!!!._ Society, PP• 61-2. 
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guidelines to recommend or limit action. Further, rules are made subject 
to agreement (again, formal or informal) by the memoers of a society and 
without such agreement among persons social order could not prevail. 41 
Previously we have considered the relationships oetween superiors 
and inferiors; through the concept of rule we come upon tne relationsnips 
among equals in a social order. Tne rules of a society apply equally, in 
theory, to all its members. The rulers may frame the laws, out once the 
laws are accepted by the populous they apply equally to the ruler and the 
ruled. 42 Often the social order becomes disrupted because those with 
power attempt to enforce rules unequally, exempting either themselves 
or a special interest group with whom they feel a sense of identity. 
Such unequal protection of the law brings forth some of the strongest 
forms of objection from the society, for the social order is totally 
dependent upon the equal application of rules. As Duncan argues, "rules 
and laws are powerful because we believe that all will obey rules whicn 
represent the 'consent' of the community. 1143 And when it becomes clear 
that some can get away with disobeying the rules, all the oasic asswnp-
tions that lead to social cohesion have been undermined. In Duncan's 
terms, 
Inferiors are obedient to the commandments of tneir 
superiors because of their belief that superiors 
uphold sacred principles of social order •••• Since 
the power of the leader depends on the sacredness of 
the covenant between him and his followers, whoever 
breaks the covenant undermines the sacred toundations 
of social order.44 
41Ibid., P• 30. 
42Ioid., p. 58. 
43lliid., p. 75. 
44Ibid., p. 76. 
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Whenever the "mystery" of the enforcer of rules--umpire, Judge, police~ 
man~ or dissertation adviser--vanishes, effective rule of law also 
disappears. 45 
Thus, language and leaders and rules can all play extremely important 
roles in the establishment and maintenance of social order. But each, in 
its own way, can also prove destructive of that wnich it seeks to promote. 
Language, because it is ambiguous, can allow misperceptions of the intent 
of persons and cause them to be branded, "incorrectly," as destroyers of 
order. Leaders who become psychotic in the enforcement of order can cause 
a general breakdown of order through a destruction of faith. And the rule 
itself, either because it has not received approval of the ruled or because 
it is prejudicially enforced, can contribute to aisorder. 
Disorder in a society implies that tne social structure is not 
meeting the expectations of the people. hence, social change to establish 
a re-ordered hierarchy is nearly inevitable--even if the change is a very 
minor one. Burke relates the need for social change to Veblen's concept 
of cultural lag: "In its simplest form, his doctrine is concemed ill.tn 
institutions which, developed as a way of adequately meeting past situa-
tions, become a menace insofar as the situation has changed. 1146 .But, as 
Duncan warns us, "Change is never easy, and, as we see in revolutions, 
often occurs only in open revolt. 114 7 Change can occur in a social order 
in either cooperative ways, in which all parties (or nearly all) partici-
pate in initiating and capping the change, or by way of "battle, 11 either 
45 Ibid., p. 91. -
46Kenneth Burke, Permanence Change (Indianapolis: The 
Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1965), p. 47. 
47ouncan, Symbols Society, p. 123. 
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1). • verbal. or physical.. In most societies change comes as a result of not-
! 
too-intense verbal. battle. Occasionally, when a truly significant issue 
a 
is at stake and when verbal battle cannot resolve differences to the 
hf . h . B ch d sat1 s action of all, change occurs wit open revolution. ut su ras-1--J 
tic measures are so destructive of the old order that the establishment of 
a new set of hierarchies may be more dissatisfying than was the old one. 
Basically, disorder results from a society's failure to provide a 
sanctioned means of passage from one social structure to another. We 
have seen this operating in our society in the past two decades. Blacks, 
finding that the negotiating table did not bring them equal protection 
within the social order began protest marches, sit-in demonstrations, and 
other such activiTies which were designed to focus attention on tneir 
needs. Other groups followed suit, including war and draft protesters, 
women's lib advocates, and members of the gay liberation front. These 
protests varied in intensity from quite peaceful activities to rock-
throwing debacles, but each was designed in its own way to confront the 
guardians of the social order in the ho~es of establishing new hierarchies. 
Orderly change can be and usually is achieved as a society provides 
"bridges from the old to the new11 in its eternal quest for a better social 
system. Indeed, "A social structu?"e exists ~passage from old to new, 
as well as in fixed principles of order.1148 But there are times when the 
lead.ers prove unaccessible to the masses, as when "a hierarchy becomes so 
stratified that inferiors cannot talk to superiors or must talk to tnem 
only through cold and distant intermediaries," leading to a loss of faith 
48Ibid., p. 53. 
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in the sanctioned mean~
1 
of enforcing the covenant. 49 As Duncan puts it, 
Bureaucratic officials may necome so concerned with 
the majesty of their command, and so ins.1.s tent on 
"going through channels" in communication, that they 
finally disappear as persons and we come to think of 
bureaucratic consensus as an impersonal process 
dependent upon i~gulations (which somehow breed 
themselves), not upon the will of human beings.~0 
And, when there are no upward channels of communication, 81no upward ways 
to transcendence, conflict can be solved only in violence,.n 51 
Order and disorder in society are ever-present. Order is a term 
for the covenants we have set and strive to honor; disorder represents 
our failure, either intentional or accidental, to live up to the standards 
set for society. Because of the constant interplay of order and disorder, 
change is inevitable. Change can be achieved quietly if the principles 
of social order are supplemented by a good system of vertical communica-
tion and by leaders who are representative of the will of the people--
leaders who are willing to provide even-handed enforcement of the rules 
by which society wishes to live. Lacking such leaders and such a ccmmuni-
cation network, change must take place in more disruptive ways. One task 
of a society must always be the development of leaders who are willing 
to develop good communication systems. For, in the view of Duncan, "If1 
we learn to face gaps and breakdowns in communication /by learning how 
to prevent them in the future/ . . . we may not need to fight. 11 52 
49Ibid., p. 83. 
50~09 p. 133., 
51Ibid., P• 132. 
52Ibid~ • P• 108. 
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CONCLUSlON 
The new rhetoric, grounded in the notion of identification, speaks 
directly to matters relating to the social order. In one view, it is a 
means of developing, maintaining, and/or changing the social order. In 
the title of one of Burke's books we can witness the aim of this socially 
grounded rhetoric: Towards !.. Better~-53 Rhetoric, through the work-
ings of identification among equals, superiors, and inferiors, "guides" 
us toward the social ideal of community consubstantiali ty. The language 
we use, the leaders we choose, and the rules we form all contribute to 
the pursuit of the better life. But each of these can also disrupt our 
orderly progress by bringing disorder into society. From the writings 
of Kenneth Burke and Hugh Duncan we can learn much about the ways in 
which human interaction can either promote social order and social growth 
or be a disruptive force blocking their achievement. The lessons these 
writers teach us are surely important if our society is to continue orderly 
progress toward consubstantiality--they may even be essential. For these 
writers can help us learn from the past errors of various societies how 
to avoid the violent upheavals, both verbal and physical, and how to 
respond constructively when social disruption inevitably begins. Our 
concern in this chapter has been with the ways in which rhetoric can 
promote social order. The ideas of Burke and Duncan give us at least a 
good start toward understanding this role of rhetoric. 
53Kenneth Burke, Towards a Better Life (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1966). - -
Chapter 9 
BALANCE THEORY AS GROUNDING FOR PERSUASION THEORY 
AND SUPPORT FOR "IDENTIFICATION" 
In the three previous chapters two basic rhetorical motives have 
been discussed. The larger of these motives, "identification," is the 
basis upon which the new rhetoric is judged to be different from and 
more encompassing than traditional rhetoric. And, the lesser of these 
motives, "persuasion,"--the key term of traditional rhetoric--is still 
considered to be a viable rhetorical motive in the new rhetoric. In 
this chapter we will examine both of these motives in light of the find-
ings of one adjunct of symbolic 1.nteractionism, balance theory. 
This approach has grown out of the claim found at several points 
in this study that persons operate as individual loci of motives and 
individual interpreters of reaU ty. Coupled with tnis, in Chapter Seven, 
was the view that individuals develop personalized grammatical forms--
a sort of vtindividualized" rnetorical logic. These forms are primarily 
responsible for guiding human thought processes. So, in this cnapter we 
will explore, first, one specific development of these forms--balance 
theory. Then balance theory will be examined as a oasis for the study 
of the persuasion motive. Finally, Kenneth Burke's notion of identifi-
cation as a primary human motive will be tested agai11st the balance 
theory literature. 
In!, Theory of Personality George Kelly posits a theory of con-




corollaries. His "organization corollary" asserts that "Each person 
characteristically evolves, for his convenience in anticipating events, 
a construction SY,stem embracing ordinal relationships between constructs."1 
Fritz Heider began the development of a theory which suggests a specific 
way in which such cognitive and affective organization is carried out. 
His work, culminating in .!!'!!. Psychology .2f. Interpersonal Relations in 
1958 lays the groundwork for balance theory. 2 This theory suggests, in 
particular, that persons organize their thoughts and oeliefs into coherent 
and consistent patterns. It is through these patterns that man views nis 
world and reacts to it. 
BALANCE THEORY: AN ADJUNCT TO SYMBOLIC Il-lTERACTION 
One may approach balance• theory from several paths. Originally, in 
Heider' s formulation, it was intended as a theory of personality designed 
to "get at" the way man views and adjusts to his perceptual world. Our 
concern, though, is more limited--balance theory is here being primarily 
considered as a critical and analytic tool, as well as a theoretical 
g;rounding, for persuasion theory. Thus, we are concerned with under-
standing the way man adjusts to his perceptual world in situations that 
allow persuasive attempts of one sort or another. 
Heider's original development of balance theory concerned itself 
with both two and three element relationships. The three element set, 
or triad, was made up of "p" (perceiver), "o" (other person) 1 and "x" 
(a nonpersonal entity). The relationships among elements can either be 
1George Kelley, !!_ Theory of Personality (New York: W. w. 
Norton and Company, Inc., 1963), p. 56. 
2rri tz Heider, ..'.!h!. Psychology of Interpersonal Relations 
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1958). 
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positive (designated by a+ or a solid line) or negative (designated by 
a - or a broke~ line). There are eight possible combinationsu of positive 
and negative relationships among the elements of0 the triad. In Heider's 
view, which is illustrated in Figure 1, each triad either had to be 
balanced or unbalanced. For him, balance exists whenever all three 
Figure l 



















relations are positive or when two relations are negative. Sets are un-
balanced when they contain an odd number of negative relationships. 3 
The fundamental assumption made by Heider, and by all balance 
theorists, is that states of balance are preferred to states of un-
balance; therefore, when unoalance exists in a person's perceptual fiele1 
tension is produced which generates forces to restore balance. Heider's 
central thought here is summarized by Rosenberg and Abelson: 
Heider' s approach to this problem is based upon 
the principle that the sentiment (affect) char-
acterizing one's response to a person will tend 
toward "balanced" relations with the sentiment 
3This explication of the basic Heider model is drawn from 
Heider, Interpersonal Relations and David C. Glass, "Tneories of 
Consistency and the Study of Personality , 11 Handbook of Personality 
Theory~ Research, eds. Edgar Borgatta and WilliamLambert 
{Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1968), PP• 788-97. 
characterizing one's response toward some object 
with which the person is perceived to be related. 4 
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This basic Heider model stimulated a great deal of research, much 
of wnich was aimed at refining the system. Experimenters soon began to 
conclude that the system was too vague in its predictions to be fully 
useful.. In one attempt to improve upon the Heider model. Cartwright and 
Harary devised a system which allowed the baslc set of relations to be 
expanded past three elements to basically any number of interconnected 
elements. Their model suggested that it was possible to assess the de-
gree of balance in any cognitive (or affective) set oy noting the number 
of positive and negative cycles operating within it. 5 In effect, this 
increased the predictive power of balance tneory to include more tnan 
the basic three element relationships and it provided a system for 
measuring "rough" degrees of balance--somewhat more sophisticated tnan 
Heider's comparatively simple notion that triads are either balanced or 
unbalanced. A further refinement of the same nature was made by 
Morrissette. Starting with the notion of degrees of balance he devised 
a method for testing the tension for change that is produced by varying 
the degrees of balance. Specifically, be concluded that " { a) The magni-
tude of force toward balance is inversely related to the degree of 
balance of the system; (b) The magnitude of tension for change that is 
created by a system is inversely related to the degree of balance of 
4Milton J. Rosenberg and Robert P. A.oelson, "An Analysis of 
Cognitive Balancing," Attitude Organization Change, eds. 
Rosenberg, Carl hovland, et al (New Haven: Yale University 
Press,- 1960), p. 113. 
5Dorwin Cartwright and Frank Harary, "Structural Balance: 
A Generalization of Heider's Theory," Psychological Review, 63 
(September, 1956), pp. 277-93. 
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that system. 116 Thus, these two basic revisions of balance theory add 
to Heider's basic system the ability to measure degrees of balance and 
tension for change in the various degrees of balance and unbalance. The 
work of Feather7 and Wiest8 has further refined the predictive capacity 
of the basic balance model. 9 
But these models are not the ones with which I am primarily con-
cemed. In this group only the Feather system has direct application to 
persuasion and it has not been sufficiently tested and developed to allow 
for the types of predictions that are necessary for a theory of persuasion. 
Rather, we should focus our attention upon the balance model seit forth by 
Theodore Newcomb. Over a period of years Newcomb has made basic changes 
in the Heider model which make it more directly applicable to persuasion. 
In addition, he and other experimenters have refined the predictive capa-
city of the model to the point that, as I shall contend later in the 
chapter, we can draw some rather specific implications for persuasion. 
6Julian o. Morrissette, "An Experimental Study of the Theory of 
Structural Balance," Human Relations, 11 (August, 1958), p. 253. Note 
that this statement leaves open the possibility tnat some tension 
can exist even in a state of balance. This conclusion is specifically 
drawn by Newcomb, as reported later in this chapter. 
7see N. T. Feather, "A Structural Balance Model of Communication 
Effects," Psychological Review, 71 (1964), pp. 291-313. This study 
is one of the very few that directly addresses itself to the outcome 
of intrapersonal commwiication efforts. 
8See w. M. Wiest, "A Quantitative Lxtension of Heider's Theory 
of Cognitive Balance Applied to Interpersonal Perception and Self-
Esteem," Psychological Monographs, 79 ( 1965), Whole No. 607. 
9A recent study investigating the Wiest and Feather models 
is Rodney Wellens and Donald Tbistlethwai te, "An Analysis of Two 
Quantitative Theories of Cognitive Balance," Psychological Review, 
78 (1971), pp. 141-50. 
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Newcomb's revisions of balance theory can usefully be broken into 
two thrusts, separated in time as well as content. In the 1950 1s Newcomb 
11 adapted1110 balance, moving away from Heider's interest in cognitive forma-
tions in one person toward an orientation emphasizing communication among 
people. 11 In this early expansion of balance theory Newcomb described tne 
simplest communicative act as one person transmitting information to another 
person about some obJect or event. Viewing the primary triad as a com-
municative relationship allows one to view the set from more than one 
angle, yet it allows the observer to asswne a phenomenological approach 
as did Heider in keeping the triadic relationship housed in tne mind of 
one of the two individuals involved in the act. Newcomb comments: "For 
some purposes the system may be regarded as a phenomenal one within the life 
space of A or B, or for other purposes as an 'objective' system including all 
the possible relationships as inferred trom A and B's behavior.•t12 Tne most 
important aspect of this early revision of balance theory, for current pur-
poses, is that it directly relates balance theory to persuasion. The basic 
assumption flowing from this approach is that in a communicative situation, 
individuals will attempt to "maintain simultaneous orientation toward one 
'f 
another as conununicators and toward objects of communication,"13 
10Theodore Newcomb, "An Approach to the Study of Communicative 
Acts," Readings in Attitude Theory and Measurement, ed. Martin 
Fishbein (New York: John Wiley and~ns, Inc., 1967), pp. 293-JOO. 
11.c;iass, "Theories of Consistency," pp. 794-5. 
12Newcomb, "Communicative Acts," p. 293. 
lJI.oid. -
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indicating in a way that the concept of the other is ever-present in the 
mind of the communicator. 
Far more important to persuasion theory, though, is tile later work of 
Newcomb which comes to a head in his comprehensive 1968 article. 14 Studies 
which he and a number of others conducted led him to the conclusion that 
there are tnree rather than two states of balance. Specifically, he argues 
that a triad may be either balanced, nonbalanced, or imbalanced: 
I regard a set of cognitions as imbalanced insofar 
as it instigates the cognizer toward modification of 
one or more relationships within the set. A cognitive 
set may fail to be clearly imbalanced in either of two 
ways. First, because it is unobjectionable as it 
stands, thus instigating acceptance; such a set is 
clearly balanced. Or, second, because it clearly 
invites neither modification !!.5!:. acceptance--whether 
by reason of indifference, uncertainty, or ambivilance. 
This latter kind of set, neither clearly balanced nor 
clearly imbalanced, I shall label nonbalanced; changes 
in one of its constituent relations might result in 
balance, imbalance, or continuing nonbalance. 15 
The eight possible triadic relations are presented in Newcomb's formula-
tion in Figure 2. Balanced states are those which fit Heider's definition 
Figure 2 






















P.-0 \ ,,, p-o '\ / 
X X 
14Theodore Newcomb , "Interpersonal Balance," Theo»ies of 
Cognitive Consistency: Sourcebook, eds. Robert P. Abelson, ~lliot 
Aronson, et al (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1968), pp. 28-51. 
15~. t p. 41. 
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of balance and have positive P-0 relationships. Imbalanced states are 
those which Heider would term unbalanced and which have positive P-0 
relationships. Nonbalanced states are those which have negative P-0 
relationships, regardless of how Heider would designate them. 
The earliest study to provide support for the three-state view was 
conducted by one of Heider's students. Jordan's study suggested that 
balanced situations are more pleasant than unbalanced ones. However, 
he reported that negative units were rated as unpleasant even when 
"balanced." Further, in the four sets tnat Heider calls balanced, 
positive units were found to be more pleasant than negative ones. 16 
Thus Glass argues, "It would appear that ratings of pleasantness are 
a function of balance plus positive relations between elements of a unit; 
unpleasantness is a function of imbalance -2!:negative relations between 
elements in the unit. 1117 At base, then, the data uncovered oy Jordan 
indicated that the simple "balanced-unbalanced" dichotany was too ambiguous, 
given that the various forms in which balance and unbalance are found can 
vary in pleasantness. 
Price, Harburg, and Newcomb removed some of the ambiguity that re-
mained even after Jordan's study. Basically, they found that the most 
uncomfortable of the negative relations was the negative P-0 relationship. 
The results of their study, summarized in Table l, indicate 
Current versions of balance theory predict neatly 
to findings when P-to-0 is positive; in each of the 
first four situations_L}:>ositive P-0 relations/ more 
than 80% of responses are as predicted, and neutral 
16see Nehemiah Jordan, "Behavioral Forces that are a Function of 
Attitudes and of Cognitive Organization," Human Relations, b (1953), 
pp. 273-87. 
17Glass, "Theories of Consistency," p. 795. 
responses do not significantly exceed expected fre-
quencies. When P-to-0 is negative, however, responses 
to only one of four situations are as predicted by 
Heider's formula ••• 18 
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Thus, these results indicate clear support for Heider's definitions of 
balance and unbalance when the P-0 relationship is positive, but not 
when it is negative. In this way they lend support to Newcomb' s more 
detailed three-state system. This study, however, substituted a tnird 
Table 1 
Sununary of Pleasantness Ratings19 
Ranse of Percent~es of 
All Scores 
All situations -
in which. . . Uneasi Neutral Pleasant 
P /0 Positive 
balanced 5-6% 6-7% 87-89% 
inbalanced 84-89% 0-8% a-11% 
P /0 Negative 
balanced 28-43% 22-39% 33-35% 
imbalanced 17-65% 15-38% 22-45% 
person, Q, for the usual nonpersonal entity--a substitution which could 
cause different results. Newcomb, however, reports two studies conducted 
by Rodrigues which show similar results using the more common nonpersonal 
entity. The results of these studies are summarized in Table 2 and 
Table 3. Table 2 is a "raw" presentation of unpleasantness scores, 
while Table 3 compares Newcomb's and Heider's systems in terms of mean 
l8Kendall o. Price, Ernest Harburg, and Theodore M. Newcomb, 
"Psychological Balance in Situations of Negative Interpersonal 
Attitudes," Journal 2!._ Personality~ Social Psychology, 3 
(1966), p. 267. 
19Newcomb, "Interpersonal Balance," p. 36. Newcomb is reporting 
this data from Price, Harburg, and Newcomb, ~-
19Y 
pleasantness ratings. All scores are taken from a scale ranging from 10 






















Mean Pleasantness Scores for Two 
Category Systems of Balance21 
Heider's triad mean modified 
category pattern score category 
mean mean label - +++ 20.2 27.4 positive 
balanced 42.2 +-- 34.7 balance 
--+ 59.7 
-+- 54.2 61.3 nonbal. 
64.6 
unbal. 64.3 -++ ob.6 




These studies clearly indicate support for Newcomb's non-balanced 
relation. In addition, when paired with the Price, Harburg, and Newcomb 
study they make the positive P-0 relationship generalizaole to situations 
in which the third element is either a personal or nonpersonal entity. 
20Ibid., P• 37. Newcomb is here reporting data uncovered by 
the Rodrigues studies at UCLA. 
21Ibid., P• 38. Newcomb is here reporting data uncovered by 
the Rodrigues studies at UCLA. 
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But our concern is with persuasion, and unpleasantness of relation-
ships may not be an accurate measure of susceptibility to appeal for 
change. Table 4 presents a more direct measure of susceptibility to 
persuasion in various balance s1. tuations, providing additional support 
for the three-state model. Table 4 is also taken by Newcomb from the 
Rodrigues studies. 
Taole 4 

























Thus, the material in tables 1 througn 4 indicates both in terms 
of the pleasantness individuals feel in the various "balance configura-
tions" and their willingness to change from these various sets that 
Newcomb's three-state balance system more closely represents the feelings 
that people have in various states of balance and imbalance. 
Other studies have provided the beginnings of some refinements which 
could be applied to this system. As described to this point, the Newcomb 
system does not clearly take into account such potentially significant 
matters as the importance of a given relationship to the perceiving in-
dividual and the strength of a given bond between two elements. Price, 
Harburg, and McLeod reported studies in 1965 in which subjects,rated the 
22Ibid. , p. 39. Newcomb is here reporting data uncovered ny 
--s---the Rodrigues studies at UCLA. 
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intensity of the three relationships involved in balanced and imbalanced 
triads. They concluded that it was possible to measure the unpleasantness 
of various balanced and imbalanced states in terms of the intensity of the 
l . h" . 1 d 23 re ations ips invo ve. These studies, however, were conducted using 
the earlier Newcomb version of balance theory, the A-B-X system. Tnougn 
we might speculate that similar results could be expected if the ~-0-A 
system were used, we cannot be certain. However, Rodrigues reported a 
study in 1965 which used the more standard P-0-X system that more clearly 
holds to the phenomenological approach. He foW'ld, first, that the impor-
tance the perceiver attributes to X "is related to the amount of tension 
generated by imbalanced triads." Further, he indicates, "the greater the 
number of strong bonds in an imbalanced triad, the greater the tension 
generated by it. n 24 Such studies need to be followed up in detail. For 
example, which of the three relationships will generate pressures for change 
under specific varying degrees of importance place upon both A and the 
three relationships. But these studies do indicate with some degree of 
clarify that such investigations are possible and that it is possible 
to make over more specific predictions based upon Newcomb's model. 
BALANCE THEORY, ATTITUDE CHANGI., AND PERSUASION 
Newcomb's version of balance theory has been developed in a more 
complete manner than has thus far been suggested, as will become clear 
within the next few pages. But we now have enough of the basic theory 
23 Kendall o. Price, Ernest Harburg, and Jack M. McLeod, "Positive 
and Negative Affect as a Function of Perceived Discrepancy in ABX 
Situations," Human Relations, 18 (1965), pp. 97-8. 
24Aroldo Rodrigues, "On the Differential Effects of Some 
Parameters of Balance,"~ Journal of Psycnology, 61 (1965), P• 249. 
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before us to begin an investigation of its implications for persuasion. 
In this section primary emphasis will be placed upon drawing several 
implications from balance studies which can help the student of persua-
sion better understand how the problem of changing human attitudes might 
be approached. We are here concerned, then, with pers uasion--the primary 
motive of traditional rhetoric and a viable secondary motive in the new 
rhetoric. 
To begin at the most basic level, a rough set of implications re-
garding persuasion and attitude change can be deduced from the data now 
before us. At base, the persuader's task is easiest when he works with 
an audience25 which is in a state of imbalance his message can relieve. 
Next in line, of course, would be the states of non-balance followed by 
the balanced perceptions. Colburn argues that the function of a persua-
sive speech is twofold: first, the persuader needs to arouse a state of 
psychological imbalance in the audience; after that he would attempt to 
offer recommendations which will restore balance. 26 In the case of im-
balanced situations, the task of the persuader is simplified in that the 
imbalance already exists. At most, the persuader might be expected to 
make the audience cognizant of the psychological tension. ~ut in the 
other two states, the persuader must not just oring existing imbalance 
to the surface; in many cases he must create the imbalance from what the 
25Audience is taken to mean,tnroughout this chapter, one or 
more persons addressed by a speaker. Further, in certain cases, 
audience may refer to the self, as in the internal dialog of the 
"I" and the "me." 
26c. William Colburn, "Fear Arousing Appeals," Speech Communication: 
Analysis Readings, eds. Howard H. Martin and 1'enneth E. Anderson 
(Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1968), PP• 214-23. 
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audience perceives as a relatively "pleasant" state. 
Because of the apparent difficulty of persuading an audience that 
has a balanced set of cognitions, perhaps a direct discussion of this 
persuasive task is in order. Roughly speaking, depending upon the 
specific situation, the persuader could go either of two directions in 
addressing an audience of this type. First, he could move to strengthen 
their balanced state. Table 2 indicates that even in the most pleasant 
of the eight triadic relationships, there is still some uneasiness. ~y 
implication, it would be possible to make the Donds stronger and thus 
make the balanced position more resistant to change. It, nowever, the 
persuader's goal lies in a direction opposite the balanced leanings of 
the audience, he must begin his task by changing at least one relation-
ship: he must induce some degree of imbalance. As Table 3 indicates, 
this is a most difficult task; the balanced states appear quite resistant 
to change. Then, after creating psychological imoalance he must restore 
balance by changing yet another of the relationships between elements of 
the triad. The end product, of course, must be a different triadic re-
lationship than was found in the original situation. 
First, then, we can rank-order the three balance states in terms of 
their usefulness to the persuader as imbalanced, nonnalanced, and balanced. 
It is possible, however, to further .oreak down the nonbalancea relation-
ships in terms of their utility to the persuader. Those nonbalanced 
relationships which Heider termed unbalanced ( --- and-++) show nigner 
willingness to change scores in Table 3, and thus, could be expected to 
be more susceptible to persuasive appeals than woula the other two non-
balanced situations. 
A final breakdown which can be made on this relatively wirefine~ 
204 
level is a rank-ordering of each of the triadic relationships. Notice, 
though, that data is not available for each of the eight sign patterns in 
terms of change scores; we must settle for the pleasantness scores which are 
not as directly relevant to claims about attitude change. Taole 2 suggests 
that the most susceptible-to-change pattern (given the previous assumptions 
about the rank-order of imbalance, nonbalance, and balance) is +-+. The 
others, in order, should be++-,-++,---,--+,-+-,+--, and+++. 
Until now I have concentrated on predictions about which of tne triadic 
relationships can be most easily approached by a persuader. however, it is 
important that the persuader understand which of the three relationships 
(that between the perceiver and the other, between the perceiver and the 
object, or the perceived relationship between the otner and the object) is 
most susceptible to change in given situations. Table 5 provides tne data 
for these predictions. 
Table 5 
Mean Scores of willingness 
to Change Signs of Intra-Structure Relations27 
Positive Sign Negative Sign 
Structural Sign Presented Presented Mean for 
ProEerties Pattern P/0 P/X 0/X .tlQ. EL! 0/X Siin Pattern Heider-bal. +++ 21.a 20.s 21.1 
Newcomb-bal. 2b.l 
P/X--0/X agree +-- 24.2 35.8 2t>.3 
Heider-bal. --+ 37.7 39.7 34.3 
Newcomb-nonbal. 38.0 
P/X--0/X disag. -+- 22.7 43.4 50.5 
Heider-unbal. 48.7 38.4 33.3 
Newcomb-nonbal. 40.7 
P/X--0/X agree -++ 27.6 42.4 54.1 
Heider-unbal. ++- 35.4 31.3 71.5 
Newcomb-imbal. 47.0 
P/X--0/X disag. +-+ 32.7 59.6 51.6 
Mean 28.525.546:a 46.545:o4574 
27Newcomb, "Interpersonal Balance," p. 43. Newcomb is here reporting 
data uncovered by the Rodrigues studies at UCLA. 
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Several pages could be consumed relating the many "iffy" statements 
that could be drawn from this data. On the broadest level, as is inoicated 
by the mean scores at the bottom of the table, there is a greater willing-
ness to change a negative sign than a positive one--a factor oalance 
theorists refer to as positivity force. Among these mean scores, greatest 
willingness to change is found in the negative P-0 relationship, followed 
by the negative 0-X sign, the positive 0-X, and so on. RegardLng indi-
vidual signs in particular triadic relations, the most susceptible sign 
is the negative 0-X sign in the unbalanced (Newcomb) triad. Presumably 
this is the point at which the persuader would find it most likely that 
he could induce change. Furthermore, the changing of this one sign in 
the ++- triad would make the triad a +++, the most pleasant balanced 
state and the most resistant to change (hence, most resistant to counter-
persuasion). Other conclusions which can be drawn fran this data include: 
(1) When P-0 relationships and P-X relationships are positive (especially 
in oalanced situations) there is little willingness to change them; 
(2) Willingness to change the perceived 0-X relationship is high in all 
situations, primarily because it is the one relationship that does not 
represent P's own attitude; and (3) There is a rather high willingness to 
change a negative P-0 in unbalanced situations. 28 Put in terms more 
familiar to students of persuasion, (1) It is quite difficult to get a 
person to change a positive personally held evaluation or attitude; (2) 
It is relatively easy to get a person to change his understanding of 
another person's opinions; and (3) It is relatively easy to get a person 
to change an unfavorable evaluation of another person. The persuader is 
28rb~d., 42 3 ... pp. - • 
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more likely to achieve success in these and other instances if he can 
deal. with those relationships which are most susceptible to change and 
avoid those which are least open to modification. 
Further refinement of these conclusions, in terms of the stren6tn 
of the various relationships in given patterns, is possible. The data 
in Table 6 allows us to draw a few conclusions along these lines. 
Specifically, we can conclude that there is relatively little willingness 
Table 6 
Mean Ratings of Dissatisfaction Under Va~~ng 
Conditions of P's Attraction Toward 0 
Un~leasantness Willininess Chanie 
weak stron~ weak stron& 
P/0 Positive -
balanced 34.3 22.5 30.7 17.3 
imbalanced 61.5 73.l 47.8 45.8 
differences -277i -'s"o.6 -rT:7 -28.5 
P /0 Negative 
balanced 58.9 64.5 43.6 31.7 
imbalanced 45.5 54.4 31.8 36.7 
differences +Ta:ii'.' +Io.T +1.'2':2 -5.0 
to change when P has a strong attraction for O in a balanced situation. 
Greatest willingness to change is found when a situation is imbalanced 
and the attraction of P to O is weak. And, again, a rough rank-ordering 
of the susceptibility to attitude change througn persuasion in the various 
situations included in this data is possible. These results are less 
specific than the results of Price, Harburg, and McLeod, but do address 
the issue of attitude change--which the latter did not directly attempt. 
Further, the data in Table 6 is supported by a study conducted by 
291bid., p. 45. Newcomb is here reporting data uncovered by the 
Rodrigues'studies at UCLA. 
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Hershkowitz 30 which considers not only the strength of the P/0 relation, 
but al.so that of the P/X relation. 
Over the past few pages, two issues involved in balance studies of 
pleasantness and willingness to change have been touched upon• but de-
serve more direct mention: positivity and agreement. The balance theor-
ists posit, as their basic assumption, that persons will tend to prefer 
states of balance to states of imbalance. As a corollary to this they 
maintain that if an individual senses he is in an imbalanced state he 
may feel tensions leading him to change some relation so as to achieve 
psychological balance. However, some of the data in Table 5 do not fully 
support this conclusion. In some instances individuals have showed a pre-
ference for positivity or agreement rather than Dalance. For example, in 
the--+ triad, whicn Newcomb calls norwalanced, the greatest willingness 
to change was found in the P-0 (negative) relationship. Such a change 
would create a +-+ tr1.ad, which is a clearly imbalanced one. A change 
of either of the other two signs would have proauced a more pleasant, 
nonbalanced triad which would be more in concert with the central tenet 
of the balance theorists. Rodrigues, in a study reported in 1967, found 
that "willingness to cnange the P/0 bond is • clearly determined by 
. • • f u3l . . 5 h . . . positivity orces. Notice that in Ta.ole t ere is a low willingness 
to change a positive P-0 relationship even when such a chanse might reduce 
tension by changing an imbalanced triad to a nonbalanced one. Further, 
there is a high willingness to change negative P-0 links even when acing 
so will create a state of clear imoalance. 
30lbid., p. 46. 
31Aroldo Rodrigues, "Effects of .Balance, Posi ti vi ty, and Agreement 
in Triadic Social Relations," Journal Personality and Social Psychology, 
5 (1967), p. 472. 
208 
In other instances , there is a clear preference to change a sign 
in order to get P-X, 0-X agreement. Rodrigues maintains that willingness 
to change the 0-X bond is often dictated by agreement forces. 32 Notice, 
again, in Table 5 that willingness to change the 0-X link is closely as-
sociated with whether such a change would create agreement or disagreement 
with the P-X sign. 
These apparent exceptions to the basic notion of balance theory, 
though, do not invalidate the theory. Often changes designed to bring 
agreement also bring the individual "closer" to bal.ance. For example, in 
the++- imbalanced situation, greatest willingness to change is found in 
the 0-X bond and a change there would also produce the strongest type of 
balanced set. Further, as I will argue in the final section of this 
chapter, it is possible to conceptualize positivity and agreement forces 
as "offshoots" of balance forces if we recall that for the symbolic inter-
actionist "identification" is the basic human motive. 
To this point I have concentrated on presenting predictive conclu-
sions, both general and specific, regarding the situations most likely to 
be open to change through persuasive appeal. Now I shall investigate 
balance theory as a basis for persuasion theory through three of the 
central issues in persuasion: source credibility, general persuasibility, 
and innoculation. As this inquiry progresses, however, it is necessary 
that the reader be cognizant of the fact that tne data being investigated 
has no~ been directly addressed to these issues. Rather, any conclusions 
drawn are speculations or, put in a more positive sense, inferences .oased 
upon seemingly reasonable extensions of the available raw data. To the 
32Ibid. -
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best of nry knowledge, no studies have been conducted from tne viewpoint 
of balance theory which have directly addressed the importance of tne 
source in persuasive attempts, the general persuasibility of indiviauals, 
or tne need for innoculation against counter-persuasion. Put another way, 
persuasion has not been the primary interest of the balance tneorists, 
and those for whom persuasion has been a primary interest have not yet 
explored their subject via balance theory. In a way, then, the next few 
pages are aimed more at exploring the possibilities that balance theory 
holds for predictions regarding these three central issues than at draw-
ing conclusions about the issues. 
Perhaps the most central, or at least the most often discussed, 
issue in persuasion is source credibility. To cast source credibility 
in balance terminology, we are here concerned with the relative importance 
of the influence one person can cast upon another person in a communica-
tive situation. According to the data presented in this chapter the P-0 
bond, or tne relationship between the two persons in a triad, is the most 
important of the three relationships. First, it is this relationsnip 
which determines whether a situation is capaole of balance or is non-
balanced. Second, the theory suggests that in cases where tne P-0 bond 
is positive, other elements in the triad are more likely to change. In 
the two cases of imbalance, the simplest route to balance involves chang-
ing either, in one case, a negative 0-X or, in the other case, a negative 
P-X link. In both cases the influence of tne P-0 bond is the dominant 
one, possibly even casting its influence on the negative element in an 
amount sufficient to assist change. Further, in both ot tnese imbalanced 
relations, it would be possible to change the other positive sign 
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(P-X or 0-X) and restore balance. Third, we can term the P-0 relation-
ship "dominant" in that it is the nardest to change, in most cases, when 
a positive bond exists and it is the most likely to change when the oond 
is negative. At any rate, balance theory asserts--wi th some rather power-
ful evidence at hand--that the strongest type of relationship is one 
between persons. 
As for the specific matter of whether this strong bond between persons 
operates as a "form of proof" (ethos) in persuasive situations, two com-
ments seem in order: First, none of the data seems to clearly disagree 
with the strong conclusions of Hovland33 and others working from perspec-
tives other than balance theory that the source of a commwiication is, at 
least in the snort run, important in producing attitude change. Second, 
there is a clear need for expansion of balance studies to measure actual 
attempts at persuasion involving, in the current instance, the use of 
high and low credible sources. Roughly speaking such studies might take 
up where the current studies have left off. we now have strong informa-
tion relative to the pleasantness and willingness to cnange involved in 
each of the eight triadic relationships. Studies designed to present 
these situations to subjects, followed oy persuasive a~peals from difterent 
types of sources could test the ability of sources to influence indivi-
duals to make the changes which we now claim they are either relatively 
willing or relatively unwilling to make. 
In swn, specific conclusions aoout the power of sources to influence 
change in oalanced, nonbalanced, and imbalanced situations cannot .be 
33see Carl I. Hovland, Irving L. Janis, and Harold H. Kelley, 
Communication and Persuasion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), 
pp. 19-55. -
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drawn because the data simply is not available. But the clear importance 
of the "interpersonal" relationship involved in the P-0 bond at least 
suggests that balance theory provides a rich grounding for studies search-
ing for such data. 
A second issue in persuasion theory is general persuasibility. I 
have not found sufficient clear evidence to support any specific conclu-
sions about general persuasibility. However, there is enough evidence 
to suggest at least two intriguing possibilities. 
First, there is evidence to suggest that in even the most balanced 
state individuals are still susceptible to change. Though the levels of 
unpleasantness and willingness to change are low in the clearly balanced 
relationships, some tension for change still exists. This does not 
argue that individuals are, in all circumstances, fully open to persua-
sion; neither does it deny it. Rather, it suggests that the possibility 
of persuasion exists in even the most "comfortable" arrangement. 
Second, it is probable that balance theory would replace the concept 
of persuasibility with a notion of the "level of tension" that one can 
withstand before seeking to restore balance. Direct support for this 
statement can be found even in Newcomb's basic three-state view of 
balance. His argument, rephrased to the current concern, would be that 
although nonbalanced situations produce some unpleasantness and develop 
some willingness to change, they are still cnaracterized by ambivalence. 
In other words, in nonbalanced situations, generally, the tension produced 
is not quite sufficient to motivate a subject to actively seek change. 
One prediction along this line might be that in nonbalanced situations, 
if the persuader can develop a strong enough relationship between certain 
elements in the triad he will be able to create tension strong enough to 
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motivate change. Much more research is needed to determine the "thresh-
old of tension" which different people can withstand in different situa-
tions before any concept resembling general persuasibility canoe fully 
developed in a balance approach to persuasion. 
A third issue of some importance in persuasion concerns counter-
persuasion and the innoculation of an audience against it. Viewed from 
the standpoint of balance theory, perhaps the strongest means of innocula-
tion is the estaolishment of firm relationships (and intense ones) in a 
balanced set of cognitions. If the persuader can leave the audience in a 
balanced condition, particularly one involving three positive relations, 
they will themselves tend to ward off later attempts to change their 
attitudes. Table 5 makes the point clear: balanced relationships spur 
very little willingness to change. Other data indicate, further, that 
balanced relationships are quite pleasant. These two ideas should com-
bine to indicate that a balanced set of cognitions will not only fail to 
respond quickly to appeals for change, but should actually put up a good 
deal of resistance to such appeals. 
Persuasion texts are full of arguments noting that persuasive cam-
paigns, rather than single speeches, are capable of bringing lasting 
change in a person's belief systems. One of the persuasive situations 
discussed earlier in this chapter involves the persuader who finds his 
audience's cognitions balanced and who, if he is to achieve his goal, 
must first induce some sort of imbalance into them. This in itself is 
no easy task, for the balanced relationships will resist cnange. Quite 
probably, a long campaign is needed to bring about such imbalance. The 
task of this campaign is made more difficult, from the standpoint of 
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balance theory, because after each of the separate messages in the 
campaign the individual is quite susceptible to counter-appeals whicn 
will restore his earlier state of balance. On the other hand, if the 
persuasive campaign can succeed in bringing a person's cognitions into 
a new balance the danger of a counter-campaign re-changing the person's 
attitude will be fairly small. 
From this we can conclude, at least tentatively, tnat if the per-
suader succeeds in establishing balance, no specific innoculation is 
really required. The balanced attitudes will protect tnemselves from 
change. If, however, the persuader has to leave an audience in a state 
of imbalance at some point in a persuasive campaign, a good deal of 
innoculation against counter-persuasion is called for. 
In sum, then, several specific predictions can be drawn from balance 
literature which can be of aid to the persuader--predictions regarding 
the conditions under which most people will be willing to change atti-
tudes and which attitudes they will be most willing to change. On the 
other hand, not enough research has been conducted specifically aimed 
at tying balance theory to persuasion to allow us to generalize to such 
relatively important issues as the influence of the source and the general 
persuasibili ty of all people. Despite this it appears tnat balance theory 
can provide a rich basis for the study of persuasion. It is, however, 
up to the students of persuasion to make the yet needed linkages by 
undertaking the types of studies which will reveal the now missing 
information. 
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BALANCE THEORY AS SUPPORT FOR BURKEIAN "IDENTIFICATION" 
The balance theorists' claim that individuals primarily attempt to 
maintain balance in their cognitive systems seems, in a way, to represent 
a claim that balance is the primary human motive. On the other hand, the 
position taken in an earlier chapter of this thesis argued that identifi-
cation was the primary human motive. Thus balance theory and symbolic 
interaction seem to be in conflict regarding the primary force motivating 
human action. The conflict, I feel, is more apparent than real. The 
assumption of balance as a basic motive was an early claim made by Heider, 
and much more recent literature has undermined that claim. Now the balance 
studies seem to suggest that in different conditions either balance, posi-
tivity, or agreement forces may be the primary motivators of action. On 
the other hand, it is possible to speculate that these three forces are 
part of a larger system whicn Bur.Ke terms "identification." In this 
section, then, I shall explore the nature of these three forces with the 
possibility in mind that each, in its own way, may help the individual 
to further his basic goal of identification. 
In Chapter 6 identification was discussed in its two functions: 
First, it was termed the prime rhetorical motive in that man seeks to 
constantly "identify" with other men; second, it was termed a means of 
achieving "identification" with other men in that "smaller" identifi-
cations can be used as the basis for appeals designed to create oroader 
identifications. In Chapter 8 we additionally considered the notion 
that identification, through the operations of heriarcnic integration, 
provided the basic mechanism for social order. In the pages that follow 
support will be sought for identification considered both in the broad 
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and narrow senses. 
At least two sets of data from balance literature lend general sup-
port to the centrality of identification: the importance of the P-0 
bond and the findings of preferences for positivity in certain circumstances. 
In all the data reviewed in this chapter, the importance of the P-0 
relationship has been clear. When P-0 is positive it is an extremely dif-
ficult bond to change. This in itself argues for a general notion of 
identification, in that it indicates that individuals prefer to be in 
positive contact with one another. Basically, the positive nature of 
the P-0 linkage indicates that people prefer, positive interpersonal re-
lationships. This is much like tne notion of integrative social order 
through interpersonal identification. Further, the high degree of un-
pleasantness and willingness to change negative P-0 relationships provides 
additional support for this assumption. 
Second, there is a fairly clear preference for positivity over nega-
tivity in all of the triadic relationships. In only a few instances 
reported in Table 5, for example, is the highest willingness to change 
found in what was originally a positive linkage of elements. The only 
contradictory instance is found in the +-+ imbalanced set. -In this case 
the positive 0-X bond seems to be the most susceptible to change. And, 
in this case it would appear that positivity is being set aside for agree-
.1 
ment (the change of this sign would bring P-X and 0-X into agreement), 
a move which we will momentarily see can also provide support for a more 
particular notion of identification. Now, how does positivity argue for 
the concept of identification? Basically, identification implies together-
ness or• at least, a feeling for the views of another person who may not 
hold views similar to one's own. But more important, identification is 
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grounded in the concept of substance34 which Burke often develops in 
terms of property "ownership. 1135 We have already noticed how positivity 
in tne P-0 relationship implies the former concept of identification. 
Positivity in the P-X bond should "automatically" link to the property-
substance notion of identification in that the P-X oond is a link between 
a person and a non-personal entity. This leaves the 0-X oond to be ex-
plained in relation to consubstantiality. In one instance(+-+) there 
is relatively high willingness to change the 0-X to a negative linkage. 
In terms of a given individual's desire for identification with "property" 
we must remember that the 0-X relationship does not involve the perceiver's 
relationship to X at all. Ratner, it involves the perceiver's view of 
the other's link with X. Thus, this one exception to positivity in the 
0-X bond does not serve to refute an otherwise clear preference for posi-
tivity. On the other hand, the preference for positivity in the other 
seven 0-X linkages suggests that the perceiver may recognize in others 
the same desire for positive "property" linkages that he himself has. In 
these various ways, then, positivity lends at least strong inferential 
support for the primacy of identification as rhetorical motive. 
Agreement is a second force which seems to dictate individual pre-
ferences in certain situations. Basically, agreement refers to the 
34see Marie Hochmuth Nichols, Rhetoric and Criticism (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1967), pp. 85-90. Also see Kenneth 
Burke,!, Grammar of Motives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1969), pp. 29-35 and 43-58. 
35see Kenneth Burke, Attitudes Toward Histo~ (Boston: 
1961). Further, see Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives aerkeley: 
of Califomia Press, 1969), pp. 23-7. -
:Beacon Press, 
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presence of either positive P-X and 0-X relationships or negative ones 
in a given triad. Table 5 indicates that willingness to change either 
P-X or 0-X is relatively high in most situations in which the two are 
not in sign agreement. Such a change would bring about agreement, re-
sulting in lower willingness to change either of the then agreeing 
relationships. 
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Agreement forces can be profitably viewed as a desire for "external 
identification" (or, identification of feelings between two persons in 
regard to some "object"). Thus when there is a fairly stI'ong feeling of 
unpleasantness and a high willingness to change either the P-X or 0-X 
relationship in a non-agreeing configuration (e.g.,+-+), we can view 
the desire for a change as a desire to create a stronger social bond be-
tween two persons via their evaluation of a third element. 
Finally we come to the desire for balance itself, which manifests 
itself in other interpersonal situations. And, just as agreement forces 
were termed as forces calling for "external identification," balance 
forces can be termed forces toward "internal identification. 11 Most 
versions of balance theory, and Newcom1> 1s in particular, view a triadic 
relationship totally from the perspective of the perceiver. In other 
words, balance theory is concerned with how one individual's psycnological 
processes are internally organized. Thus when one is primarily concerned 
with achieving or maintaining a balanced set of cognitions, he is directly 
concerned with "setting his own house in order." Put in more .iiurkeian 
terms, he is seeking internal order, seeking to have his views relevant 
to a given object, event, or whatever be "substantially alike." Viewed 
this way, forces for balance can lend support to forces for "intemal 
identification. 11 Recalling that symbolic interaction theory includes 
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the intrapersonal. in the realm of rhetoric, it is clear that internal 
attempts at persuasion and identification take place. Thus wnen attempts 
to change certain Triadic relationships are conducted internally to achieve 
personal psychological balance we may say that intrapersonal rhetoric is 
at work. 
There are times, of course, when the need for internaJ. .balar,ce may 
cane in conflict with the need for external agreement or when positivity 
forces may outweigh both of these. Some work has oeen done by balance 
theorists to suggest when each of these forces will prevail: Rodrigues 
has concluded, for example, that willingness to change tne P-X .bond and 
willingness to differentiate feelings towara O is most strongly influenced 
by bal.ance forces , while willingness to change tne P-0 bona is primarily 
a function of positivity forces and change in the 0-X bond is primari~y 
accomplished through agreement forces. however, it is possible that none 
of these tnree forces mignt have a su~erior hand in some situations. In 
the--+ nonbalanced situation, for example, there is very little aiffer-
ence in willingness to change from one element to the next. In cases like 
these, presumably, the individual must make a decision as to whicn of 
the bonds is most J.mportant to him and his willingness to change one or 
more of them will probably be a function of tnat decision. 
At .oase, though, there is sufficient evidence to allow the drawing 
of some tentative implications regarding the relationship between balauce, 
positivity, and agreement forces and the Burkeian concept of identification. 
The occasional. strength of positivity and agreement factors has proved 
.bothersome at times to the balance theorists uecause it has graaually 
chipped away at the Heiderian notion that balance is the primary force 
regulating the construction of an individual's psychol.ogical. processes. 
If we consider each of these three forces to be aspects of a broader 
notion of identification in social actions, and there is adequate reason 
to at least begin considering such a view, we move from relatively indivi-
dually oriented questions of theoretical inconsistency to more rigorous 
questions of how the individual's psychological processes operate to 
bring social order to the arena of social action. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has been addressed to two basic questions. First, of 
what utility is the literature of oalance theory to the student of persua-
sion? And, second, when viewed from the standpoint of symbolic interaction 
is balance theory a self-contained study or is it a part of a larger 
theory of social action? 
Students of persuasion have been slow to grasp the probaole value of 
balance theory for their subject. As a result, very few (if any) studies 
have been attempted using the metnod of balance investigations to explore 
the ways in which attitudes are actually changed by external appeals. 
Rather, we can speculate about the applicability of balance theory to 
persuasion using literature which has been primarily aimed at perception 
theory. Based upon the available studies, however, it is possible to 
conclude that balance theory does imply several general and specific 
predictions of value to the study of persuasion. In fact, the data re-
viewed in this chapter (given that it was not originally aimed at answer-
ing the questions of the persuader) is so rich with implications for per-
suasion that I will register a strong recODDilendation to our field in 
general that studies using balance methodology be undertaken on a regular 
basis. Surely many questions that confront persuasion theory could be at 
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least partially answered by such investigations. 
And, balance theory can perhaps profit from association with the 
new rhetoric. In the final section of this chapter we found reason to 
bring balance tneory, along with its side-discoveries of positivity and 
agreement forces, under the larger symbolic interactionist heading of 
"identification." Such a linkage of the work of the cognitive psycholo-
gists and the "new rnetoricians" could help to broaden the scope and 
understanding of b,oth fields. 
Chapter 10 
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Thinking about starting points can not only help one 
see and understand the old and to judge it, but such 
thinking can suggest ways in which rhetoric might 
grow beyond its present state, and overcome its pre-
sent limits.l 
This study has been aimed at helping rhetoric to grow beyond the 
limitations of traditional theory. The germ for tnis version of "new 
rhetoric" has been lurking in the stacks of our libraries for years, 
some of it in use and some of it almost totally ignored. Kenneth .Burke's 
writings provided much of the original inspiration for the study--and his 
thinking nas been explored to a significant extent in our j oumals. nut 
the explications of Burke's ideas about rhetoric have largely been con-
fined to his Rhetoric of Motives and an occasional relevant article. ---------
This appears to me to be a very restricted view of the utility which 
Burke has for the rhetorical theorist. In effect, we have shown an in-
terest in Burke only to the point of discussing his conclusions. We nave 
largely ignored the ideas in his other works which are not specifically 
addressed to rhetoric and we have ignored the widerp1.nnings of his rhe-
torical theory. 
As a :result of this perceived inadequacy in the scholarship sur-
rounding Burke's new rhetoric, this study uas explored a fuller range 
1otis M. Walter, "On Views of Rhetoric, Whether Conservative or 
Progressive," Contemporary Theories Rhetoric: Selected Readings 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 27. 
221 
222 
of Burke's writings with hopes of filling in the foundations that lie 
behind his views of the rhetorical efforts of man. But BurKe himself 
leaves several questions not fully answered, and others he has answered 
without great clarity. Therefore, the writings of a group of theorists 
from psychology and sociology termed "symbolic interactionists" has been 
consulted to fill in the blank spaces and to better prepare the ground-
work for a full understanding of the type of rhetorical system that BurKe 
is discussing. 
Through Burke and the symbolic interactionists tne starting points 
for rhetorical theory based in symbolic interactionism have been explored. 
Johannesen I s basic questions served as the "research plan" for the study, 
and by now the answers to Johannesen's six philosophical questions shoula 
be fairly clear. Man is distinguished from all other beings because of his 
symbol-using capacities. Man is defined in terms of his language. He is 
so deeply groWlded in language that he is screened from objective reality 
by it. All that he sees and does, in terms of his social behavior, is 
mediated through his language. A rock has meaning to him only after he 
assigns that meaning--and he assigns meaning through his symbol system. 
He acts in response to things and events only as he defines them--through 
his language. His reasons for acting--his motives--are drastically af-
fected by his language. Man is ever defining all that goes on around 
him, and his definitions are screened through the language ne uses. Part 
One of this study systematically attacked the problem of explaining the 
starting points for a symbolically oriented theory of rhetoric. The 
conclusions drawn in those four chapters provide us witn a relatively 
clear widerstanding of the nature of man, the nature of language and 
meaning, reality and our knowledge of it, and the way in which ethics 
fits into man's total system of action. 
/ 
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In Part Two specific implications for rhetorical theory of the 
symbolic interactionists' views of man and society have .oeen drawn. Tnis 
theory is a much broader one than is the traditional theory based in 
Aristotle's Rhetoric. At base, it judges all pragmatically oriented 
symbol.icbehavior to be rhetorical. This means that all verbal ana non-
vernal symbolic behavior aimed at achieving "social goals" ( in a .broad 
sense) can be studied as rhetoric. Further, it more clearly moves us 
from tne arena of formal speaker-audience situation to both inter~ersonal 
and intrapersonal situations. The new rhetoric declares the primary rne-
torical motive of man to be "identification," a much broader motive than 
the "persuasion" of the traditional theory. The rhetorical theory being 
studied does not deny the efficacy of persuasion as a type of rhetorical 
motive, but it places primary emphasis upon the broader term, identifica-
tion. In line with the pragmatic orientation for rhetoric, and its ground-
ing in the motive of identification, rhetoric has also oeen seen to oe 
a strategic activity aimed at solving social problems. The oasic method 
of such a rhetoric requires tnat the "speaker" momentarily become one w1. th 
those whom he is addressing. He carries on an internal dialogue between 
himself and his internalized picture of the "other." In tnis dialogue he 
tests his ideas and plans his strategies so that his overt symbolic act 
may be more likely to achieve his desired goal. 
Finally, in the last two chapters, rhetoric was considered as a force 
operating in society. First, it was investigated in terms of the ways in 
which the primary rhetorical motive, identification, promotes the social 
order and the ways in which the division always present in our world-
both seeks to tear away at social order and provides the impetus for 
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hopefully progressive changes in that order. Second, one of the correla-
tive studies of the symbolic interactionists--balance theory--was investi-
gated. It was found to be a rich source of material for a theory of 
persuasion. This approach to persuasion, which is still a viaole motive 
in the new rhetoric, would emphasize the personalized ways that ina.i viduals 
look at and react to the world. Thus, it emphasizes the importance ot 
rhetoric as "addressed" symbolic behavior. Furtner, balance theory was 
found to be full of specific implications for the conditions under which 
,persuasion can most likely be accomplished. 
The perspective of the symoolic interactionists offers great promise 
for rhetorical theory. It is a broadly based theory which seeks to ex-
plain all human interaction which is symbolic in nature. Because rnetoric 
is primarily a social instrument, it can find a worthy counterpart in 
symbolic interaction theory. 
But much work remains to be done in the attempt to draw a full theory 
of rhetoric from the writings of these theorists. The current study has 
been concerned with only the most basic implications which can be drawn 
from symbolic interactionism. Several reconnnendations for further study 
and exploration seem in order. 
On the broadest level, the study of symbolic interaction needs 
to continue in order to more fully understand the nature of these social 
theories. As Just one example, role-taking and the "I"-"me" dialogue 
is one concept which holds tremendous promise for students of rhetoric. 
The symbolic interactionists have done far more with this concept than I 
have reported in these pages. We can prooably more fully understand the 
implications of the nature of rhetoric as "addressed" by taking a longer 
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and more critical look at the symbolic interaction studies of role-
taking. The same applies to their investigations of the social act, the 
all-pervasive nature of language, their concept of symbolic action, the 
nature of symbol-as-motive, and so on. In short, we need to taJCe a longer 
look at the work of these theorists if we are to take full advantage of 
the groundwork this perspective offers to rhetoric. 
In addition, work needs to proceed in devising theories of argumen-
tation and rhetorical criticism nased in this perspective. In recent 
years many writers have attacked the formal systems of argument wnich 
have .oeen relied upon by rhetoricians in the past. riowever, no fully 
adequate counter-theories seem to have emerged. Symbolic interaction 
theory would seem to support strongly any move against o.OJectively im-
posed formal systems of argument. Pernaps a sustained investigation of 
the literature of the symbolic interactionists would help to begin the 
construction of a more individually oriented theory of argument. 
This perspective also suggests a theory for rhetorical criticism 
much different from the critical method employed by traditional critics. 
Burke's pentad seems to be the key to such a system, as it appears to 
cover the full range of human symbolic interaction. In addition, the 
"correct" application of the pentad in criticism rejects the "cookie-
cutter" approach that has often prevailed in our journals. Ratner, each 
critical piece is tailored to the piece of discourse it investigates--
the methodology comes out of the situation under investigation. It is 
not yet clear, however, how one goes about devising such methodologies. 
Karlyn Kohrs Campbell's recent text2 attempts to explain this perspective 
2see chapters one through three of Karlyn Kohrs Campoell, Critiques 
_2t Contemporary Rhetoric (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing 
Company, Inc., 1972). 
226 
for the critic. And, it contains several excellent examples of "Burkeian 
criticism." But it is an initial thrust and cannot .be complete. Addi-
tional work to clarify this new critical angle is l.IIlperative. 
Finally, we need to more fully explore tne literature and methoaology 
of balance theory to discover more of its implications for the student of 
persuasion. The studies which now relate at all to persuasion werE:: wider-
taken from the standpoint of interpersonal perception and any attempt to 
draw l.IDplications for persuasion from these studies must fall a bit short 
of its goal. The balance theorists have not directly addressed persuasion 
because that is not their primary interest. The conclusions of tnis 
study, particularly as contained in Chapter Nine, do suggest that balance 
theory can provide a viable methodology for persuasion research. It is 
now up to students of persuasion to complete the task for themselves. 
Now that ten chapters have passed, it may appear that we are still 
drowning in a sea of data. I think not. Though the literature of tne 
symbolic interactionists is extensive--and much of it has .been considered 
in this study--it is unified by a consistent and emphatic view of man and 
language. Thus, while it is a broad theory it is also a close-knit theory 
and one which stands ready to do additional service as tne basis for a 
theory of rhetoric. 
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